Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: Some Empirical Studies by Stel, A.J. (André) van
  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SOME EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN: 90 5170 985 4 
 
Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a.d. Geul 
 
This book is no. 350 of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through 
cooperation between Thela Thesis and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books which 
already appeared in the series can be found in the back. 
The research has partly been funded by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
‘Programmaonderzoek MKB en Ondernemerschap’ (Research Program SMEs and 
Entrepreneurship). 
  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
SOME EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 
Ondernemerschap en economische groei 
enige empirische studies 
 
 
 
PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de 
rector magnificus 
Prof.dr. S.W.J. Lamberts 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
donderdag 10 maart 2005 om 16.00 uur 
 
door 
 
Adriaan Johannes van Stel 
geboren te Wissenkerke 
Promotiecommissie 
 
Promotoren:  Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik 
 Prof.dr. M.A. Carree 
 
Overige leden: Prof.dr. E.J. Bartelsman 
 Prof.dr. J.F. Francois 
 Prof.dr. L.I.E. Sleuwaegen 
 Preface 
This PhD thesis investigates the relation between entrepreneurship and economic 
growth. The origins of this book trace back to already some eight years ago. In 1997, 
when I was in the process of finishing my studies in econometrics at the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, I was provided the opportunity to write my Master thesis at the 
EIM Business and Policy Research in Zoetermeer. Marcel Lever acted as supervisor. 
After graduating I took part in a two year training programme in applied social sciences 
called ‘Research Trainee’. This involved following courses at the Tinbergen Institute 
while at the same time participating in research projects at EIM. The submission of a 
paper for the Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper series completed the training. My 
discussion paper investigated the relationship between entrepreneurship (business 
ownership) and economic growth. This paper became the beginning of this PhD 
research (see Chapter 2). In the last five years I worked on several studies on this topic 
which has resulted in the present book. For most of this period I carried out my research 
working at EIM. The last few months I have been finishing my PhD thesis at the Max 
Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems in Jena, Germany. 
Several people have been influential during my PhD research. Roy Thurik already acted 
as supervisor in my two years as Research Trainee. After this period he stimulated me 
to continue doing research on entrepreneurship and to write a PhD thesis. I benefitted 
from his suggestions and support throughout the years. He also stimulated me to work 
together with researchers outside of EIM. Martin Carree also helped me considerably 
during the years. On numerous occasions he advised me on issues of model building, 
econometric technicalities, and on several other problems that arose during my research. 
I learned a lot from him. Both Roy Thurik and Martin Carree contributed to several of 
the chapters in this thesis.  
During my time at EIM I was part of the department Strategic Research, led by Sander 
Wennekers. He supported me in a number of ways, for instance by commenting on draft 
versions of papers or by stimulating me to go to international conferences on behalf of 
EIM. He also contributed to one of the chapters in this thesis (Chapter 2). Besides 
Martin Carree, Roy Thurik and Sander Wennekers, four more persons have contributed 
to a chapter of my PhD thesis. They are David Audretsch, Bart Diephuis, Henry 
Nieuwenhuijsen and David Storey. I am also grateful to the members of my PhD 
committee for their useful comments and to the editors of the academic journals in 
which some of the chapters were published, for granting permission to use the articles 
for this book. Throughout the years several colleagues contributed to a pleasant working 
environment. Besides persons already mentioned, I especially remember Niels Bosma, 
Mickey Folkeringa, Frank Hindriks, Jan de Kok, Joris Meijaard, Kasper Nova, Viktor 
Stunnenberg, Martijn Torenvlied, Ingrid Verheul and Gerrit de Wit. During the 
graduation ceremony my brothers, Martin and Peter, will act as paranimphs. I appreciate 
their willingness to support me in this final stage of my PhD trajectory. 
Finally, I want to thank my parents for supporting me unconditionally. 
 
André van Stel 
Rotterdam, January 2005 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction, Overview and Conclusions 
The importance of entrepreneurship for achieving economic growth in contemporary 
economies is widely recognized, both by policy makers and economists. It is deeply 
embedded in the current European policy approach that the creativity and independence 
of entrepreneurs contribute to higher levels of economic activity. Indeed, according to 
the European Commission (2003, p. 9), “The challenge for the European Union is to 
identify the key factors for building a climate in which entrepreneurial initiative and 
business activities can thrive. Policy measures should seek to boost the Union’s levels 
of entrepreneurship, adopting the most appropriate approach for producing more 
entrepreneurs and for getting more firms to grow.” Audretsch (2003, p. 5) states that 
“Entrepreneurship has become the engine of economic and social development 
throughout the world.”  
The relation between entrepreneurship and economic growth is embedded in several 
strands of the economic literature. A first strand of literature involves the general 
understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in the modern economy. Seminal 
contributions were made by Schumpeter (1934), Knight (1921) and Kirzner (1973). 
These economists stress different aspects of the role of the entrepreneur. While 
Schumpeter stresses the innovating aspect, Knight stresses the risk assuming aspect. 
Kirzner, finally, stresses the role of the entrepreneur in leading markets to equilibrium. 
Acs (1992) discusses the contribution of small firms in modern economies. He claims 
that small firms play an important role in the economy as they are agents of change by 
their entrepreneurial activity, as they are a source of considerable innovative activity, as 
they stimulate industry evolution and as they create an important share of the newly 
generated jobs. The role of small firms and entrepreneurship in stimulating economic 
growth is complex, because various intermediate variables are at play. Examples of such 
variables are entry and exit of firms (competition), innovation and variety of supply. 
Economists have started to build theoretical frameworks which try to capture the role of 
the intermediate variables. An example of such a framework is provided by Thurik et al. 
(2002). 
A second strand of literature involves the mathematical modelling of economic growth. 
Although entrepreneurship played no role in the neoclassical growth model –which 
assumes that technological progress is exogenous– it does play a role in some of the 
more recent endogenous growth models. For instance, Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
introduce a model where firms invest resources in research to achieve a new product 
that makes the previous product obsolete. Firms are motivated by the prospect of 
monopoly rents once the innovation is patented. Economic growth and technological 
progress at the macro level are then endogenously determined by competition among 
firms (entrepreneurs) that generate innovations.  
A third strand involves the empirical modelling and measurement of the relation 
between entrepreneurship and economic growth. This thesis makes a contribution to this 
third strand of literature. The consequences of entrepreneurship, in terms of economic 
performance, have generated an extensive empirical literature (Carree and Thurik, 
2003). However, this literature has generally been restricted to two units of observation 
– that of the establishment or firm, and that of the region. Between these two units of 
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observation, studies at the regional level are in the minority. Noticeably absent are 
studies linking the impact of entrepreneurship on economic performance for the unit of 
observation of the country (Carree and Thurik, 2003, p. 437).1 We aim at extending the 
literature on the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth at the country and the 
regional level.  
The nature of this thesis is empirical. In seven out of the eight chapters in this book 
(apart from this introductory chapter), economic models are introduced and confronted 
with empirical data. Each chapter deals with a different aspect of the link between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. The common denominator, however, is that the 
relationships are investigated at either the country level (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8) or the 
regional level (Chapters 5 and 6). The final chapter of this book is devoted to EIM’s 
COMPENDIA data base (COMParative ENtrepreneurship Data for International 
Analysis), which attempts to harmonize data on business ownership across 23 OECD 
countries, from 1972 onwards. The construction of harmonized cross-country data bases 
on numbers of entrepreneurs is important as the limited availability of comparable 
cross-country data is actually one of the reasons why research at the country level has 
been lacking in empirical entrepreneurship literature. The COMPENDIA data base is 
also used for the analysis in Chapter 2. 
Besides the focus on countries and regions, this thesis contributes to the literature in at 
least four ways. First, while most studies model a linear relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth, this book introduces the notion of an ‘optimal’ 
industry structure, operationalized either in terms of the number of business owners or 
in terms of the small-firm share in value-of-shipments. The concept of an optimal level 
implies that the number of entrepreneurs in an economy can either be too low or too 
high. We provide empirical evidence for the existence of an ‘optimal’ industry structure. 
Second, it is investigated whether the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth 
varies with the development level of an economy, with the sector of economic activity, 
and with the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial supply. Empirical evidence is 
provided showing that the impact is dependent upon all these three aspects. Third, we 
pay extensive attention to statistical measurement issues concerning entrepreneurship. 
The relative absence of studies at the national level linking entrepreneurship to 
economic growth is in part due to severe constraints in measuring entrepreneurship in a 
cross-national context (Carree and Thurik, 2003). Apart from constructing the 
COMPENDIA data base (see Chapter 9), massive efforts have been conducted to 
construct harmonized data bases on business ownership at the country-sector level (used 
in Chapter 3) and on startup rates at the regional level (used in Chapter 6). We claim 
that this careful attention to the data greatly improves the reliability of empirical 
analyses. Fourth and finally, when talking about cross-country data sets on 
entrepreneurship, the world’s biggest research program in this area, the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), may not be left unmentioned (see Reynolds et al., 
2000, 2002). This thesis provides one of the first attempts to empirically link 
entrepreneurial activity to economic growth in the framework of an economic model, 
making use of the main entrepreneurial activity measure of the GEM data base, the 
Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate (TEA).  
                                                          
1 This is also apparent from the absence of entrepreneurship as an explanatory variable in the empirical 
growth literature. See Table 1 in Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002). 
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The organization of this introductory chapter is as follows. In Section 1.1 we describe 
the increased importance of entrepreneurship and small businesses since the last quarter 
of the previous century. Also the main causes of this development are briefly discussed. 
In Section 1.2 we provide a theoretical framework explaining how entrepreneurship 
may lead to economic growth at the country or regional level. The next sections pay 
attention to the measurement of entrepreneurship and economic performance (Section 
1.3) and the various units of analysis (Section 1.4) that are covered in this book. Section 
1.5 provides an overview of the separate chapters of this thesis, while some conclusions 
are formulated in Section 1.6. It is followed by a brief overview of the publications 
which form the basis for the chapters of this thesis. 
1.1 The increased importance of entrepreneurship 
The role of entrepreneurship in the economy has changed dramatically over the last half 
century. During the post-World War II era, the importance of entrepreneurship and 
small businesses seemed to be fading away (Audretsch, 2003). Giant corporations were 
seen as the most powerful engine of economic and technological progress in the early 
post-war period. Large firms were thought to have a competitive advantage over small 
and new ones, due to scale economies in the production of new economic and 
technological knowledge (Schumpeter, 1950). Indeed, the share of small firms in most 
Western economies was decreasing constantly during this period. However, from the 
1970s onwards things have changed. There is ample evidence that the share of small 
businesses in manufacturing in Western economies has started to rise (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1993; Thurik, 1999). Also, Acs et al. (1994) report that a majority of OECD-
countries experienced an increase in the self-employment rate during the 1970s and 
1980s. Further evidence of a recent increase in self-employment in many OECD 
countries appears from EIM’s data set COMPENDIA. For instance, for the United 
Kingdom, the number of non-agricultural self-employed (including the incorporated 
self-employed) as a fraction of total labour force increased from 7.8% in 1972 to 10.5% 
in 2000, and in the United States this fraction increased from 8.0% to 10.0% in the same 
period (see Van Stel, 2003). 
There are several reasons for the revival of small business and self-employment in 
Western economies. Notably, in many sectors, new technologies have reduced the 
necessity of scale economies to arrive at competitive advantages (Meijaard, 2001). 
Developments like globalization, the ICT-revolution and the increased role of 
knowledge in the production process have led to increased dynamics and uncertainty in 
the world economy from the 1970s onwards (Thurik et al., 2002). In turn, these 
developments have created room for (groups of) small firms to act as agents of change 
(Audretsch and Thurik, 2000, 2004). The larger role in technological development for 
small and new firms is referred to by Audretsch and Thurik (2001) as a regime switch 
from the ‘managed’ to the ‘entrepreneurial’ economy. In particular, Audretsch and 
Thurik argue that the model of the managed economy is the political, social and 
economic response to an economy dictated by the forces of large-scale production, 
reflecting the predominance of the production factors of capital and (unskilled) labor as 
the sources of competitive advantage. By contrast, the model of the entrepreneurial 
economy is the political, social and economic response to an economy dictated not just 
by the dominance of the production factor of knowledge – which Romer (1990, 1994) 
and Lucas (1988) identified as replacing the more traditional factors as the source of 
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competitive advantage – but also by a very different, but complementary, factor they 
had overlooked: entrepreneurship capital, or the capacity to engage in and generate 
entrepreneurial activity. See also Audretsch and Thurik (2004). The revival of 
entrepreneurship is discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis. 
1.2 The effect of entrepreneurship on economic performance 2 
The big importance of entrepreneurship for economic growth in modern 
‘entrepreneurial’ economies is related to the increased importance of knowledge in the 
economic process. In the old, ‘managed’ economies, land, labour and capital were the 
main factors of production. However, globalization and the telecommunications and 
computer revolutions have drastically reduced the cost of shifting not just capital but 
also information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into lower-cost locations 
around the world. This means that economic activity in high-cost locations is no longer 
compatible with routinized tasks. Rather, globalization has shifted the comparative 
advantage of high-cost locations to knowledge-based activities, and in particular search 
activities, which cannot be costlessly transferred around the globe. Knowledge as an 
input into economic activity is inherently different from land, labour and capital. It is 
characterized by high uncertainty, high asymmetries across people and is costly to 
transact (Thurik and Wennekers, 2004).3  
In entrepreneurial economies principal-agent problems in evaluating the expected value 
of new ideas will emerge more often than in managed economies. It is the uncertainty 
inherent in new economic knowledge, combined with asymmetries between the agent 
possessing the new knowledge and the decision making bureaucracy of the incumbent 
organization with respect to its expected value that potentially leads to a gap between 
the valuation of that knowledge (Acs and Audretsch, 2003, p. 71). This gap may 
stimulate the agent possessing the new knowledge to start a new firm, in an attempt to 
appropriate the new knowledge.4 However, given the uncertainty of the new knowledge 
it is not a priori clear whether the economic value of the new knowledge is actually high 
or low. Only after observing their performance in the industry do the new firms become 
aware of the actual economic value of their idea (passive learning).  
At the aggregate level of industries, countries and regions the many individual attempts 
of economic agents trying to commercialize their new knowledge compose a mosaic of 
new experiments. In evolutionary terms this can be termed ‘variety’. A process of 
competition between these various new ideas and initiatives takes place continuously 
leading to the selection of the most viable firms and industries.5 Variety, competition, 
                                                          
2 This section is based on Thurik and Wennekers (2004) and Carree and Thurik (2003). 
3 Knowledge, as opposed to information, is often highly specific in nature and therefore difficult to 
transmit through formal means of communication. Face-to-face contacts are important for the diffusion of 
knowledge (Audretsch and Thurik, 1999). 
4 In this way, entrepreneurship serves as a conduit for knowledge spillovers. The knowledge spills over 
from the source (i.e. the agent holding the knowledge) to a new firm in which it is commercialized 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). Chapter 5 of this thesis focuses on a different aspect of knowledge 
spillovers: do knowledge spillovers occur predominately between, or rather within industries? 
5 Jovanovic (1982) labels this process as noisy selection. The efficient firms grow and survive whereas 
the inefficient firms decline and fail. This selection process is characterized by high levels of business 
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selection and also imitation expand and transform the productive potential of a regional 
or national economy. This occurs by replacement or displacement of obsolete firms, by 
higher productivity and by expansions of new niches and industries. Furthermore, there 
are also important feedback mechanisms. Competition and selection amidst variety 
undoubtedly enable individuals (and firms) to learn from both their own and other’s 
successes and failures. These learning processes enable individuals to increase their 
skills and adapt their attitudes (active learning). The outcome of these so-called 
spillovers will be new entrepreneurial actions, creating a recurrent chain of linkages 
(Carree and Thurik, 2003). The resultant of this chain of dynamic processes is economic 
growth. 
1.3 Measuring entrepreneurship and economic performance 
When investigating entrepreneurship, an important question is what we understand by 
‘entrepreneurship’. There is little consensus about what actually constitutes 
entrepreneurship (Audretsch, 2003, p. 2). This is related to the fact that it is an ill-
defined, at best multi-dimensional concept (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). It may be 
argued that it covers at least three dimensions: (dealing with) risk and uncertainty, the 
perception of profit opportunities, and innovation and change (Hébert and Link, 1989). 
Also, definitions of entrepreneurship typically vary between the economic and 
management perspectives (Audretsch, 2003). An interesting combination of these 
perspectives is reflected by the definition chosen in the Green Paper Entrepreneurship 
in Europe (European Commission, 2003): “Entrepreneurship is the mindset and process 
to create and develop economic activity by blending risk-taking, creativity and/or 
innovation with sound management, within a new or an existing organisation”. For a 
discussion on various views on entrepreneurship we refer to Hébert and Link (1989) and 
Wennekers and Thurik (1999).  
Measuring entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship has to be operationalized for empirical analysis. To this end we use 
entrepreneurship as a broad concept. We use several measures of entrepreneurship. 
Each measure represents a different aspect of entrepreneurship. In this thesis four such 
aspects are distinguished. First, we can think of entrepreneurship as owning and 
managing an incumbent business. This aspect of entrepreneurship translates into 
measures like the number of self-employed or business owners (used in Chapters 2, 3 
and 9) and the number of firms (used in Chapter 5). Second, entrepreneurship may refer 
to the extent in which markets are penetrated by new entrants. This can be measured by 
the number of new-firm startups (used in Chapters 6 and 8). Third, entrepreneurship 
may refer to the process of starting a new business, including activities required in the 
pre-startup phase. This may be called entrepreneurial activity (used in Chapter 7). 
Finally, one can think of entrepreneurship as the share of small firms in total value-of-
shipments of an economy (used in Chapter 4). 
Countries or regions may rank very differently on these different aspects of 
entrepreneurship. This is illustrated by Figure 1.1. In this figure entrepreneurial activity 
rates and business ownership rates are displayed for the G7-countries. Entrepreneurial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
dynamics (entry and exit of firms) in markets. The effect of these dynamics on industry growth is 
investigated empirically in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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activity is highest in the United States, reflecting the dynamic character of the US 
economy. Relatively many individuals are in the process of starting a new business or 
are the owner/manager of a young business (younger than 3.5 years). However, as 
regards incumbent businesses, the United States has an average value, and for instance 
Italy has a much higher business ownership rate. While there are relatively many new 
businesses in the United States (high entry rate), there is also a relatively high exit rate, 
as many of the new firms do not survive. Also, many incumbents are forced out of the 
market by the new entrants (see also Chapter 8). This makes that the number of business 
owners remains more or less constant. However, through the high levels of entry and 
exit, the business population is continuously changing and, arguably, improving. In 
contrast, while Italy has a high business ownership rate, the low entrepreneurial activity 
rate indicates that there is not much development in the composition of the business 
population. These different aspects of entrepreneurship may have different implications 
for economic performance, as is investigated in several of the chapters in this book. 
 
Figure 1.1 Entrepreneurial activity and business ownership in G7-countries, 2002 1 
0
5
10
15
20
US CAN ITA UK GER FRA JAP
TEA
BO
 
1 TEA is the Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate (source: GEM) which measures the sum of nascent 
entrepreneurs and young businesses as a percentage of adult population. BO is the business ownership 
rate (source: COMPENDIA) which measures the number of non-agricultural business owners (of 
unincorporated as well as incorporated businesses) as a percentage of total labour force. 
Of course, there is always a discrepancy between the theoretical concept of 
entrepreneurship (whatever concept is chosen) and the empirical operationalisation. For 
instance, as regards measuring the number of business owners, one has to realise that 
business ownership (self-employment) and ‘Schumpeterian’ entrepreneurship are 
related but not synonymous concepts (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). Entrepreneurship 
in a ‘Schumpeterian sense’ refers to the activity of introducing ‘new combinations’ of 
productive means in the market place. Business ownership (self-employment) means 
owning and managing a business, or otherwise working on one’s own account. Thus, on 
the one hand Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the business owners, 
while on the other hand some entrepreneurs (so-called intrapreneurs) do not work on 
their own account. Also, a disadvantage of using business ownership as a proxy for 
entrepreneurship is that it treats all businesses as the same, both high-tech and low-tech, 
and the businesses are not weighted for impact (Audretsch, 2003). Nevertheless, a major 
advantage of the business ownership measure is that it is measured and can be compared 
across countries and over time.  
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Measuring economic performance 
In studies investigating the relation between entrepreneurship and economic 
performance, various performance measures have been used, dependent on the unit of 
analysis. At the individual level, individual earnings generated from a self-owned firm 
has been the most typical performance measure. At the unit of observation of the 
enterprise and establishment, the most commonly used performance measures include 
employment growth, survival, profitability, exports, foreign direct investment, 
innovation and productivity. At the spatial unit of observation such as the country or 
region, which is the unit of observation used in this thesis, employment growth has been 
the main performance measure (Audretsch, 2003). While the current thesis also uses 
employment growth in two of the chapters (6 and 8), two other performance measures 
are used as well, these are growth of per capita income (Chapter 2), and growth of 
(sectoral) GDP (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7). Note that in all chapters of this book, economic 
performance is measured in terms of some measure of growth. 
1.4 Units of analysis used in this thesis 
The relationship between entrepreneurship and economic performance can be measured 
for different units of observation, most typically the individual level, the firm level and 
the spatial level such as country or region. As mentioned, this thesis uses the spatial 
level as unit of observation. However, this is only one dimension along which 
entrepreneurship and economic performance can be measured. In particular, several 
chapters in this thesis do not only distinguish between different countries or regions, but 
also between different sectors and/or different time periods. Sectors are collections of 
industries, like manufacturing or services. Concerning the time dimension, several of 
the chapters use data over a long period of time, which enables to investigate the 
dynamics involved in the relationship. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the exact units of 
observation used in the several chapters of this thesis.  
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Table 1.1  Units of observation covered in this thesis 
Chapter Spatial unit Sectoral unit 
 
Time unit 
2 23 OECD countries - 
 
1976-1996 
3 21 OECD countries Two sectors  
 
1970-1998 
4 17 European countries - 
 
1989-1994 
5 40 Dutch regions: 
NUTS 3 level 
Five sectors 1987-1995 1 
6 59 British regions: 
NUTS 3 level 
- 1980-1998 1 
7 36 GEM participating 
countries 
- 1994-2003 1 
8 6 OECD countries 15 industries, ranging from 2-
digit level to 4-digit level 
1994-2000 1 
9 23 OECD countries - 
 
1972-2002 
1 As far as time is concerned, the data samples in these studies are cross-sections instead of panels; 
the time periods refer to the fact that (lagged) growth is measured over a multi-year period, and/or 
that separate (cross-sectional) estimations have been performed for different periods. 
1.5 Chapter overview 
In Chapter 2 we address the two-way relationship between business ownership and 
economic development at the macro level. The chapter focuses upon three issues. First, 
how is the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership related to the stage of economic 
development? Second, what is the speed of convergence towards the equilibrium rate 
when the rate of business ownership is out-of-equilibrium? Third, to what extent does 
deviating from the equilibrium rate of business ownership hamper economic growth? 
Hypotheses concerning all three issues are formulated in the framework of a two-
equation model. The first equation deals with the impact of economic development on 
business ownership, basically estimating a (U-shaped) functional form for the relation 
between economic development and business ownership. Because this equation is 
modelled using an error-correction mechanism, and because we find a significant 
amount of error-correction, the estimated relation may indeed be considered an 
equilibrium relation.6 The second equation deals with the impact of business ownership 
on economic development. This equation tests whether differences between the actual 
and the estimated equilibrium rate of business ownership have a negative impact on 
subsequent economic growth. In other words, can the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business 
ownership also be interpreted as an ‘optimal’ rate? The model is tested for 23 OECD 
                                                          
6 In Chapters 2 and 3 of this book the term ‘equilibrium’ is not used in the meaning of markets being in 
equilibrium. What we actually mean by an ‘equilibrium rate of business ownership’ is similar to a ‘natural 
rate of business ownership’. As conditions for business ownership tend to change when nations develop 
economically, countries tend to follow a certain path of business ownership levels when they go through 
stages of economic development. Hence a ‘natural rate’ is implied. Accordingly, the error-correction 
effect may also be interpreted as a regression-to-the-mean effect. 
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countries using the COMPENDIA data set mentioned earlier. We find confirmation for 
the hypothesized economic growth penalty on deviations from the equilibrium rate of 
business ownership. This implies that economies can actually have too few or too many 
business owners. A shortage of business owners is likely to diminish competition with 
detrimental effects for static efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy. It 
will also diminish variety, learning and selection and thereby harm dynamic efficiency 
(innovation). On the other hand, a glut of self-employment will cause the average scale 
of operations to remain below optimum. It will result in large numbers of marginal 
entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human energy that could have been allocated more 
productively elsewhere. An important policy implication of the exercises is that low 
barriers to entry and exit of businesses are necessary conditions for the equilibrium 
seeking mechanisms that are vital for a sound economic development. 
The model analysed in Chapter 2 suffers from an important limitation. It studies the 
relationship between economic development and business ownership at the economy-
wide level without taking into consideration the sectoral structure of the economy. It is 
well-known that business ownership rates are much higher in the service sector when 
compared to the manufacturing sector. It is therefore possible that the penalty on 
deviating from the ‘equilibrium’ business ownership rate is not a problem of having too 
few or too many self-employed, but a problem of having a too small or a too large share 
of the service sector. Likewise, Chapter 2 finds that the ‘equilibrium’ business 
ownership rates tend to increase with the level of economic development for the highly 
most developed countries (in terms of GDP per capita). This might be caused by 
increased interest for the option of self-employment as such across the sectors in the 
economy, but may also be explained from an employment shift in modern economies 
away from the manufacturing sector towards the service sector. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the sectoral component in the two-equation model from Chapter 2 and estimates the 
model separately for manufacturing and services, using sectoral data for basically the 
same set of OECD countries. Chapter 3 shows that there is a significant penalty of the 
business ownership rate deviating from ‘equilibrium’ for manufacturing. We also find a 
negative effect for the services sector but it is far smaller than that for manufacturing. 
This may be related to the greater importance of (radical) innovation in manufacturing. 
Estimation results also suggest that there is, on average for the countries in our data set, 
a too low business ownership rate in manufacturing (consistent with a lack of incentives 
to innovate) and a too high business ownership rate in services (possibly indicating that 
there are too many marginal entrepreneurs).  
Chapter 4 also focuses on a hypothesized growth penalty on deviating from an ‘optimal’ 
industry structure. However, in this chapter, industry structure is not measured in terms 
of business ownership rates but rather in terms of the share of small firms in total value-
of-shipments. Using data for 17 European countries in the early 1990s, it is found that 
those countries that have shifted their industry structure towards decentralization (i.e. 
towards a higher share of small firms) in a more rapid fashion have been rewarded by 
higher growth rates, implying that the majority of the countries in our data set had a 
below-optimum small-firm share in value-of-shipments in the early 1990s. Although in 
Chapter 4 we do not distinguish between sectors, it is conceivable that particularly 
decentralization in manufacturing may have been conducive to economic growth, as this 
sector is dominated by large enterprises (KPMG/ENSR, 2000). This would be 
consistent with results from Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 5 deals with the impact of knowledge spillovers on economic growth at the 
regional level. As described earlier, knowledge spillovers are an important source of 
growth in modern, entrepreneurial economies. Using a variant of the model of Glaeser 
et al. (1992), Chapter 5 investigates which type of spillovers is more conducive to 
economic growth; intra-sectoral spillovers (facilitated by a higher degree of 
specialization in a region) or inter-sectoral spillovers (facilitated by a higher degree of 
diversity). It also investigates the role of local competition in regional economic growth. 
For our data set of Dutch regions in the period 1987-1995 we find that local competition 
is important particularly for economic growth in industry sectors (manufacturing and 
construction), while diversity is important particularly for growth in service sectors. We 
find no effect for specialization. By and large, this can be interpreted as intensive 
competition in manufacturing encouraging an ‘innovation race’, and high degrees of 
diversity encouraging spillovers from manufacturing towards service sectors.  
Chapter 6 deals with the impact of new-firm startups on employment growth at the 
regional level. It is argued that higher numbers of startups in a region may have positive 
effects on regional employment, because new firms create jobs, both directly and 
indirectly (the latter by stimulating the incumbent firms to perform better), and because 
new firms provide a vehicle for the introduction of new ideas and innovation to the 
economy. However, the chapter also provides reasons for expecting no relationship or 
even a negative relationship between startup rates and subsequent employment growth. 
The case for a negative relationship derives from examining policies to stimulate new 
firm formation in ‘unenterprising’ areas (areas with low startup rates and relatively few 
firms). If entry is subsidised, this may attract individuals with low human capital levels 
to start a business. The subsidised entrants temporarily have a competitive advantage 
over incumbents who are forced out of business. However, once the subsidy is removed, 
the no-longer subsidised entrants may be forced out of business themselves and end up 
more disadvantaged than before they started. The effect is likely to erode customer 
confidence leading to lower expenditure and hence lower employment (Greene et al., 
2004). Chapter 6 investigates the impact of startup rates on employment growth for 
British regions in the period 1980-1998. The key results call into question the impact of 
policies seeking to raise new firm formation, so as to enhance employment creation, 
particularly in areas where new firm formation rates are low. Specifically we find that, 
in the 1980’s, when national public policy was focussed on raising new firm formation, 
there is no evidence that this led to increased employment creation during that decade. 
Furthermore, although the employment impact is non-significant for the UK as a whole 
in the 1980’s, it is significantly negative for the North East of England, an area with 
notably low rates of new firm formation. In the 1990’s, when UK national policy shifts 
away from stimulating new firm formation, a positive relationship emerges between 
new firm formation and employment creation. Crucially, however, in Scotland, which 
implemented a policy to stimulate new firm births in the 1990’s, a significant negative 
relationship between new firm births and employment creation appears in this decade, 
although our data do not extend sufficiently in time to imply that Scotland’s business 
birth rate policy led to lower employment. Our interpretation of these results is that 
implementing ‘birth rate’ policies (i.e. maximising the number of startups), particularly 
in ‘unenterprising’ areas, is likely to be unproductive at best and counter-productive at 
worst. 
In Chapter 7 we return to the country level again. We investigate the impact of the Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity rate from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) on 
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growth of national GDP for 36 countries. The Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate (TEA) 
is defined as that percent of adult population that is either actively involved in starting a 
new venture or the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 months old 
(Reynolds et al., 2002). Compared to the data bases that we use in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, 
the variation in per capita income levels in the GEM data base is much larger. In 
particular, a number of less developed countries is included in this data base, allowing 
to test for a possibly different impact of TEA on growth in highly developed economies 
and in developing countries. We find that entrepreneurial activity affects economic 
growth, but that the effect increases with per capita income. This suggests that 
entrepreneurship plays a different role in countries in different stages of economic 
development. Probably, entrepreneurs in highly developed countries have higher human 
capital levels compared to entrepreneurs in developing countries, which also leads to a 
stronger impact on growth in highly developed countries.  
Chapter 8 examines the relationship between business dynamics (entry and exit of 
firms) and employment growth at the country-industry level. We use a cross-country 
data set with harmonized data on numbers of entries and exits for a selection of fast-
growing and innovative industries in six developed economies. In our regression 
analysis we allow for separate effects of both the extent of business dynamics (volatility 
of firms) and the composition of business dynamics (net-entry of firms). Using both 
these measures enables to distinguish between situations of high net-entry and low 
volatility, possibly indicating high survival rates, and situations of low net-entry and 
high volatility, possibly indicating lower survival rates but more fierce competition 
(displacement). As these situations may have very different implications for economic 
growth, it is important to measure the effects of net-entry and volatility separately. We 
also test for the existence of an ‘optimal’ level of business volatility, possibly indicating 
that entry and exit levels are too high in certain industries. We find positive employment 
effects of net-entry rates and volatility rates. These effects are found to be considerably 
stronger for manufacturing compared to services. We find no evidence for an ‘optimal’ 
level of business volatility. 
The final chapter of this book is devoted to the COMPENDIA data base. This data base, 
constructed by EIM, contains business ownership rates for 23 OECD countries from 
1972 onwards, and is updated regularly. The data base is used for cross-country 
entrepreneurship research not only in this book (Chapter 2) but also in an increasing 
number of other studies (e.g. Audretsch et al., 2001, 2002b). Operationalizing 
entrepreneurship for empirical measurement is difficult for at least two reasons (Storey, 
1991). First, there is no straightforward definition of the term entrepreneurship, so how 
should it be measured? Second, in the case of cross-country analysis, even proxy 
measures used for entrepreneurship differ across countries. To measure 
entrepreneurship, economists usually use the number of self-employed. Although the 
measure of self-employment is accompanied with much critique (Audretsch, 2003), 
measures of self-employment are widely used to reflect the degree of entrepreneurship, 
largely because they are measured in most countries, and measured in comprehensive 
ways facilitating comparisons across countries and over time (Blau, 1987). 
Nevertheless, in Chapter 9 we argue that the comparability of international self-
employment data is a major problem, because each country uses its own self-
employment definition. In particular, the extent to which owner/managers of 
incorporated businesses (OMIBs) are included in the numbers of self-employed as 
published in OECD Labour Force Statistics, differs between countries. The 
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COMPENDIA data base makes an attempt to construct an international data base with 
self-employment figures for 23 OECD countries that are comparable across countries. 
The business ownership definition used in COMPENDIA includes owner/managers of 
both unincorporated and incorporated businesses and excludes unpaid family workers.7 
For countries not following our business ownership definition in OECD Labour Force 
Statistics, we make corrections. This involves estimating the number of incorporated 
self-employed as well as removing unpaid family workers from the data. We also 
correct for trend breaks. Chapter 9 provides a detailed description of the construction of 
the COMPENDIA data base. Special attention is paid to the United States. This country 
alone accounts for about 30% of all self-employed reported in the COMPENDIA data 
set. 
1.6 Conclusions of the thesis 
Combining the empirical evidence provided in the various chapters in this book we can 
formulate some conclusions as regards the effect of entrepreneurship on economic 
growth. The majority of the empirical evidence presented in this book points to a 
positive effect. However, we have also found some exceptions to this stylised fact. The 
evidence suggests that the sign and magnitude of the effect depends on at least three 
factors: a country’s stage of economic development, the sector of economic activity, and 
the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial supply. 
As regards the stage of economic development, Chapter 2 shows that deviations from 
the ‘equilibrium’ rate of entrepreneurship (here defined as business ownership) 
negatively affect economic growth. The estimated model implies that the ‘equilibrium’ 
number of entrepreneurs is different at different stages of economic development. For 
instance, in the upward part of the U-shaped equilibrium relationship, a given level of 
entrepreneurship may be below the optimum for a higher level of economic 
development while the same level of entrepreneurship is above the optimum for a lower 
level of economic development. Hence, a further increase in entrepreneurship positively 
affects economic growth in the higher income country while it negatively affects growth 
in the lower income country (as the gap between the actual and the equilibrium rate of 
entrepreneurship becomes bigger). This is consistent with the results from Chapter 7, 
where increases in entrepreneurship (here defined as the sum of nascent entrepreneurs 
and young businesses) affect national economic growth positively in high income 
countries and negatively in low income countries. Hence, entrepreneurship plays a 
different role in economies in different stages of economic development.  
In modern, highly developed economies, growth is powered by their capacity to 
innovate and to win new global markets for their technologically advanced products 
(McArthur and Sachs, 2002). Entrepreneurship is an important aspect of this capacity. 
Entrepreneurs may introduce important innovations by entering markets with new 
products or production processes (Acs and Audretsch, 1990, 2003). They may enhance 
our knowledge of what is technically viable and what consumers prefer by introducing 
variations of existing products and services in the market. The resulting learning process 
                                                          
7 In this book we use the terms business ownership and self-employment interchangeably, referring to 
both the unincorporated and the incorporated self-employed. However, in entrepreneurship literature the 
term self-employment is sometimes understood to include unincorporated self-employed individuals only. 
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speeds up the discovery of the dominant design for product-market combinations. In 
other words, in highly developed economies entrepreneurship contributes to growth by 
shifting the technology frontier (technological innovation).  
Economies at lower stages of economic development may grow through exploitation of 
economies of scale and scope by large firms and by rapidly absorbing the advanced 
technologies and capital of the highly developed economies (technology transfer), for 
example through high levels of foreign direct investment from high-tech multinationals 
(McArthur and Sachs, 2002). In addition, smaller firms may also flourish as they may 
act as suppliers for large firms (outsourcing) and may learn a lot from the large 
companies. However, in these economies small and new firms are not at the front of the 
innovation process and hence their impact on economic growth is smaller compared to 
entrepreneurs in modern economies. In fact, in Chapter 7 their impact on economic 
growth is even estimated to be negative, which may point to a lack of large companies 
in these countries. High levels of entrepreneurship in poorer countries may reflect 
hidden unemployment as there may not be enough large companies to employ them as 
wage-earners. 
In terms of the different types of economies –managed versus entrepreneurial– 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) distinguish (see also Section 1.1), the role that 
entrepreneurship plays in lower developed economies is more in line with the managed 
economy, while the role of entrepreneurship in higher developed economies is more in 
line with the entrepreneurial economy. 
As regards the sector of economic activity, results from several studies in this book are 
consistent with a stronger effect of entrepreneurship on growth for manufacturing 
compared to services. For instance, Chapter 3 shows that the penalty related to deviating 
from the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership is more severe for manufacturing than 
for services. In Chapter 5, the impact of local competition (the number of firms in the 
region) on regional economic growth is investigated. We find a significantly positive 
effect for manufacturing but no effect for services sectors. Finally, in Chapter 8 we 
examine the effect of business dynamics on employment growth at the country-industry 
level. Again the impact of business dynamics (net-entry and volatility of firms) on 
growth is found to be stronger for manufacturing than for services.  
The stronger effect in manufacturing may be related to the greater importance of 
innovation in manufacturing, compared to services. Innovation in service firms has a 
different character than in manufacturing. In particular, innovations in service industries 
are often non-technological and they mostly involve small and incremental changes in 
processes and procedures (De Jong et al., 2003, p. 16). To the contrary, innovations in 
manufacturing require more R&D and are more radical in nature. In modern 
entrepreneurial economies radical innovation is more conducive to economic growth 
than incremental innovation. This is because industry life-cycles are shorter and hence, 
at a given point in time, more (niche) markets are in an early stage of the life cycle 
where R&D is highly productive and the costs of radical innovation tend to be relatively 
low (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). Hence, a lack of entrepreneurship in manufacturing 
industries may be particularly damaging to economic performance, as it may imply a 
lack of incentives to create (radical) innovations.  
The conclusion that also the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial supply plays a role 
in the effect on economic performance, is based on Chapter 6 of this book. If 
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government policy is directed towards maximising the number of startups by 
subsidising entry, this may stimulate individuals to start businesses for the wrong 
reason, i.e. not because, for instance, they have an idea that they want to try and 
commercialize, but simply because they can get an amount of money for starting a 
business. Particularly unemployed individuals may be attracted to start subsidised 
businesses, as the opportunity cost of not starting a subsidised business is higher for 
them, compared to wage-earners. As the unemployed often have relatively low human 
capital levels, the new firms are likely to be unsuccessful once the subsidy is removed. 
The effect is to erode confidence, both of the customers and of the failed business 
owners, which leads to declining economic performance of the region. Hence, policies 
just focusing on the quantity of entrepreneurial supply without considering the quality 
of the entrepreneurs may not lead to the intended results. Chapter 6 provides empirical 
indications that policies of subsidising entry may indeed not be very successful in 
creating jobs. 
In Chapter 2 of this book it is concluded that low barriers to entry and exit of businesses 
are important for a sound economic development. However, although subsidising entry 
may be seen as an (extreme) example of lowering entry barriers, the lesson from 
Chapter 6 is that such policies do not contribute positively to economic development. A 
policy that could contribute is to lower administrative burdens related to starting a new 
business (Van Stel and Stunnenberg, 2004). However, enterprise policies that involve 
creating a financial advantage for some business owners over others (e.g. subsidising 
entry) should be avoided, as it may attract individuals who are not intrinsically 
motivated to start a new firm. In particular, it may attract a substantial number of 
marginal entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human energy that could have been 
allocated more productively elsewhere (see Chapter 2 of this book). 
1.7 Publications 
Chapters 2 through 9 of this book are based on previously written articles and papers. 
The chapters can be read independently of each other. Below an overview is given of 
the chapters and the corresponding articles and papers.  
Chapters 2 through 4 are based on articles that were published in Small Business 
Economics (Carree et al., 2002), International Small Business Journal (Van Stel and 
Carree, 2004), and Kyklos (Audretsch et al., 2002a), respectively. Two of the chapters 
of this thesis are based on articles published in Regional Studies, these are Chapter 5 
(Van Stel and Nieuwenhuijsen, 2004) and Chapter 6 (Van Stel and Storey, 2004). Early 
versions of the remaining three chapters appeared in working paper series. Chapters 7 
and 8 are based on Max Planck Institute Discussion Papers on Entrepreneurship, 
Growth and Public Policy (Van Stel et al., 2004, and Van Stel and Diephuis, 2004, 
respectively), while Chapter 9 is based on an EIM Research Report (Van Stel, 2003). 
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Chapter 2 
Economic Development and Business Ownership 
In this chapter we address the relationship between business ownership and economic 
development. We will focus upon three issues. First, how is the equilibrium rate of 
business ownership related to the stage of economic development? Second, what is the 
speed of convergence towards the equilibrium rate when the rate of business ownership 
is out-of-equilibrium? Third, to what extent does deviating from the equilibrium rate of 
business ownership hamper economic growth? Hypotheses concerning all three issues 
are formulated in the framework of a new two-equation model. We find confirmation 
for the hypothesized economic growth penalty on deviations from the equilibrium rate 
of business ownership using a data panel of 23 OECD countries. An important policy 
implication of our exercises is that low barriers to entry and exit of businesses are 
necessary conditions for the equilibrium seeking mechanisms that are vital for a sound 
economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Carree, M.A., A.J. van Stel, A.R. Thurik and A.R.M. Wennekers (2002), Economic 
Development and Business Ownership: An Analysis Using Data of 23 OECD 
Countries in the Period 1976-1996, Small Business Economics 19, 271-290. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Joseph Schumpeter’s contribution to our understanding of the mechanisms of 
technological progress and economic development is widely recognized. In The Theory 
of Economic Development he emphasizes the role of the entrepreneur as prime cause of 
economic development. He describes how the innovating entrepreneur challenges 
incumbent firms by introducing new inventions that make current technologies and 
products obsolete. This process of creative destruction is the main characteristic of what 
has been called the Schumpeter Mark I regime. In Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, Schumpeter focuses on innovative activities by large and established firms. 
He describes how large firms outperform their smaller counterparts in the innovation 
and appropriation process through a strong positive feedback loop from innovation to 
increased R&D activities. This process of creative accumulation is the main 
characteristic of what has been called the Schumpeter Mark II regime. 
The extent to which either of the two Schumpeterian technological regimes prevails in a 
certain period and industry varies. It may depend upon the nature of knowledge required 
to innovate, the opportunities of appropriability, the degree of scale (dis)economies, the 
institutional environment, the importance of absorptive capacity, demand variety, etc. 
Industries in a Schumpeter Mark II regime are likely to develop a more concentrated 
market structure in contrast to industries in a Schumpeter Mark I regime where small 
firms will proliferate. 
Most of the 20th century can be described as a period of accumulation. From the 
Second Industrial Revolution till the 1970s the large firm share was on the rise in most 
industries and the economy as a whole. It was the period of “scale and scope” 
(Chandler, 1990). It was the era of the hierarchical industrial firm growing progressively 
larger through exploiting economies of scale and scope in areas like production, 
distribution, marketing and R&D. The conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s 
seemed to have set the case. The period has the characteristics of the Schumpeter Mark 
II regime. However, from the 1970s onwards times have changed. There is ample 
evidence that the share of small businesses in manufacturing in Western economies has 
started to rise (Acs and Audretsch, 1993; Thurik, 1999). Large firms have been 
downsizing and restructuring in order to concentrate on “core business” again. In the 
meantime the entrepreneur has risen from the dead. High-technology innovative small 
firms have come at the forefront of technological development in many (new) 
industries. Piore and Sabel (1984) claim that an “Industrial Divide” has taken place. 
Jensen (1993, p. 835) considers it the period of the “Third Industrial Revolution”. The 
last quarter of the 20th century may therefore be characterized as a period of creative 
destruction in the sense of the Schumpeter Mark I regime. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) 
refer to a change from “a managed to an entrepreneurial economy”. 
In the present chapter we discuss why this change happened and what its consequences 
have been for economic progress and the rate of business ownership. We develop a 
model relating the regime switch to economic development and present empirical 
evidence. In Section 2.2 we discuss a variety of theoretical considerations on the 
relation between business ownership rates and economic development. It is followed by 
Section 2.3 where we present our two-equation model. The first equation explains the 
change in the business ownership rate while the second equation explains economic 
growth. The notion of an equilibrium business ownership rate, being a function of the 
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level of economic development, is crucial in the analysis. In Section 2.4 we present the 
data of 23 OECD countries and in Section 2.5 we present the estimation results. The 
final section is used for discussion. 
2.2 Theory 
In this section we will discuss how business ownership rates and economic development 
are interrelated. We will pay attention to the role that the “Schumpeterian regime 
switch” has played in this relationship. We discuss the pre-1970s era of declining self-
employment rates and the period thereafter in which the rates have risen in most 
Western economies. Next we discuss how the business ownership rate at the economy-
wide level can be used to determine the extent of structural transformation. 
The first three quarters of the 20th century can be characterized as a period of declining 
small firm presence in most industries. In many Western countries and industries this 
decline has ended and even reversed. Many old and large firms have been losing ground 
to their small, new and more entrepreneurial counterparts. It suggests a switch from a 
(more) Schumpeter Mark II type of regime towards a (more) Schumpeter Mark I type of 
regime. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) label this as a regime switch from “a managed to 
an entrepreneurial economy”. We note that the regime labels are rough approximations 
as the industrial landscape shows a far too great variety to claim that in each and every 
industry one of the Schumpeter regimes is prevailing. A further complication is that 
business ownership and entrepreneurship are not synonymous for at least two reasons. 
First, entrepreneurial energy is not limited to self-employed individuals. Large 
companies promote “intrapreneurship” within business units to achieve more flexibility 
and innovativeness (Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994). Second, business owners serve 
many roles and functions. Many researchers distinguish between Schumpeterian (or 
real) entrepreneurs and managerial business owners (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). 
Entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the business owners. They own and direct 
independent firms that are innovative and “creatively destroy” existing market 
structures. After realizing their goals Schumpeterian entrepreneurs often develop into 
managerial business owners, but some may start new ventures. Managerial business 
owners dominate in the large majority of small firms. They include many franchisees, 
shopkeepers and people in professional occupations. They belong to what Kirchhoff 
(1996) calls “the economic core”. Occasionally, entrepreneurial ventures grow out of 
them. In an empirical context it is difficult to discriminate between managerial business 
owners and entrepreneurs. Profiles of individual business owners would be required. 
Moreover, the discrimination is a theoretical one since most business owners are neither 
pure “Schumpeterians” nor pure “shopkeepers” but share the attitudes associated with 
these extremes in a varying degree (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). 
Despite these conceptual problems we argue that the secular trend of the business 
ownership rate declining and afterwards starting to rise again presents a fair indication 
of the general development of the level of entrepreneurship, at least in modern 
economies. It shows how the (secular) decline of “mom-and-pop” businesses in 
traditional sectors like retailing and craft has tended to become compensated for by a 
rise in new ventures in services and high-tech industries in the period from the 1970s 
onwards. 
18 
The impact of economic development on business ownership 
The proportion of the labor force that is self-employed has decreased in most Western 
countries until the mid-1970s. Since then the self-employment rate has started to rise 
again in several of these economies. Blau (1987) observes that the proportions of both 
male and female self-employed in the nonagricultural U.S. labor force declined during 
most of this century. He also observes that this decline bottomed out in the early 1970s 
and started to rise until at least 1982. The data used in this chapter show that the 
business ownership rate in the U.S. has continued to rise in the 1980s while stabilizing 
in the 1990s.8 More recently business ownership increased in several other countries as 
well. We will first discuss the period of decline of business ownership (Mark II regime) 
followed by a discussion of the period of reversal of this trend (Mark I regime). 
Decline of business ownership 
Several authors (Kuznets, 1971; Schultz, 1990; Yamada, 1996) have reported a negative 
relationship between economic development and the business ownership (self-
employment) rate. Their studies use a large cross-section of countries with a wide 
variety in the stage of economic development.  
There are a series of reasons for the decline of self-employment, and of small business 
presence in general. Lucas (1978) shows how rising real wages may raise the 
opportunity cost of self-employment relative to the return. Given an underlying 
“managerial” talent distribution this induces marginal entrepreneurs (in this context 
Lucas refers to managers) to become employees. This pushes up the average size of 
firms. Schaffner (1993) takes a different approach. She points out that “over the course 
of economic development the advantages firm owners derive from being less risk averse 
(better diversified) than self-employed producers are likely to rise relative to the 
disadvantages caused by the costliness of circumventing asymmetric information 
problems” (p. 435). Iyigun and Owen (1998) develop a model implying that economic 
development is associated with a decline in the number of entrepreneurs relative to the 
total number of employees. They argue that fewer individuals are willing to run the risk 
associated with becoming an entrepreneur as the “safe” professional earnings rise with 
economic development.  
Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of investment in production, distribution, and 
management needed to exploit economies of scale and scope during the period after the 
second industrial revolution of the second half of the 19th century. It was a period of 
relatively well-defined technological trajectories, of stable demand and of seemingly 
clear advantages of diversification.9 
Reversal of the trend 
                                                          
8 There is considerable controversy about the number of U.S. self-employed. Publications which deal with 
various issues on estimating the actual number of business owners in the U.S. include Fain (1980), 
Bregger (1996), Dennis (1997) and SBA (1997), Chapter 3. Most controversy is about measuring the 
number of incorporated self-employed. In the present chapter we basically follow the approach taken by 
SBA (2000), p. 5, in which the number of incorporated self-employed is estimated by the number of 
employer firms. 
9 Audretsch and Thurik (2001) characterize this period as one where stability, continuity and homogeneity 
were the cornerstones and label it the managed economy. 
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Several authors have provided evidence of a reversal of the trend towards less self-
employment. Acs et al. (1994) report that of 23 OECD-countries, 15 experienced an 
increase in the self-employment rate during the 1970s and 1980s. They show that the 
weighted average of the self-employment rate in OECD-countries rose slightly from 
8.4% in 1978 to 8.9% in 1987. Closely related to the development of the self-
employment rate is the development of small business presence in general. Some of the 
other sources showing that the growing importance of large business has come to a halt 
in Western countries include Carlsson (1989), Loveman and Sengenberger (1991), Acs 
and Audretsch (1993), Acs (1996) and Thurik (1999).10  
There are several reasons for the revival of small business and self-employment in 
Western economies.11 First, the last 25 years of the 20th century may be seen as a 
period of creative destruction. Piore and Sabel (1984) use the term “Industrial Divide”, 
Jensen (1993) prefers the term “Third Industrial Revolution”, while Freeman and Perez 
(1988) talk about the transition from the fourth to the fifth Kondratiev wave. Audretsch 
and Thurik (2000) stress the effects of globalization and the information revolution 
leading to the demise of the comparative advantage of Europe in many of the traditional 
industries, such as machine tools, metalworking, textiles and automobile production. 
The most obvious evidence is the emergence of new industries like the software and 
biotechnology industries. Small firms play an important role in these new industries. 
Acs and Audretsch (1987) provide empirical evidence that small firms have a relative 
innovative advantage over their larger counterparts in such highly innovative industries. 
Evidence for the comparative advantage of small firms in inventing radically new 
products is also given in Prusa and Schmitz (1991) and Rothwell (1983, 1984). 
Second, new technologies have reduced the importance of scale economies in many 
sectors. Small technology-based firms started to challenge large companies that still had 
every confidence in mass production techniques (Carlsson, 1989). Meredith (1987) 
argues that small firms are just as well, or better, equipped to implement technological 
advances and predicts the factory of the future to be a small factory. Jensen (1993) 
argues that “It is far less valuable for people to be in the same geographical location to 
work together effectively, and this is encouraging smaller, more efficient, 
entrepreneurial organizing units that cooperate through technology” (p. 842). This is 
supported by Jovanovic (1993) claiming that: “recent advances in information 
technology have made market-based coordination cheaper relative to internal 
coordination and have partially caused the recent decline in firm size and 
diversification” (p. 221). Others, like Rothwell (1983, 1984), stress that large and small 
firms complement and succeed each other in the innovation and diffusion process. See 
also Nooteboom (1994) for an account of this concept of “dynamic complementarity”. 
Third, deregulation and privatization movements have swept the world. In countries like 
Australia, Finland, Italy and Sweden there have been strong tendencies to deregulate 
and privatise (OECD, 1995, pp. 39-49). Phillips (1985) reports that small firms have 
dominated in both the creation of new businesses and new jobs in deregulated industry 
sectors in the U.S. in the early 1980s. This confirms some preliminary empirical 
evidence as provided by Shepherd (1982). Governments have also begun to 
                                                          
10 See also the various editions of The European Observatory for SMEs that provide an account of the 
state of small business in Europe, for instance EIM/ENSR (1997). 
11 Brock and Evans (1986) were the first to provide an elaborate overview. 
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acknowledge and promote the vital role of small (start-up) firms in achieving economic 
growth and development. See Storey and Tether (1998), OECD (1998) and EIM/ENSR 
(1994, 1996). 
Fourth, there has been a tendency of large firms to concentrate on “core competences” 
(Carlsson, 1989). Jovanovic (1993) reports that the 1980s were characterized by 
corporate spin-offs and divestment. Aiginger and Tichy (1991) blame much of the 
“back-to-basics” and downsizing (or rightsizing) tendencies on the opportunistic 
conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s. 
Fifth, the increasing incomes and wealth have enabled individuals to strive for “higher” 
needs. As a result the demand for variety increases (Jackson, 1984). Cross-cultural 
influences have also enlarged the demand for variety. Small firms are often the most 
obvious suppliers of new and specialized products. The decrease in diversification as 
reported by Jovanovic (1993) suggests that large firms have not been capable of 
entering into such market niches. 
Sixth, self-employment is more highly valued as an occupational choice than before. 
Roughly one out of four young U.S. workers pursue self-employment according to 
Schiller and Crewson (1997). Kirchhoff (1996) argues that self-employment is not 
characterized anymore as under-employment or as mom-and-pop establishments, but as 
a way to achieve a variety of personal goals. Also, as hypothesized in the social 
psychology there is a Maslowian hierarchy of human motivations, with physical needs 
at the bottom and self-realization at the top (Maslow, 1970). A higher level of 
prosperity will induce a higher need for self-realization and may stimulate 
entrepreneurship.12 
Finally, the employment share of the services sector has been well documented to 
increase with per capita income (Inman, 1985). Given the relatively small average firm 
size of most services (barring airlines, shipping and some business and financial 
services) this creates more opportunities for business ownership. 
Obviously, some of these factors may have a temporary effect only. For example, it is 
not unlikely for the outsourcing and deregulation waves to dry up. On the other hand, 
there are more permanent effects like the impact of new technologies. We refer again to 
Freeman and Perez (1988). They claim that in the new techno-economic paradigm (fifth 
Kondratiev wave) the organization of firms will be “networks” of large and small firms. 
See also Oughton and Whittam (1997) who emphasize the role of external economies of 
scale when explaining the viability of small firms. Moreover, the introduction of these 
new technologies is also positively related to the stage of economic development 
because they cannot be made effective without the necessary skills and other 
investments. This structural influence of economic development is reinforced by the 
increasing variety of demand for specialized goods and services and the enhanced 
valuation of self-realization which are also dependent on the level of prosperity. 
An equilibrium rate of business ownership 
                                                          
12 Entrepreneurial energy as such may not suffice for economic progress. Baumol (1990) stressed the 
importance of entrepreneurship being led into productive channels. 
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In this chapter we investigate whether countries that deviate from the “equilibrium” 
business ownership rate for comparable levels of economic development suffer in terms 
of economic growth. For this we develop an error-correction model to determine the 
“equilibrium” rate of business ownership as a function of GDP per capita. The notion of 
“equilibrium” appears more akin to neo-classical economic theory than to a 
Schumpeterian framework. However, in our empirical application the “equilibrium” 
concerns the labor market and not the product market. 
Equilibrium rates of self-employment in the neo-classical framework can be derived by 
making assumptions about (1) the aggregate production function combining the efforts 
of business owners and wage-employed individuals and (2) their rational occupational 
choice between self- and wage-employment. Differences in the assumptions about 
which factors influence the choice for self-employment lead to different equilibrium 
models. Two early contributions are Lucas (1978) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). 
Lucas assumes individuals to have different managerial abilities while Kihlstrom and 
Laffont assume individuals to differ with respect to their risk attitudes. Calvo and 
Wellisz (1980) extend the Lucas model by introducing a learning process through which 
managers acquire the necessary knowledge. Peretto (1999) presents a model in which 
“development and growth are subsequent stages of the process of structural 
transformation that economies undergo as they advance from poverty to affluence” (p. 
390). This model as well as related models (see for example Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 
2000) suggest that the stage of economic development is the driving force of 
“equilibrium”. For an extensive overview of this type of models, see De Wit (1993). 
We hypothesize an “equilibrium” relationship between the rate of business ownership 
and per capita income that is U-shaped.13 The U-shaped pattern has the property that 
there is a level of economic development with a “minimum” business ownership rate.14 
Many forces may cause the actual number of business owners to deviate from the long-
term equilibrium rate. Such a “disequilibium” may result from cultural forces, 
institutional settings (regulation of entry, incentive structures, functioning of the capital 
market) and economic forces (unemployment, profitability of private enterprise). See 
Kirzner (1997), Davis and Henrekson (1999) and Henrekson and Johansson (1999). 
There are several forces in market economies that contribute to a process of adapting 
towards the equilibrium. An example may illustrate this. A high labor income share and 
a structurally low number of enterprises have contributed to structural unemployment in 
the late 1970s and 1980s in many Western economies. Such high levels of 
unemployment may have various consequences. First, unemployment may have a direct 
effect on self-employment, as unemployed are claimed to be more likely to become self-
employed than employees. See for instance Storey (1991) and Evans and Leighton 
(1989). Second, structural unemployment gradually results in wage moderation helping 
to restore profitability of private enterprise (lower labor income share). In addition, a 
perceived shortage of business ownership will induce policies fostering 
entrepreneurship, ranging from better access to financing to competition policies. See 
OECD (1998). The overall impact of these equilibrating processes are hard to observe 
directly and may therefore be modelled best using an error correction mechanism. 
                                                          
13 Schultz (1990) reports having found statistical evidence for a quadratic relationship between the share 
of wage earners and the stage of economic development. 
14 In case the “minimum” is reached at a level of per capita income exceeding those attained in the data 
set, the relation can be better described as L-shaped. 
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The effect of business ownership on economic growth 
There is some evidence on the relation between size class distributions and economic 
performance. For instance, see Nickell (1996), Nickell et al. (1997) and Lever and 
Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) who present evidence that competition, as measured by 
increased number of competitors, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor 
productivity growth. Carree and Thurik (1998, 1999a) show that the share of small 
firms in manufacturing industries in European countries has a positive effect on the 
industry output growth. Thurik (1996) reports that the excess growth of small firms15 
has had a positive influence on percentage change in gross national product for a sample 
of 16 European countries in the period 1988 through 1993.16 
A theoretical endogenous growth model was developed by Schmitz (1989). His model 
predicts that an increase of the proportion of entrepreneurs in the working force leads to 
an increase in long-run economic growth. See also Holmes and Schmitz (1990) who 
develop a model of entrepreneurship in the spirit of T.W. Schultz. They show how 
specialization in managerial tasks and entrepreneurship – responding to opportunities 
for creating new products and production processes – may affect economic 
development. Finally, some evidence of a well-established historical (long-term) 
relationship between fluctuations in entrepreneurship and the rise and fall of nations has 
been assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). Also the work of Eliasson (1995) on 
economic growth through competitive selection is of relevance. He shows (for the 
Swedish economy) how a lack of industry dynamics affects economic progress not so 
much on the short term but very strongly so on the long term (from about two decades 
on). 
Another source of evidence on the relation between self-employment and progress is the 
economic history of the formerly centralized planned economies. A characteristic of 
these economies was the almost complete absence of small firms (and private 
ownership of the means of production), and this extreme monopolization constituted 
one of the major factors leading to the collapse of state socialism (Acs, 1996). The 
development of small enterprises is considered a vital part of the current transition 
process in Eastern Europe.17  
In this chapter we investigate whether deviations between the actual and the equilibrium 
rate of business ownership will diminish the growth potential of an economy in the 
                                                          
15 The excess growth of small firms in that study is defined as the percentage change in the value-of-
shipments accounted for by small firms minus that accounted for by large firms. See also Chapter 4 of 
this book. 
16 A subset of small firms which are assumed to improve economic performance are the so-called New 
Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs). Many of the businesses can be found on Science Parks of which the 
number in many countries has increased strongly during the 1980s and 1990s. Storey and Tether (1998) 
show that most of the NTBFs are, in fact, small firms. They report the average number of employees to be 
around 20 both in France and the U.K. The two countries were the first in Europe (in 1969) to establish 
science parks (Cambridge Science Park in the U.K. and Sophia Antipolis in France). They claim that Italy 
serves as an example of lagging behind in the establishment of “advanced” science parks and relate this to 
the relatively low proportion of university research that is financed by the Italian private sector. 
17 See for example Russia’s Shatalin Plan, which “is built on the assumption that society needs small 
enterprises to orient production to the needs of every person, to fight the dictatorship of monopolies in 
consumer and production markets, and to create a favourable environment for quick introduction of new 
scientific and technological ideas” (Nolan, 1995, p. 82). 
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medium term. A shortage of business owners is likely to diminish competition with 
detrimental effects for static efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy. It 
will also diminish variety, learning and selection and thereby harm dynamic efficiency 
(innovation). On the other hand, a glut of self-employment will cause the average scale 
of operations to remain below optimum. It will result in large numbers of marginal 
entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human energy that could have been allocated more 
productively elsewhere. 
Iyigun and Owen (1998) show in a dynamic model with two types of human capital 
(professional and entrepreneurial) that a misallocation of the existing human capital 
stock between professional and entrepreneurial activities may occur. The nature of the 
inefficiency, however, is not clear-cut. There may be too much entrepreneurship or too 
little, depending on how entrepreneurial and professional skills contribute to the level of 
technology. They find that “a more efficient ratio of professional and entrepreneurial 
skills will raise the steady state of technology, the wages paid to human capital 
providers, and therefore, the economy’s human capital stock” (p. 457). Their model 
supports our notion that deviations from the level of “equilibrium” entrepreneurial 
activity come at a cost of lower economic performance. See also Peretto (1999) who 
derives a hump-shaped relation between the number of firms and returns to investment 
and R&D. 
2.3 Model 
The object of this section is to develop a model of the interrelationship between 
business ownership and economic development at the macro level. The model consists 
of two main equations. The first equation deals with the causes of changes in the rate of 
business ownership whereas the second deals with its consequences. From the first 
equation we derive the equilibrium rate of business ownership as a function of the stage 
of economic development. In the second equation we estimate the effect on economic 
growth of deviating from this equilibrium rate.  
The first equation of the model relates the change in the rate of business ownership itE  
in country i in year t to the extent to which this rate deviated from the equilibrium rate 
*
itE , to the unemployment rate itU  and to the labor income share itLIQ . The second 
equation of the model relates the extent of economic growth to the (absolute) deviation 
of the actual business ownership rate from the equilibrium rate. Economic growth is 
measured as the relative change in the variable itYCAP , the per capita gross domestic 
product in purchasing power parities per U.S. dollar in 1990 prices in country i and 
period t. We correct for catching-up effects by including the level of economic 
development. The equations use the notation 44 −−=∆ ttt XXX . The third equation 
presents the equation relating the equilibrium business ownership rate to the level of 
economic development. It is assumed to be a quadratic function of )YCAPln( it 1+ .
18 
The model reads as follows: 
                                                          
18 In Carree et al. (2000) we compare four different specifications of the relationship between the 
equilibrium business ownership rate and GDP per capita, based upon an earlier version of our business 
ownership dataset (COMPENDIA 1999; in the present chapter we use COMPENDIA 2000.1, see Section 
2.4). The log-quadratic specification adopted in this chapter was found to outperform the other 
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The symbols stand for the following variables:  
 
E:  number of business owners per labor force, 
E*:  equilibrium number of business owners per labor force, 
YCAP: per capita GDP in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices, 
U:  unemployment rate, 
U :  sample average of unemployment rate, 
LIQ:  labor income share, 
LIQ :  sample average of labor income share, 
21,εε :  disturbance terms in Equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively, 
Business ownership equation 
In Equation (2.1), the variable to be explained is the growth in the number of business 
owners per labor force in a period of four years. The first explanatory variable in the 
equation, which has the parameter b1 assigned to it, is an error correction variable 
describing the difference between the equilibrium and the actual rate of business 
ownership at the start of the period. The parameter b1 is expected to have a positive 
sign. In this version of our model the equilibrium function is U-shaped with respect to 
per capita income (Equation (2.3) has a quadratic form). Because the parabola should 
first drop and then rise, we expect the parameter γ  to be positive and the parameter β  
to be negative. In case of absence of economic development ( itYCAP =0) the equilibrium 
function equals α . Since the relative number of business owners cannot be negative or 
in excess of one, the parameter α  should lie between zero and one. 
As a second explanatory variable we use lagged unemployment acting as a push factor 
for business ownership.19 The expected sign of the parameter b2 is positive. We choose 
a lag of six years instead of four for this variable because mental preparation, practical 
procedures and legal requirements are involved in starting a new enterprise.  
As a third explanatory variable we use labor income share. This variable is a pragmatic 
proxy for the earning differentials between expected profits of business owners and 
wage earnings. We assume that a relatively high business profitability (as compared to 
wage earnings) acts as a pull factor for business ownership. The labor income share is 
defined as the share of labor income (including the “calculated” compensation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
specifications in terms of goodness of fit, although not by much. The estimates of the error-correction 
parameter b1 and the growth penalty parameter c1 did not differ much between the four specifications. 
19 Audretsch et al. (2001), in an empirical investigation for 23 OECD countries find a positive effect of 
the (lagged) change of unemployment on the change of the self-employment rate. 
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self-employed for their labor contribution) in the net national income. The expected sign 
of the parameter b3 is negative. As with the unemployment variable, a time lag has been 
included. 
Economic growth equation 
In Equation (2.2), the variable to be explained is economic growth in a four-year period, 
measured as the relative change in gross domestic product per capita. The first 
determinant of growth is the (absolute) deviation of the actual number of self-employed 
(business owners) from the equilibrium rate of business ownership at the start of the 
period. As explained in a previous section, the deviation variable is expected to have a 
negative impact on growth.20  
Next to this deviation variable, we use the level of per capita income at the start of the 
period as a control variable. It allows to correct for the convergence hypothesis of 
countries: countries which are lagging behind in economic development grow more 
easily than other countries because they can profit from modern technologies developed 
in other countries. The expected sign of the parameter c2 is negative.  
2.4 Data and estimation technique 
We use data of 23 OECD countries including the fifteen countries of the EU-15, 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the U.S. and 
for the period 1976 through 1996.21 Data are made available for the even years only. 
The main data sources are the OECD Labour Force Statistics and the OECD National 
Accounts. In Table 2.1 some summary statistics values are given for the first and last 
year of the sample and the mid year 1988 (due to lags only the period 1980-1996 will be 
used in the estimation procedure). 
                                                          
20 In Carree et al. (2000) we consider an alternative penalty function based on the squared instead of the 
absolute deviation. For each of the shapes of the equilibrium function the absolute deviation penalty 
structure outperformed the squared deviation case. 
21 For the unemployment rate and the labor income share we also use data of 1974. 
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics for the 23 OECD countries  
 
Country  E1976  E1988  E1996  YCAP1988          E*1988 
 
Austria  0.077  0.069  0.074  15,651  0.112 
Belgium   0.098  0.109  0.119  15,326  0.113 
Denmark  0.081  0.056  0.064  16,263  0.110 
Finland  0.059  0.076  0.080  15,456  0.112 
France   0.105  0.099  0.088  16,421  0.110 
Germany (West) 0.070  0.070  0.082  17,245  0.109 
Greece   0.179  0.186  0.196    7,274  0.180 
Ireland   0.074  0.091  0.100    9,735  0.145 
Italy   0.142  0.169  0.183  15,289  0.113 
Luxembourg  0.093  0.075  0.062  21,103  0.107 
The Netherlands 0.092  0.082  0.102  14,867  0.114 
Portugal  0.110  0.116  0.160    8,424  0.161 
Spain   0.109  0.122  0.130  10,886  0.135 
Sweden  0.068  0.064  0.081  16,632  0.110 
United Kingdom 0.074  0.101  0.109  15,590  0.112 
Iceland   0.099  0.101  0.130  17,368  0.109 
Norway  0.089  0.084  0.071  17,301  0.109 
Switzerland  0.069  0.071  0.085  20,133  0.107 
United States  0.081  0.107  0.104  21,543  0.107 
Japan   0.126  0.123  0.101  16,328  0.110 
Canada  0.078  0.106  0.128  18,573  0.107 
Australia  0.147  0.164  0.154  16,154  0.111 
New Zealand  0.098  0.116  0.133  13,532  0.119 
 
Average  0.096  0.102  0.110  15,526  0.118 
 
Note: The business ownership rates E are per labor force. The business ownership figures are exclusive of 
the business owners in the agricultural sector. The unit of GDP per capita (YCAP) is purchasing power 
parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices. In the last column the estimated equilibrium business ownership rates 
for 1988 are given, using the estimates of α , β  and γ  from the “Two yearly” case from Table 2.3. 
Germany refers to West-Germany for 1976 and 1988. This business ownership data set is referred to as 
COMPENDIA 2000.1. 
From Table 2.1 we see that Australia, Greece and Italy have the highest levels of self-
employment (business ownership) in 1988: more than 15% of the labor force. The 
unweighted sample average level of self-employment in that year is 10%. The countries 
with the lowest levels of self-employment in 1988 are Denmark and Sweden: six 
percent of the labor force. Looking at the GDP per capita in 1988, we see that the 
United States, Switzerland and Luxembourg are the most affluent countries while 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are the least affluent countries in the sample. The 
unemployment rates are not given in the table but they were highest in the 1980s in 
Ireland and Spain. Low unemployment rates were found in Japan, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Iceland and Luxembourg in that period. 
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Variables and sources 
The variable definitions and their main sources are given below. 
E : self-employment or business ownership. This variable is defined as the number 
of business owners (in all sectors excluding the agricultural sector), expressed as a 
fraction of the labor force. Data sources include the OECD Labour Force Statistics 
1976-1996 and 1978-1998. EIM completed the missing data by using ratios derived 
from various other sources. Furthermore, EIM made a unified data set of business 
owners as the definitions of business owners or self-employed (we use these terms 
interchangeably) in the OECD statistics are not fully compatible between countries. In 
some countries business owners are defined as individuals owning a business that is not 
legally incorporated. In other countries, owner/managers of an incorporated business 
(OMIBs) who enjoy profits as well as a salary are considered owners too. There are also 
countries who classify a part of the OMIBs as self-employed and another part as 
employee. This results from a different set-up of labor force surveys in different 
countries.22 By and large, Australia, Japan, Norway and U.S. use a narrow business 
ownership definition (excluding OMIBs or excluding most OMIBs), while the other 
countries apply a broader characterization (including OMIBs or including most 
OMIBs). Business owners in the present report are defined to include OMIBs. For the 
countries not following this definition, EIM made an estimation of the number of 
OMIBs using information derived from The European Observatory for SMEs 
(KPMG/ENSR, 2000), or using information from domestic sources for the non-
European countries. Another difference in definition is that for some countries unpaid 
family workers are included in the self-employment data as well, mostly for early years. 
For these years, the unpaid family workers were removed from the data by using ratios 
from more recent years for which separate data on unpaid family workers are available. 
Finally, for countries where important unclarified trend breaks occur, these trend breaks 
were corrected for. Data on the labor force are also from the OECD Labour Force 
Statistics. Again, some missing data have been filled up from various other sources.23 
YCAP : gross domestic product per capita. The underlying variables gross domestic 
product and total population are from OECD National Accounts 1960-1996, Detailed 
Tables, and from the OECD Labour Force Statistics 1976-1996 and 1978-1998, 
respectively. GDP is measured in constant prices. Furthermore, purchasing power 
parities of 1990 are used to make the monetary units comparable between countries. 
U : (standardized) unemployment rate. This variable measures the number of 
unemployed as a fraction of the total labor force. The labor force consists of employees, 
self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, people employed by the Army and 
unemployed persons. The main source for this variable is OECD Main Economic 
Indicators. Some missing data on the number of unemployed have been filled up with 
help of data from the OECD Labour Force Statistics and the Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics from the International Labour Office.  
LIQ : labor income share. Total compensation of employees is multiplied by (total 
employment/number of employees) to correct for the imputed wage income for the self-
employed persons. Next, the number obtained is divided by total income (compensation 
                                                          
22 This topic is dealt with in Chapter 5 of OECD Employment Outlook June 2000. 
23 See also Chapter 9 of this book for more information about these business ownership data. 
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of employees plus other income). The data on the separate variables are from the OECD 
National Accounts 1960-1996, Detailed Tables. Some missing data have been filled up 
with help of data from the OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
When estimating the model, we weight the observations with population. We consider 
larger countries such as the U.S. and Japan to be more important in establishing the 
relationship between business ownership and economic growth than small countries. 
When the data of, for example, Luxembourg or Iceland would call for a different 
relation, we would not want this to have a big impact on the estimation results.  
2.5 Estimation results 
To estimate the Model (2.1)-(2.3) we substitute Equation (2.3) into Equation (2.1): 
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We apply (weighted) least squares to this equation and then find estimates for the 
equilibrium relation parameters through: 
 
(2.5)  15141320 b/aˆb/aˆb/)LIQbUba(ˆ ==++= γβα . 
 
These coefficients are substituted into Equation (2.3) so that we can calculate E*. This 
variable is incorporated into Equation (2.2). This equation is then also estimated using 
(weighted) least squares.  
We consider two samples. The first is the “Two yearly” case in which data for all the 
even years are used (1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996). The 
total number of observations then equals 207. As an alternative we use the “Four 
yearly” case in which data for the years 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 are used. The 
total number of observations then equals 115. The reason for removing observations 
from the sample is that the observation periods for two consecutive even years overlap. 
This may lead to a downward bias in the estimated standard errors of the coefficients. 
Weighting with population (in the year t-4) implies that all variables (including 
constants and dummies) are multiplied with the square root of population before the 
least squares procedure is run. A more detailed description of the weighting of 
observations can be found in the Appendix to this chapter. 
The estimation results of Model (2.1)-(2.5) are given in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Estimation results of Model (2.1)-(2.5) 
 
Parameter Two yearly Four yearly Parameter Two yearly Four yearly 
 
a0   0.049   0.038  α    0.538   0.254 
   (1.1)   (0.6)     (0.6)   (0.2) 
b1   0.050   0.049  β   -0.127   0.104 
   (2.8)   (1.8)     (0.2)   (0.1) 
b2   0.066   0.057  γ   -0.004  -0.050 
   (4.5)   (2.8)     (0.0)   (0.3) 
b3  -0.030  -0.034  c0   0.222   0.205 
   (2.2)   (1.8)     (7.5)   (5.6) 
a4  -0.006   0.005  c1  -0.488  -0.349 
   (0.2)   (0.1)     (3.0)   (1.9) 
a5  -0.000  -0.002  c2  -0.008  -0.007 
   (0.0)   (0.3)     (5.3)   (3.8) 
 
2
1R    0.224   0.197  
2
2R    0.504   0.569  
N   207   115  N   207   115 
 
Note: Absolute t-values are between brackets. 
From Table 2.2 we see that most coefficients are significant with the expected signs: 
unemployment has a positive effect on self-employment and the effect of labor income 
share is negative (coefficients b2 and b3, respectively). Furthermore, the hypothesized 
error-correction process and the negative impact on growth of deviating from 
equilibrium also seem to be supported: coefficients b1 and c1 are significantly positive 
and negative, respectively. The speed of adjustment is low: 5%. However, the results on 
the error-correction process and the growth penalty should be interpreted with caution, 
since the estimated equilibrium relation between the business ownership rate and per 
capita income appears not well determined: coefficients α , β  and γ  have very low t-
values.  
Special position of Italy 
The low t-values for the equilibrium relation coefficients may be caused by the 
existence of certain (large) countries with specific developments in the business 
ownership rate not covered by our model. This could influence the estimates towards 
implausible results. The country we suspect may deviate most from the other countries 
is Italy. Looking at Table 2.1, we see that Italy combines a high level of self-
employment with a near average level of per capita income. This is not in accordance 
with what we would expect: the countries with a high rate of self-employment (business 
ownership) are generally in a less advanced stage of economic development (for 
example Greece). Italy can be divided in two different economies: a well-developed 
economy (Northern Italy) and a less developed economy (Southern Italy or the 
Mezzogiorno). Italy might not fit well in our model because it basically consists of two 
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different economies. A closer inspection of the data for Northern and Southern Italy24 
shows that Northern Italy in particular deviates from the expected pattern, i.e. the U-
shaped trend of the relative number of business owners set out against per capita 
income. Here, a high self-employment rate is combined with a relatively high value of 
GDP per capita. Small and medium-sized firms seem to play a bigger role in (Northern) 
Italian manufacturing than in other industrialized countries.25 A notable feature of the 
organization of Italian small and medium-sized firm production is its high geographical 
concentration in small areas or industrial districts (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The 
geographical distribution also shows that the majority of small and medium-sized 
manufacturing firms is located in Northern and Central Italy (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). 
They often have a strong family component.  
The Italian model of extensive small and medium-sized firm production differs from 
that in other countries in similar stages of development. It may have positive and/or 
negative effects on economic growth. Many of the Italian firms are highly specialized 
and are organized on a flexible basis, so as to meet specific customer needs, and 
produce well designed and fashionable goods, aimed at the richest segments of the 
market. Another characteristic of the Italian model is that Italian R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of GNP are by far the lowest among the largest OECD-countries. They 
amount to only half of that in Germany, the U.S. and Japan over a long period (Klomp 
and Pronk, 1998, p. 167). Hence, the number of business owners in Northern Italy is 
higher than one would expect on the basis of the advanced stage of economic 
development. The data for Southern Italy seem to be in conformity with the general 
pattern: there is also a high level of self-employment but combined with a low value of 
the GDP per capita.  
Looking again at the Italian data in Table 2.1, we see that Italy not only has a relatively 
high self-employment rate but also that self-employment in Italy continues to rise. 
Therefore we suspect that the hypothesized error-correction process does not apply to 
the Italian economy. We approach this problem by introducing a dummy variable DITA 
that is 1 for the Italian observations and 0 elsewhere. That is, we have the error term in 
Equation (2.1) equal to itITAITAit Da ηε += ,01 .  
The estimation results of the model including the “Italy-dummy” are given in Table 2.3.  
                                                          
24 Separate data for Northern and Southern Italy are obtained from Eurostat Regions Statistical Yearbook. 
25 The size of newly established firms in Italy is very small in comparison with the size of incumbent 
firms (see Santarelli and Sterlacchini, 1994). 
 31
Table 2.3: Estimation results of Model (2.1)-(2.5), including dummy for Italy in (2.4) 
 
Parameter Two yearly Four yearly Parameter Two yearly Four yearly 
 
a0   0.109   0.098  α    0.863   0.743 
   (2.5)   (1.5)     (2.5)   (1.5) 
b1   0.120   0.120  β   -0.494  -0.398 
   (5.4)   (3.6)     (2.0)   (1.1) 
b2   0.063   0.055  γ    0.081   0.062 
   (4.5)   (2.8)     (1.7)   (0.9) 
b3  -0.011  -0.014  c0   0.182   0.183 
   (0.8)   (0.7)     (8.9)   (7.6) 
a4  -0.059  -0.048  c1  -0.571  -0.576 
   (1.9)   (1.0)     (2.7)   (2.4) 
a5   0.010   0.007  c2  -0.006  -0.006 
   (1.6)   (0.9)     (5.3)   (4.5) 
a0,ITA   0.011   0.011 
   (4.9)   (3.4) 
 
P-value of Wald test on 0== γβ      0.002   0.042 
Minimum value of E* at γβ 2−      3.06   3.22 
         (12.5)   (5.2) 
2
1R    0.307   0.274  
2
2R    0.500   0.575  
N   207   115  N   207   115 
 
Note: Absolute t-values between brackets. 
We see that the t-values of the estimated coefficients of the hypothesized U-shape of the 
equilibrium rate of business ownership in Table 2.3 are higher than those presented in 
Table 2.2. Also, the coefficients are in accordance with our expectations. The estimates 
of β  and γ  have the predicted signs and that of α  lies between zero and one. 
However, the t-values of β  and γ  are still not high. This is not surprising, considering 
the high correlation between the linear and the quadratic )YCAPln( it 1+  variables. 
Indeed, the Wald test for the hypothesis that β  and γ  are jointly zero is rejected. 
Furthermore, an analysis of γβ 2−  (which is the minimum of the parabola in terms of 
)YCAPln( it 1+ ) shows that this expression does have a high t-value, implying that the 
log-quadratic specification performs reasonably well. Further investigation of the 
parabola shows that for the “Two yearly” case the minimum value is reached for a level 
of per capita income of 20,398 U.S. dollar (in purchasing power parities) at 1990 prices. 
The minimum level of equilibrium business ownership is 10.7% of the labor force. In 
Figure 2.1 we show the equilibrium curve and the actual data for the G7-countries. In 
this figure also the (YCAP; E) combinations for the “out-of-sample” years 1972, 1974 
and 1998 are incorporated. For the “Four yearly” case the value of the minimum is 
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0.103 and it is attained at a level of 23,930 U.S. dollar. We will concentrate on the 
results of the “Two yearly” case as they are similar to the “Four yearly” one. 
The last column of Table 2.1 presents the equilibrium business ownership rates in the 
year 1988. Greece has the highest equilibrium rate, 0.180. Most of the countries are 
close to the minimum of the curve, though. The two richest countries, Luxembourg and 
the United States, have an equilibrium rate which is close to the minimum of the curve. 
These countries have reached a level of per capita income in 1988 which just exceeds 
the GDP per capita level at which the equilibrium rate reaches its minimum. For the 
interpretation of this parabola describing the equilibrium rate of business ownership 
given a certain stage of economic development, it should be noted that the relation is 
based upon a limited range of values of GDP per capita. For values of per capita income 
far outside our sample range -for example less developed countries or GDP per capita 
levels twice as high as attained in the richest countries in our sample- the equilibrium 
rate of business ownership may not be described properly by the quadratic function. 
Furthermore, U-shaped equilibrium functions cannot be distinguished from L-shaped 
functions in a statistical sense, because the majority of the GDP per capita values in our 
sample lie below the level associated with the minimum of the parabola. 
As before, we find that the hypothesized error-correction process of the number of 
business owners towards the equilibrium rate is supported: the estimate of b1 is 
significantly positive. The speed of adjustment is not high: the deviation from 
equilibrium at a certain point in time decreases with 12 percent in a period of four years. 
The low value of the speed of adjustment is not surprising. The convergence process of 
the actual business ownership rate towards the equilibrium rate is intrinsically slow 
because it involves structural changes on the supply side (setting up enterprises, 
investments in physical and human capital, divestments, etc.) as well as cultural and 
institutional changes. Note that the estimate of b1 is higher than in Table 2.2, in which 
the “Italy-dummy” was excluded from the model. It shows that Italy is an exception to 
the general pattern of the business ownership rate adjusting towards the equilibrium 
level. The lack of error-correction for Italian self-employment is also clear from Figure 
2.1.26 
The estimate of b2 points at a positive impact of unemployment on self-employment: 
every percent point rise in the unemployment rate leads to a rise of 0.06 percent point in 
the self-employment rate in the succeeding six years. This is in accordance with 
evidence in some earlier studies: unemployment is a push factor for self-employment. 
The other variable explaining the change in self-employment, the labor income share, 
has the expected effect: the estimate of b3 is negative. The effect is insignificant, 
though. This means that we fail to find evidence for our variable of business 
profitability to act as a pull factor for business ownership. The remaining variable in the 
business ownership equation, the “Italy-dummy”, shows a significant positive 
                                                          
26 We have also run a regression of Equation (2.4) with dummy-variables included for all countries in the 
sample. We found the error-correction effect to increase to 0.20 and the growth penalty to become 
insignificant (t-value below unity). Because one possible interpretation of such a regression is that every 
country has its own unique equilibrium level, these results are not surprising. However, this type of 
country-specific equilibrium levels is not the focus of this chapter, since we are investigating a 
“universal” equilibrium function which should be valid for all countries. Indeed, as we described earlier, 
we do not even interpret the “Italy-dummy” as reflecting a country-specific equilibrium. Instead, we 
interpret it as an autonomous additional rise in the number of business owners, not necessarily favouring 
economic growth. 
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coefficient. The rate of business ownership in Italy rises faster ceteris paribus than in 
other countries. 
Another important characteristic of the estimation results is the deviation of the actual 
number of business owners from the equilibrium rate having a negative impact on 
economic growth: the estimate of c1 is significantly negative.27 This implies that 
economies with a business ownership rate below the equilibrium may benefit from 
stimulating new start-ups. In case this rate exceeds the equilibrium, it suggests that there 
are important impediments to growth for small and medium-sized enterprises. In the 
growth equation, the per capita income parameter c2 is estimated to be negative. This 
might reflect the convergence of countries hypothesis. However, it may also be a within 
(regression-to-the-mean) effect: a higher value of GDP per capita in a certain year leads 
to a smaller economic growth in the subsequent period. Finally, the constant term c0 is 
positive.  
A comparison of the third and sixth column of Table 2.1 shows that in 1988 most 
countries had too few self-employed relative to the equilibrium value. An obvious 
exception is Italy. It indicates that the high level of self-employment in Italy is not 
efficient: it has a relatively large negative impact on economic growth.28 Another 
exception is Australia. But as opposed to Italy, Australia moved in the direction of 
equilibrium between 1988 and 1996, as can be seen from the fourth column of Table 
2.1. Countries which experienced very low business ownership rates compared to the 
equilibrium include the Scandinavian countries. These economies are chacterized by a 
large public sector, relatively low entry and exit rates and high taxes. Eliasson (1995) 
blames part of Sweden’s relatively bad economic performance in the 1980s on limited 
private initiative and a lack of structural adjustment. Another country with a relatively 
low business ownership rate is Germany. In Figure 2.1 it is shown that, at least until 
recently, Germany has failed to restructure where for example the United Kingdom has. 
Klodt (1990) blames (West) German industrial policy for repressing structural change in 
supporting large-scale industries with subsidies. An important reason for the lack of a 
vibrant sector of new firms and industries in Germany up till the mid 1990s has been the 
high barriers to innovative activity (Audretsch, 2000). An example of important 
economic reforms transforming an economy from a regulated one to a market-orientated 
one with increasing business ownership rates is New Zealand (see e.g. Evans et al., 
1996). Carlsson (1996) shows the strong increase in the number of firms as a result of 
the reforms, certainly when compared to countries like Sweden. After a painful 
transition period the New Zealand’s reforms appear to ultimately have generated 
economic growth (McMillan, 1998). The data in Table 2.1 suggest that, indeed, 
business ownership rates were below equilibrium values for New Zealand before the 
start of the reforms in 1984. The increase in business ownership rates has been fierce in 
                                                          
27 We do not include country-specific dummies in Equation (2.2). However, when including such 
dummies the coefficient of c1 remains negative and the value of the estimate barely changes, both in the 
“Two yearly” case and the “Four yearly” case. This is also found for both cases when the “Italy-dummy” 
in the first equation is excluded (as in Table 2.2). Likelihood ratio test statistics testing whether or not to 
include country-specific dummies in Equation (2.2) have values between 34.0 and 46.5 for the four cases 
of Table 2.2 and 2.3. These values are close to the critical values at 5% (33.9) and 1% (40.3). 
28 In Italy, research and development expenditures are by far the lowest among the largest OECD 
countries as a percentage of gross national product. This is in line with the idea that when there are too 
many business owners, the scale advantages in research and development are not utilized. See Cohen and 
Klepper (1996).  
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the period thereafter and may be “overshooting”, making some “shake-out” of newly 
entered entrepreneurs likely. 
Figure 2.1:  The actual and equilibrium rate of business ownership for G7-countries, 
1972-1998 
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2.6 Discussion 
Business ownership has received considerable attention from policy makers in 
European countries. The high unemployment rate coupled with limited economic 
growth in Europe has triggered a plea by policy makers for rethinking the policy 
approach that fostered prosperity during the post-war era. In two ways globalization has 
reduced the ability of the European countries to generate economic growth and create 
jobs. On the one hand the advent of new competition from low-cost countries in Asia 
and Central and Eastern Europe has flooded the EU markets. On the other hand, the 
telecommunications and computer revolutions have drastically reduced the cost of 
shifting capital and information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into lower-
cost locations around the globe (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). 
It is deeply embedded in the current European policy approach that the creativity and 
independence of the self-employed contribute to higher levels of economic activity. In 
modern economies a great variety of organizations is involved in making innovative 
products. This is the case particularly in niche markets like in the ICT sector. The more 
organizations are active in such markets, the greater the chance that an innovation takes 
place. Variety and selection play a dominant role in this mechanism. Therefore, major 
funds of governmental institutions and independent donor organizations are being 
channeled towards young and small firms. The present chapter aims at achieving some 
first insights into whether such policies are justified in different phases of economic 
development. 
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We seek to explain the interrelationship between economic progress and the size class 
structure of firms. This chapter zooms in on one specific linkage: that between the 
number of business owners and economic development. Three aspects of this linkage 
are investigated. First, we investigate whether there is a long-term equilibrium relation 
between the number of business owners and the stage of economic development. This 
conjecture arises from analysing empirical and theoretical work in this area. The 
relation is hypothesized to initially be a decreasing function of economic development 
in that the self-employment rate is high in low-developed economies whereas more 
highly developed countries where mass production and scale economies thrive have 
lower self-employment rates. A large literature points at a still later phase of economic 
development where the business ownership rate is increasing again. This phase is 
characterized by “the reversal of the trend” towards increasing economies of scale and 
scope. Therefore we formulate the equilibrium business ownership to have a U-shaped 
relation with respect to economic development. Second, we investigate whether there is 
a correction mechanism when the rate of business ownership is out of equilibrium and 
compute the speed of convergence. Deviations from equilibrium can occur due to 
exogenous shocks and institutional divergences, for instance, because “government 
regulation of market activity is likely to obstruct and frustrate the spontaneous, 
corrective forces of entrepreneurial adjustments” (Kirzner, 1997, p. 81). Third, we 
investigate whether deviating from the equilibrium rate of business ownership leads to 
lower economic growth. The three aspects are tested using a two-equation model. The 
first equation explains the growth of the number of business owners using the deviation 
between the actual and the equilibrium rate of business ownership, unemployment as a 
push factor and the labor income share as a measure of business profitability. The 
second equation explains economic growth using the deviation between the actual and 
the equilibrium rate of business ownership, and the per capita income level. The model 
is tested using a data panel of 23 OECD countries.  
We find evidence for a long-term equilibrium relation between economic development 
and business ownership. However, U-shaped equilibrium functions cannot be 
distinguished from L-shaped functions in a statistical sense. In fact, the large majority of 
countries has levels of economic development smaller than that at which the U-curve 
reaches its “minimum”, making the “equilibrium function” largely L-shaped. 
We find evidence for an error correction mechanism between the actual rate of business 
ownership and the equilibrium rate. Lagged unemployment appears to be a significant 
push factor of business ownership. Italy plays an exceptional role in our sample of 23 
OECD countries in that there appears to be an additional autonomous increase of the 
rate of self-employment which may have frustrated economic growth. 
The rate of business ownership is found to influence economic growth through 
deviations from the equilibrium rate. This result supports the view that size distribution 
differences across countries matter when explaining economic performance (Davis and 
Henrekson, 1999). As a consequence, economies can have both too few or too many 
business owners and both situations can lead to a growth penalty. By and large, a five 
percent point deviation implies a growth loss of three percent over a period of four 
years. 
An important policy implication of our exercises is not only that “To induce dynamic 
entrepreneurial competition we require the fulfillment of only one condition: 
guaranteeing free entrepreneurial entry into any market where profit opportunities may 
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be perceived to exist” (Kirzner, 1997, p. 74), but also that exit free of stigma and 
financial burdens has to be safeguarded. Low barriers to entry and exit of business 
owners are a necessary condition for the equilibrium seeking mechanisms which are 
vital in our model of the relation between business ownership and economic 
development. 
The results presented in this chapter should be interpreted with caution. The very 
concept of the economy-wide rate of business ownership entails several difficulties of 
interpretation. For example, it is impossible to make the rates perfectly statistically 
comparable across countries. In addition, the composition of the rates are unclear: high-
tech start-ups are indistinguishable from old mom-and-pop businesses in the retail 
sector (with the same number of employees). Nevertheless, we argue that this chapter 
may provide a good starting point for a promising line of research. As an important 
issue we mention that while the present research is based upon country-wide 
composites, sectoral diversity between countries probably plays a role when explaining 
differences in equilibrium situation and differences in the equilibrium restoring 
mechanism.  
2.A Appendix: Weighted regressions 
Estimation results are obtained by weighting the observations with the number of 
inhabitants. In this appendix we provide the rationale. For simplicity we consider the 
case of cross sectional data (i.e. no time dimension). 
Suppose that there are N regions in L countries with L << N. In our case, L would be 23 
because we have 23 countries in our data set. We assume that these N regions are all of 
the same size. Thus, for example, the U.S. would have many regions the size of 
Luxembourg. If we would dispose of data per region, we would propose the following 
model for a linear relationship between two variables x and y: 
 
(2.A1)  iRiRiR xy ,,, εβ += ,       i = 1,…,N (regions). 
 
The subscript R is used to denote that the data are assumed to be available at the 
regional level. The OLS-estimator of β  in (2.A1) is then 
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However, we have data at the aggregated level of countries and not at the level of 
regions. Given our assumption that the regions are equally large, we write the model 
with the variables x and y at the country level (subscript C) as  
 
(2.A2)  jCjCjC xy ,,, εβ += ,      j = 1,…,L (countries),  
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where 
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The variable Di,j is defined as follows: Di,j = 1 if region i lies in country j and 0 
otherwise. Furthermore, Nj denotes the number of regions in country j ( NN
L
j
j =∑
=1
). 
Hence, we assume that the variables x and y at the country-level can be written as the 
averages of the variables over the regions of the country. When we translate these 
country-level variables yC,j and xC,j in (2.A2) back to the regional level variables yR,i and 
xR,i in (2.A1), we obtain the following observations for our original Model (2.A1) at the 
regional level: 
Observations for which: 
 Di,1 = 1: 1,
*
,1,
*
, CiRCiR xxyy ==    (N1 observations) 
 . 
 . 
 Di,L = 1: LCiRLCiR xxyy ,
*
,,
*
, ==    (NL observations) 
Writing the data at the regional level in this manner, it is implicitly assumed that within 
countries, the various regions are identical. With these observations, the OLS-estimator 
can be written as: 
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Thus, here it is assumed that there are N observations where for every observation 
(region) within a country, the variables have identical values. However, we have only L 
observations and then the OLS-estimator of β  from (2.A2) reads as 
 
∑
∑
=
=
= L
j
jCjC
L
j
jCjC
OLS
xx
yx
Ab
1
,,
1
,,
)2( . 
We see that this estimator is different from b*OLS(A1), which we would like to have. 
The estimator bOLS(A2) does not take into account that different countries have different 
numbers of regions, or stated differently, that the various countries are not equally large. 
Therefore, we weight the observations by premultiplying the variables xC and yC from 
(2.A2) with the square root of the number of regions. The (weighted) least squares 
estimator bWLS(A2) reads as 
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We see that the WLS-estimator of (2.A2) is exactly the same as the OLS-estimator of 
(2.A1), b*OLS(A1). Clearly, we do not know the number of regions per country. We use 
the population size as a proxy.  
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Chapter 3 
Business Ownership and Sectoral Growth 
We investigate the development of business ownership (self-employment) rates over 
time at the sectoral level and the effect of these rates on sectoral output growth. In an 
earlier exercise, Carree et al. (2002) presented an analysis of the interrelationship 
between economy-wide business ownership rates and economic development. Their 
analysis raised an important research question: to what extent do differences in business 
ownership rates at the economy-wide level reflect differences in the sectoral structures 
of economies or differences in business ownership rates at the sectoral level? The 
current chapter investigates this question making use of a sectoral data base of 21 
OECD countries for the period 1970-98. Estimation results suggest that there is, on 
average, a too low business ownership rate in manufacturing and a too high business 
ownership rate in services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Van Stel, A.J. and M.A. Carree (2004), Business Ownership and Sectoral Growth: An 
Empirical Analysis of 21 OECD Countries, International Small Business Journal 22, 
389-419. 
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3.1 Introduction 29 
The empirical growth literature has generated a long list of regressors assumed to affect 
economic growth. The regressors range from schooling to climate and from the extent 
of democracy to life expectancy (see e.g. Bleaney and Nishiyama, 2002). These factors 
are of considerable importance and it is for example unlikely to find a non-democratic 
country with an extreme climate to show fast economic growth, except when oil or 
other natural resources come into play. However, little attention in the empirical growth 
literature has been devoted to entrepreneurship and competition usually considered vital 
to economic progress. The lack of economic progress in (formerly) centralized planned 
economies has been at least partly due to the absence of these private initiatives. A 
characteristic of these economies was the almost complete absence of small firms and 
this extreme monopolization was a major factor leading to the collapse of state 
socialism (see e.g. Acs, 1996). The incorporation of entrepreneurship and competition 
into empirical growth models has been hampered by the problem of measurement. 
However, a small literature has developed that investigates the effect of the industry 
structure in terms of the share of small firms on economic progress. Examples include 
Nickell (1996), Carree and Thurik (1998), Audretsch et al. (2002a) and Carree (2002a).  
Recently, Carree et al. (2002) introduced a model that describes the interrelationship 
between the rate of business ownership (or interchangeably self-employment) and 
economic development. This model consists of two equations, which are estimated 
successively. In the first equation, an “equilibrium” relation is derived between the rate 
of business ownership and the level of economic development of a country. In the 
second equation the impact on economic growth of deviating from the “equilibrium” 
rate is estimated. The basic idea behind the model is that there can be too many or too 
few self-employed in an economy. A consequence of a too high business ownership rate 
in a country is that economies of scale and scope are not benefited from and that R&D 
expenditures may be relatively low. A consequence of a too low business ownership 
rate is that new private initiatives and radical new innovations may be less present than 
in other countries at comparable levels of economic development. Carree et al. present 
empirical evidence for the “equilibrium” rate of business ownership to depend upon the 
stage of economic development and that deviating from the “equilibrium” implies a 
lower economic growth rate.  
The paper by Carree et al. suffers from an important limitation. It studies the 
relationship between business ownership rates at the economy-wide level without taking 
into consideration the sectoral structure of the economy. It is well-known that business 
ownership rates are much higher in the service sector when compared to the 
manufacturing sector. It is therefore possible that the penalty on deviating from the 
“equilibrium” business ownership rate is not a problem of having too few or too many 
self-employed, but a problem of having a too small or a too large share of the service 
sector. Carree et al. find that the “equilibrium” business ownership rates tend to increase 
with the level of economic development for the highly most developed countries (in 
terms of GDP per capita). This might be caused by increased interest for the option of 
self-employment as such across the sectors in the economy, but may also be explained 
                                                          
29 This chapter is reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd from André van Stel and Martin 
Carree, Business ownership and sectoral growth: an empirical analysis of 21 OECD countries, 
International Small Business Journal, Vol. 22, #4, Copyright (Sage Publications, 2004). 
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from an employment shift in modern economies away from the manufacturing sector 
towards the service sector. The current chapter examines the importance of the sectoral 
component in the Carree et al. model, using data for 21 OECD countries. The 21 
countries include 16 European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand. 
There is a lot of debate about the reasons behind the increase in self-employment rates 
in developed countries in the last quarter of the 20th century. On the one hand, 
Audretsch and Thurik (2000) consider it to be a reflection of the shift from a “managed” 
towards an “entrepreneurial” economy. They claim that there is more room for business 
ownership in the latter type of economy because of, among others, increasing variety of 
demand and rapidly changing economic circumstances in which small firms have a 
comparative advantage with regard to their larger counterparts. These phenomena 
particularly apply to fully industrialized economies and therefore, this upward trend of 
business ownership would only be observable in countries at higher stages of economic 
development. On the other hand, other economists will say that this upward trend of the 
macro business ownership rate in modern economies is just a reflection of the 
(employment) share of the service industries increasing at the cost of the manufacturing 
industries’ share. According to these economists it does not imply that also within 
sectors there would be an upward trend in business ownership. The current analysis 
gathers business ownership data on the sectoral level and applies the model of Carree et 
al. at this level. In this way, we can determine whether or not the structural changes in 
business ownership do also apply within sectors. In particular, we will estimate the 
model for two sectors: manufacturing and services. 
In Section 3.2 we will discuss the Carree et al. model and adapt it to make it applicable 
at the sectoral level. We also discuss the relevant literature. In Section 3.3 we discuss 
the data for the OECD countries. This is followed by the empirical results in Section 
3.4. Section 3.5 is left for discussion.   
3.2 Theory and model 
Carree et al. (2000, 2002) introduced a model consisting of two equations with one 
additional equation defining the “equilibrium” rate of business ownership in period t, 
*
tE . The dependent variables of the two equations are the four-year change in the 
business ownership rate, 4−− tt EE , and the four-year growth rate of GDP, 
44 −−− ttt Y/)YY( . We use the same model configuration in our analysis but adapt it 
somewhat to apply it to the sectoral level. The model reads as follows. 
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(3.3) ( ) )1(* OMIBOMIBitijt DbYCAPfE +×=  
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The symbols in these equations stand for the following variables: 
 
E : number of business owners as fraction of total employment in sector 
(sectoral business ownership rate), 
*E : sectoral equilibrium business ownership rate, 
Y : sectoral GDP, 
YCAP : GDP per capita (macro level), 
U : unemployment rate, 
U : sample average of unemployment rate, 
shareY _ : sectoral GDP as fraction of total GDP, 
ο
WT : relative growth of world trade (yearly basis), 
ITAD : dummy for Italy, 
OMIBD : dummy for countries for which number of business owners is defined 
inclusive of owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs), 
21,εε : disturbance terms in Equations (3.1) and (3.2), respectively, 
tji ,, : indices for country, sector, and year, respectively. 
The variables E , *E  and Y  are defined at the sectoral level and YCAP  and U  are 
defined at the macro level. In the current chapter business ownership is defined to 
include both the self-employed (the unincorporated as well as the incorporated) and the 
unpaid family workers. More details about this definition and the data sources used are 
given in Section 3.3. In the remainder of the current section we will describe the three 
equations in the model in some detail. A more elaborate discussion can be found in 
Carree et al. (2002). Because the concept of an “equilibrium” rate of business ownership 
is central to the model, we start with Equation (3.3). 
Equilibrium business ownership equation  
The (sectoral) equilibrium business ownership rate is assumed to be a function f  of 
(macro) economic development as measured by itYCAP . For low levels of economic 
development, we expect the function f  to be declining. Several authors (e.g. Kuznets, 
1971; Schultz, 1990) have reported a negative relationship between economic 
development and the business ownership (self-employment) rate. Their studies use a 
large cross-section of countries with a wide variety in the stage of economic 
development. There are a series of reasons for the decline of self-employment, and of 
small business presence in general, during the early phases of industrialization. 
Chandler (1990) discusses the importance of investment in production, distribution, and 
management needed to exploit economies of scale and scope during the period after the 
second industrial revolution of the second half of the 19th century. It was a period of 
relatively well-defined technological trajectories, of stable demand and of seemingly 
clear advantages of diversification. 
For high levels of economic development the function f  may be increasing. Acs et al. 
(1994) report that a majority of OECD-countries experienced an increase in the self-
employment rate during the 1970s and 1980s. Further evidence of a recent increase in 
self-employment in many OECD countries appears from EIM’s data set COMPENDIA. 
For instance, for the United Kingdom, the number of non-agricultural self-employed 
(including the incorporated self-employed) as a fraction of total labour force increased 
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from 7.8% in 1972 to 10.5% in 2000, and in the United States this fraction increased 
from 8.0% to 10.0% in the same period (see Van Stel, 2003). 
There are several reasons for the revival of small business and self-employment in 
Western economies. First, the last thirty years can be considered a period of industrial 
restructuring away from traditional manufacturing industries and towards the 
electronics, software and biotechnology industries. Jensen (1993) uses the term “Third 
Industrial Revolution” to describe this development. Small firms play an important role 
in these new industries. Second, new technologies have reduced the importance of scale 
economies in many sectors. This increases the comparative advantage of small firms 
relative to large firms (see e.g. Meredith, 1987). Third, from a certain level of economic 
development onwards, higher income and wealth increase consumer demand for variety 
(see Jackson, 1984) creating new market niches. Fourth, self-employment has become 
more highly valued as an occupational choice. This “supply side” reason may be 
derived from a supposed hierarchy of human motivations, ranging from physical needs 
at the bottom to self-realization at the top (Maslow, 1970). Once the main material 
needs have been satisfied, a still higher level of prosperity will induce a growing need 
for self-realization. Because it provides more autonomy and independence, 
entrepreneurship then becomes more highly valued as an occupational choice than at 
lower income levels. 
Based on these trends in self-employment (business ownership), we expect the 
equilibrium relation to be U-shaped (first declining and then rising business ownership 
rates). However, we will also consider L-shaped relationships (ownership rates 
continuously declining towards an asymptotic minimum rate).30 We have chosen a 
parametric approach and have used four different equilibrium functions, two of which 
are U-shaped and two of which are L-shaped. These are given in Equations (3.3a) 
through (3.3d). For ease of presentation we do not show the correction factor 
)1( OMIBOMIB Db+ . 
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The equilibrium rate of business ownership equals α  when GDP per capita (YCAP ) is 
zero in each of the four equations (3.3a) through (3.3d). In Equation (3.3a) the relation 
between the level of development and the equilibrium rate of business ownership is 
quadratic. We expect β  to be negative as initially economic development is negatively 
correlated with the business ownership rate. This decline is expected to become smaller 
over time, so γ  is expected to be positive. The minimum of the U-shaped curve is 
reached for GDP per capita equal to γβ 2/− . Another U-shaped relation can be found in 
Equation (3.3c). Again we expect β  to be negative and γ  to be positive. In this log-
                                                          
30 Carree et al. (2002) concluded that U-shaped functions cannot be statistically discriminated from L-
shaped functions.  
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quadratic case the rise of the curve after the minimum has been reached is less steep 
than the decline beforehand. Equations (3.3b) and (3.3d) give L-shaped equilibrium 
relations. The equilibrium rate is predicted to decline from α  to βα −  as the level of 
economic development rises from zero to high levels. We call this equilibrium relation 
the inverse and log-inverse cases. We compare the four different equilibrium functions 
on the basis of the explanatory powers in Equations (3.1) and (3.2). That is, we compare 
the extent to which the change in the rate of entrepreneurship and the sectoral growth 
rate can be explained from deviations of the actual business ownership rate from the 
equilibrium business ownership rate. 
The functional form of YCAP  in Equation (3.3) is multiplied by a factor )1( OMIBOMIB Db+ . 
This correction is necessary because the self-employment definitions in our data set 
vary across countries. In Section 3.3 we will go into detail about these differences in 
definition. Summarized, one group of countries have self-employed defined as 
individuals inclusive of owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs) and other 
countries have a definition exclusive of OMIBs. It is clear that this creates an upward 
bias for the first group of countries as regards the number of self-employed. As these 
differences in definition are likely to (erroneously) affect the estimated equilibrium 
functions, we apply the raise-factor )1( OMIBOMIB Db+ . The implicit assumption is that for a 
given sector the number of OMIBs as a fraction of the total number of business owners 
is constant for all levels of economic development. Obviously, the estimated OMIBb  
should be positive. 
Business ownership equation  
The dependent variable in Equation (3.1) is the growth in the fraction of business 
owners (self-employed and unpaid family workers) in total sector employment in a 
period of four years. The first explanatory variable in the equation, which has the 
parameter 1b  assigned to it, is an error correction variable describing the difference 
between the equilibrium and the actual rate of business ownership (at sector level) at the 
start of the period. The parameter 1b  is expected to have a positive sign. There are 
several forces in market economies that may contribute to a process of adapting towards 
the equilibrium. An abundance of self-employed will lead to low profits and lack of 
desire to continue family business given that the government does not provide 
extraordinary support measures to self-employed. A relative shortage of self-employed 
may indicate entrepreneurial opportunities that will lead to high (net) entry rates given 
that the government regulations do not result in high barriers to potential entrepreneurs. 
The existence of a sound entrepreneurial climate and a well-developed (venture) capital 
market are instrumental in this respect.  
The second explanatory variable is the lagged unemployment rate acting as a push 
factor for business ownership.31 The expected sign of the parameter 2b  is positive. The 
third explanatory variable is the sectoral share in GDP. It is likely that scale advantages 
rank as an important competitive advantage in a sector in case the sectoral share in an 
economy is relatively high. Opportunities for new small ventures may be less present in 
                                                          
31 The empirical evidence on the effect of unemployment on business formation is mixed. Evans and 
Leighton (1989) present evidence that unemployed workers are more likely to enter self-employment than 
employees. Carree (2002b) finds no effect of unemployment rates on the number of establishment in low 
entry barrier retail and consumer service industries.  
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later stages of the life cycle of industries in which scale economies in production or 
R&D have become key sources of competitive strength (see e.g. Klepper, 1996). Hence, 
the expected sign of parameter 3b  is negative. Finally, we follow Carree et al. in 
incorporating a dummy for Italy. Italy, especially Northern Italy, is exceptional in the 
sense that a relatively high value of GDP per capita is combined with a high and rising 
self-employment rate.32  
Economic growth equation 
The dependent variable in Equation (3.2) is sectoral economic growth, measured as the 
relative change in sectoral gross domestic product in a four-year period. The first 
determinant of sectoral growth is the (absolute) deviation of the actual rate of business 
ownership from the equilibrium rate of business ownership at the start of the period. 
The deviation is expected to have a negative impact on growth, or 01 <c . A shortage of 
business owners is likely to diminish competition with detrimental effects for static 
efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy. It will also diminish variety, 
learning and selection and thereby harm dynamic efficiency (innovation). On the other 
hand, a glut of self-employment will cause the average scale of operations to remain 
below optimum. It will result in large numbers of marginal entrepreneurs, absorbing 
capital and human energy that could have been allocated more productively elsewhere. 
The second determinant is the (economy-wide) level of per capita income at the start of 
the period. It allows us to correct for the convergence hypothesis of countries. Countries 
lagging behind in economic development may show faster economic growth than more 
highly developed countries because they can profit from modern technologies 
developed in these countries. The expected sign of the parameter 2c  is negative. 
Similarly, we include the sectoral share of GDP to capture regression-to-the-mean 
effects at a sectoral level. Countries in which a certain sector is already quite large are 
expected to be confronted with less sectoral output growth than countries in which a 
sector has a smaller share of the economy. The parameter 3c  is also expected to be 
negative. The fourth determinant is (current and lagged) growth of world trade. Value 
added growth of exporting firms is dependent on the developments in world trade. The 
hypothesized effect of growth of world trade is positive, or 0654 >c,c,c . This holds 
especially for manufacturing as there are, in general, more exporting firms in 
manufacturing compared to services. 
3.3 Data 
In this section we deal with the data used in the current chapter. The section is split up 
in two parts. First, we discuss the sectoral classification and the required sectoral 
variables number of business owners, total employment and real value added. Second, 
                                                          
32 We do not include dummies for all countries in the sample. An implication of such a specification is 
that every country has its own unique equilibrium level. However, this type of country-specific 
equilibrium levels is not the focus of this chapter, since we are investigating a “universal” equilibrium 
function which should be valid for all countries. Also, deviations from country-specific equilibrium levels 
have quite a different interpretation than deviations from a “universal” equilibrium level, as the former 
type of deviation ignores the cross-country variation in business ownership rates. 
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we provide an overview of definitions and sources for the variables, either at the 
sectoral level or at the macro level. 
3.3.1 Sectoral data 
We estimate the model for the two main private sectors in a modern economy: 
manufacturing and services. For these sectors we need data on the number of business 
owners, total employment and real value added. We have collected these variables for 
21 OECD countries for the years 1970-1998, as far as the data were available according 
to uniform definitions. This has resulted in the so-called “BLISS Oeso Sectoraal” data 
set, which is operated by EIM. The main data source for “BLISS Oeso Sectoraal” is 
OECD National Accounts 1983-1995, Detailed Tables. Where possible, missing data 
are supplied from other sources. Below we describe the sector classification used in the 
data set and describe the above-mentioned variables in some more detail. 
Sectoral classification 
The sector manufacturing is a one-digit industry in OECD National Accounts. For 
services four one-digit industries in the OECD National Accounts have been 
aggregated: (1) Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels; (2) Transport, storage 
and communication; (3) Finance, insurance, real estate and business services; (4) 
Community, social and personal services. We realise that our definition of the service 
sector is very broad. The four underlying sectors may be substantially different in 
structure, so ideally we would want to distinguish between these sectors. However, the 
composition of these four underlying sectors is quite different for different countries, 
visible in the numerous country notes on this matter to the statistical tables in the OECD 
National Accounts.33 Hence, we cannot compare the numbers of business owners in the 
four underlying service sectors between different countries. These differences in 
composition do not apply to the aggregate data of the four underlying sectors. 
Therefore, despite its limitations, we prefer to work with the broad definition of the 
service sector.34 
Number of business owners 
Collecting harmonized data on the number of business owners at sectoral level for a 
large number of countries and over a long period of time is not easy for at least three 
                                                          
33 For example, for a number of countries the sub-sector Business services, which is part of sector 
Finance, etc., is included in Community, social and personal services, see OECD (1997a), pp. 100, 212, 
351, 368 and 600. For some countries the sub-sector Restaurants and hotels, which is part of Wholesale, 
etc., is included in Community, social and personal services, see OECD (1997a), pp. 100, 148 and 368. 
For Italy, a distinction between Finance, etc., and Community, social and personal services has not even 
been made in the statistical tables of OECD National Accounts. Only aggregate data of these two sectors 
are included in the tables, see OECD (1997a), p. 431. 
34 A similar problem applies to the one-digit manufacturing sector. In some countries the one-digit sector 
mining is included in the manufacturing sector. In prevailing cases, we did correct for it with help of data 
from the Labour Force Statistics. Also, with help of data from other sources, we made a correction in the 
GDP data for manufacturing to exclude the mining part in these figures. 
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reasons.35 First, business owners (self-employed) are not defined uniformly across 
countries. In some countries owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs) are 
counted as self-employed whereas in other countries they are counted as employee. This 
is because formally an owner/manager of an incorporated business is an employee of his 
own firm. The different statistical treatment results from a different set-up of labor force 
surveys in different countries.36 Second, the big interest for entrepreneurship dates only 
from recent times. This is the reason that consistent measuring of the self-employed also 
dates from recent times. For some countries reliable data on the number of self-
employed are not available, especially for early years and at a sectoral level. Third, and 
directly related to the second problem, in some countries major revisions in the way of 
measuring the self-employed have taken place in the past. Hence, for these countries 
numbers of self-employed are not readily comparable over time.  
From the description above it becomes clear that we cannot measure the number of self-
employed in a uniform fashion for all the 21 countries and for all years in our sample 
period. Instead, we have made definitions as uniform as possible and work with an 
unbalanced panel.37 We end up with two groups of countries, using different self-
employment definitions. This is explained below.  
Three types of self-employed 
Based on legal status, self-employed individuals may be split up in three different types: 
unincorporated self-employed, incorporated self-employed, and unpaid family workers. 
For each group we have to decide whether or not we want to include them in our self-
employment definition. The most common group of self-employed individuals are the 
unincorporated self-employed and this group is obviously included in our self-
employment count. We also want to include the incorporated self-employed in our 
count because they are not fundamentally different from the unincorporated self-
employed, as far as “entrepreneurial spirit” is involved: both types of self-employed 
have chosen to “be their own boss”. However, as mentioned earlier, in some countries 
the incorporated self-employed are treated as employee in the statistical tables, and for 
those countries it is not possible to measure their numbers. Because we include the 
incorporated self-employed in our definition, we generally speak of ‘business owners’ 
throughout this chapter (in order to distinguish from ‘self-employed’ which is often 
understood to include only the unincorporated self-employed).  
As far as unpaid family workers are concerned, we would rather not include them in our 
self-employment count. Family workers who work in a family member’s firm often 
have little influence on the ‘entrepreneurial’ decisions taken. Usually they would not 
start a business in case this family member would not run one already. Therefore, we 
would have liked not to include them in our count of self-employed. However, although 
there is information at the macro level about the proportions of unpaid family workers 
in total self-employed in various countries (see the various issues of the OECD Labour 
                                                          
35 Measurement problems concerning comparability of new firm formation rates across seven 
economically advanced countries are identified in a special issue of Regional Studies, see Reynolds et al. 
(1994a). 
36 See Chapter 5 of OECD Employment Outlook June 2000. 
37 This means that the data are not available for the same period of time for all countries and sectors. 
Instead we work with the maximum amount of data that we were able to collect for each country and 
sector. 
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Force Statistics)38, there is no information about these proportions at the sectoral level. 
Because sectoral self-employment data in OECD National Accounts are inclusive of 
unpaid family workers and we cannot (in a plausible way) exclude the unpaid family 
workers from the available figures, we were left no choice but to include them in our 
self-employment count. 
Definitions 
As mentioned earlier, the way in which the self-employed are defined in OECD 
National Accounts is different across countries. Specifically, in some countries the 
owner/managers of incorporated businesses are counted as self-employed and in other 
countries they are counted as employee. We do not correct for the difference in 
definitions in our data, as we do not dispose of country- and sector-specific information 
about the proportions incorporated/unincorporated self-employed. Instead, we correct 
for the differences in our model, by means of a so-called OMIB-dummy.  
For the construction of the OMIB-dummy, we must know which countries use the 
narrow definition of self-employed (excluding the incorporated self-employed), and 
which countries use the broader one (including the incorporated self-employed). In 
OECD Employment Outlook June 2000, the countries that use the narrow definition and 
the ones that use the broad definition are given. That is, the definitions as applied in 
OECD Labour Force Statistics (LFS) are mentioned. In principle, the definition used in 
LFS is also the definition used in OECD National Accounts. But this is not necessarily 
true for all countries. Based on (1) a comparison between the total number of non-
agricultural self-employed (including unpaid family workers) according to OECD 
Labour Force Statistics and OECD National Accounts; (2) the definition used in each 
country in OECD Labour Force Statistics as reported by OECD Employment Outlook 
June 2000, p. 158; and (3) the country-notes in OECD National Accounts 1983-1995; 
we have been able to distinguish two groups of countries in our dataset: countries using 
a broad self-employment definition (including OMIBs) and countries using a narrow 
definition (excluding OMIBs). The countries having a self-employment definition 
including OMIBs are Belgium, Denmark, France, West-Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States and New Zealand. The countries 
having a self-employment definition excluding OMIBs are Austria, Finland, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Japan, Canada and Australia. In terms of 
Equation (3.3), the value of OMIBD  is 1 for the first group of countries and 0 for the 
second group.39  
                                                          
38 In earlier studies that we performed at the macro level, we have in fact used self-employment data 
exclusive of unpaid family workers (Carree et al., 2000, 2002). These studies make use of EIM’s data set 
COMPENDIA, see Chapter 9 of this book. 
39 Two remarks concerning the United States are required here. First, the definition in OECD National 
Accounts for the U.S. is exclusive of OMIBs. Instead of using these data and classifying the U.S. in the 
second group of countries (i.e. excluding OMIBs), we made an exception for the U.S. and made an 
approximation of the number of OMIBs based on information from The State of Small Business. The 
exception was made because we would like to include the number of OMIBs in our definition and we 
consider the U.S. too important to settle for a definition excluding OMIBs in our data set. Second, the 
United States is also exceptional in the sense that the self-employment data from OECD National 
Accounts are exclusive of unpaid family workers, see OECD (1997a), p. 73. Since in the U.S. the number 
of unpaid family workers is very low (0.1% of total non-agricultural employment in 1996; compare this 
with, for example 4.1% in Turkey, see OECD, 1997b), this discrepancy in definition with regard to the 
other countries is very small. 
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Supplementary sources and corrections 
As mentioned earlier, the main source for the sectoral data is OECD National Accounts 
1983-1995.40 The number of self-employed (in persons) is derived from country tables 
15: employment by kind of activity, as the difference between employment of all 
persons and employment of employees. Where possible, missing data (including the 
years 1996-98) are supplied from various other sources, including OECD Labour Force 
Statistics and OECD National Accounts 1988-98. Corrections are made to ensure that 
data from different sources correspond. In some cases country-specific data sources are 
used to make data comparable with other countries. For example, in OECD National 
Accounts the data for the Netherlands are expressed in man-years instead of persons. 
Therefore, we used information from the Dutch national accounts (published by 
Statistics Netherlands), to obtain a time series in persons. Also, for the United States, 
we constructed a series inclusive of OMIBs, making use of information from The State 
of Small Business, issues 1986 and 1996. 
Sectoral business ownership data are reported in Table 3.1. Greece and Italy have the 
highest business ownership rates (1998) for manufacturing, while the Scandinavian 
countries and the United States have relatively low business ownership rates. Strong 
increases of the business ownership rate in manufacturing during the period 1970-1998 
are found for Ireland, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, while Denmark, France, Norway, and especially Japan experienced strong 
decreases in business ownership rates during this period. Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain have the highest business ownership rates (1998) for services, while 
relatively low rates are found for the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, the United States 
and Australia. The high proportions of self-employed for the former five countries are 
partly explained by the relatively high numbers of unpaid family workers in these 
countries. According to Table 4.2 of OECD Employment Outlook July 1992, the 
proportion of unpaid family workers in non-agricultural civilian employment in 1990 
varies from 3.4% (Belgium) to 5.4% (Greece) for these countries. For comparison, this 
proportion was 0.2% for the United States and Canada in 1990. Strong increases in the 
business ownership rate during the period 1970-1998 are again found for the United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, while Denmark, France and Japan also 
experienced strong declines in business ownership rate for the service sectors.  
                                                          
40 This publication also provides data for years prior to 1983, by means of accompanying disks. 
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Table 3.1 Sectoral business ownership rates for 21 OECD countries, 1970-1984-1998 
Country Manufacturing Services 
 1970 1984 1998 1970 1984 1998 
Austria b 0.051 1976 0.044 0.040 0.166 1976 0.141 0.138 
Belgium a 0.057 0.062 0.065 0.309 0.280 0.283 
Denmark a 0.067 0.048 0.032 0.214 0.173 0.144 
Finland b  0.031 0.028 0.027 0.133 0.145 0.138 
France a 0.062 0.049 0.041 0.238 0.171 0.138 
West-Germany a 0.054 0.042 0.049 0.220 0.165 0.176 
Greece a 0.320 1972 0.300 0.307 0.359 1972 0.349 0.335 
Ireland a 0.038 0.048 0.078 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Italy a 0.139 0.155 0.164 0.425 0.459 0.437 
The Netherlands b 0.043 0.045 0.053 0.165 0.131 0.123 
Portugal a 0.056 1974 0.051 0.055 0.365 0.324 0.381 
Spain a 0.089 1972 0.123 0.123 0.411 1972 0.398 0.314 
Sweden b 0.029 0.027 0.031 0.159 0.107 0.124 
United Kingdom a 0.019 1972 0.033 0.059 0.133 1972 0.150 0.158 
Iceland b 0.048 0.026 0.044 0.175 0.133 0.138 
Norway b 0.051 0.037 0.032 0.126 0.106 0.093 
United States a 0.022 0.030 0.037 0.117 0.114 0.103 
Japan b 0.153 0.120 0.070 0.265 0.200 0.137 
Canada b 0.029 1976 0.032 0.040 0.097 1976 0.105 0.130 
Australia b 0.039 0.051 0.089 0.119 0.131 0.123 
New Zealand a 0.072 1972 0.080 0.127 0.135 1972 0.140 0.157 
Average 0.070 0.068 0.075 0.217 0.196 0.189 
Source: “BLISS Oeso Sectoraal”. Note: business ownership rates are per total sector employment. Except 
for U.S., business owners include unpaid family workers. Labels a and b indicate that owner/managers of 
incorporated businesses are included (a) or excluded (b). In case data for the year 1970 are not available, the 
first year available in the data set is reported. 
Total employment 
Data on total employment (in persons) are also obtained from OECD National Accounts 
1983-1995 (country tables 15: employment of all persons). Total employment includes 
self-employed (including OMIBs and unpaid family workers) as well as employees. 
Again, where possible, missing data are obtained from other sources, including OECD 
Labour Force Statistics and the Dutch national accounts. 
Real value added 
Sectoral data on real value added are obtained from OECD National Accounts 1983-
1995, country tables 12: gross domestic product by kind of activity. The value added 
data are transformed into data expressed in millions of purchasing power parities per US 
$ at 1990 prices. This enables valid comparison of value added between countries and 
over time. Again, where possible, missing data are obtained from various other sources, 
including OECD Stan, OECD Statistical Compendium (on CD-ROM), and, for 
Portugal, unofficial statistics from the Bank of Portugal.41  
                                                          
41 We are grateful to Jose Mata for providing us with the last-mentioned data. 
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3.3.2 Model variables and data sources 
The variables incorporated in the model have the following definitions and sources. 
 
E :  sectoral business ownership rate: number of business owners in sector as a fraction 
of total employment in sector. Counts of number of business owners and total 
employment are described in Section 3.3.1. 
Y :  sectoral GDP in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices. This variable 
is described in Section 3.3.1. 
YCAP : per capita GDP in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices (macro 
level). The underlying variables gross domestic product and total population are 
from OECD National Accounts, Detailed Tables, and from OECD Labour Force 
Statistics, respectively. GDP is measured in constant prices. Furthermore, 
purchasing power parities of 1990 are used to make the monetary units comparable 
between countries. 
U : (standardized) unemployment rate. This variable measures the number of 
unemployed as a fraction of total labor force. The labor force consists of 
employees, self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, military and 
unemployed persons. The main source for this variable is OECD Main Economic 
Indicators. Some missing data on the number of unemployed have been filled up 
with help of data from the OECD Labour Force Statistics and the Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics from the International Labour Office. 
shareY _ : sectoral GDP as fraction of macro GDP. Both sectoral GDP and macro GDP 
are taken from OECD National Accounts 1983-1995, country tables 12: gross 
domestic product by kind of activity. We correct for different value added 
definitions at sectoral level in different countries, i.e. market prices, factor costs, or 
base prices. The differences result from a different statistical treatment of the items 
import duties, value added tax, and other indirect taxes. For some countries these 
items are ascribed to sectors, while for other countries, they are not. We correct for 
this by taking GDP exclusive of these three items (i.e. the item ‘Subtotal’) as 
denominator of shareY _ . 
WT∆ : growth of world trade (yearly basis). These data are taken from Appendix A4 
(“Kerngegevens 1970-2002”) of the publication Central Economic Plan (CEP) 
2001, item “relevante wereldhandel”, by CPB Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis. 
ITAD : dummy for Italy: this variable has value one for Italy, and zero otherwise. 
OMIBD : dummy for countries defining the number of business owners inclusive of 
owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs): this variable gets value one 
for the countries Belgium through New Zealand (as mentioned in Section 3.3.1), 
and value zero for the remaining countries. 
3.4 Results 
The current section is split up in two parts. In the first part we present separate results 
for manufacturing and services. We also discuss the methods employed to compute the 
regression models. In the second part we present a model where business ownership 
rates in manufacturing and services, as well as sector structure are assumed to 
simultaneously explain growth at the macro level (growth of GDP per capita). 
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3.4.1 Methods and sector results 
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are estimated successively. For a given specification of *E  
(Equation 3.3a, 3.3b, 3.3c or 3.3d), we substitute the expression into Equation (3.1). 
This leads to an expression which is nonlinear in the parameters. Therefore we estimate 
the regression equation using non-linear least squares.42 After having estimated 
Equation (3.1), we are able to compute *E , and hence EE −* , using the parameter 
estimates of the equilibrium function (3.3). After computing EE −* , we are able to 
estimate Equation (3.2), using OLS.  
When estimating the model, we weight observations with population. We consider 
larger countries such as the U.S. and Japan to be more important in establishing the 
relationship between business ownership and economic growth than small countries like 
New Zealand and Iceland. Weighting with population (in the year t-4) implies that all 
variables (including constants and dummies) are multiplied with the square root of 
population before the least squares procedure is run. A more detailed description of the 
weighting of observations can be found in Appendix 2.A. Both for manufacturing and 
services, the regressions are computed using unbalanced panels. This is caused by 
missing data for certain countries and years in our sectoral data base. Furthermore, as in 
Carree et al., uneven years are removed.43 Our sample contains 245 observations for the 
manufacturing sector and 231 observations for services. For the exact construction of 
these samples we refer to the appendix. The estimation results are presented in Tables 
3.2 and 3.3. 
 
                                                          
42 We use the LSQ command in TSP 4.5. 
43 The removal of uneven years has the advantage of diminishing the potential danger of a downward bias 
in the estimated standard errors of the coefficients that may arise due to overlapping observation periods 
for consecutive years. The key variables like business ownership rate and GDP per capita change only 
slowly over time. Hence, it is unlikely that the results will alter much in case the uneven years would have 
been included. 
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Table 3.2 Estimation results Model (3.1)-(3.2)-(3.3), Manufacturing (245 observations) 
Eq. (3.1)+(3.3), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral bus. ownership rate 
 Quadratic Inverse Log-quadr. Log-inverse 
Error correction ( 1b ) 0.084 
(5.32) 
0.087 
(5.61) 
0.086 
(5.16) 
0.085 
(5.60) 
Unemployment ( 2b ) 0.054 
(3.08) 
0.055 
(3.30) 
0.054 
(3.07) 
0.053 
(3.21) 
Sectoral GDP share 
( 3b ) 
-0.039 
(-2.71) 
-0.037 
(-3.00) 
-0.038 
(-2.59) 
-0.039 
(-3.16) 
OMIB-correction 
( OMIBb ) 
0.293 
(1.70) 
0.281 
(1.65) 
0.287 
(1.64) 
0.293 
(1.76) 
Italy-correction ( ITAb ) 0.0083 
(3.26) 
0.0087 
(3.68) 
0.0086 
(3.20) 
0.0084 
(3.55) 
α  0.320 
(3.79) 
1.40 
(4.27) 
0.697 
(1.27) 
1.10 
(4.29) 
β  -0.019 
(-1.69) 
1.36 
(4.07) 
-0.320 
(-0.75) 
1.31 
(4.04) 
γ  0.00041 
(1.12) 
 0.042 
(0.52) 
 
2
adjR  0.302 0.305 0.302 0.305 
LR Test 0=δ  (5% 
critical value 3.84) 0.076 0.118 
LR Test 0== γβ  (5% 
critical value 5.99) 
0.056 0.117 
Eq. (3.2), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral GDP 
Constant ( 0c ) 0.145 
(2.67) 
0.143 
(2.65) 
0.144 
(2.66) 
0.145 
(2.68) 
Deviation E from E* 
( 1c ) 
-0.454 
(-3.77) 
-0.490 
(-4.00) 
-0.479 
(-3.95) 
-0.472 
(-3.96) 
GDP per capita ( 2c ) -0.0012 
(-0.71) 
-0.0011 
(-0.63) 
-0.0011 
(-0.66) 
-0.0011 
(-0.68) 
Sectoral GDP share 
( 3c ) 
-0.493 
(-3.75) 
-0.497 
(-3.79) 
-0.493 
(-3.76) 
-0.488 
(-3.72) 
World trade ( 4c ) 0.410 
(1.89) 
0.411 
(1.90) 
0.409 
(1.88) 
0.406 
(1.87) 
World tr., 2 year lag 
( 5c ) 
1.234 
(5.81) 
1.237 
(5.84) 
1.235 
(5.83) 
1.233 
(5.82) 
World tr., 4 year lag 
( 6c ) 
0.559 
(2.85) 
0.564 
(2.89) 
0.563 
(2.88) 
0.562 
(2.88) 
2
adjR  0.446 0.450 0.449 0.449 
EXTRA: Test of robustness  
Deviation E from E* 
( 1c ) 
-0.252 
(-2.46) 
-0.291 
(-2.79) 
-0.280 
(-2.72) 
-0.278 
(-2.75) 
Growth of empl. ( 7c ) 0.863 
(10.3) 
0.859 
(10.3) 
0.859 
(10.3) 
0.859 
(10.3) 
2
adjR  0.612 0.615 0.614 0.615 
Note: T-values in parentheses. The extra equation uses the same control variables as Equation (3.2). 
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Table 3.3 Estimation results Model (3.1)-(3.2)-(3.3), Services (231 observations) 
Eq. (3.1)+(3.3), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral bus. ownership rate 
 Quadratic Inverse Log-quadr. Log-inverse 
Error correction ( 1b ) 0.164 
(9.11) 
0.162 
(8.98) 
0.162 
(9.01) 
0.159 
(8.79) 
Unemployment ( 2b ) 0.111 
(4.13) 
0.093 
(3.62) 
0.106 
(3.95) 
0.088 
(3.45) 
Sectoral GDP share 
( 3b ) 
-0.003 
(-0.14) 
0.014 
(0.94) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.016 
(1.04) 
OMIB-correction 
( OMIBb ) 
0.130 
(0.99) 
0.307 
(1.15) 
0.129 
(0.91) 
0.383 
(1.13) 
Italy-correction ( ITAb ) 0.048 
(9.21) 
0.047 
(8.95) 
0.048 
(9.16) 
0.046 
(8.77) 
α  0.556 
(4.80) 
1.87 
(5.13) 
1.94 
(3.60) 
1.33 
(4.42) 
β  -0.050 
(-4.83) 
1.92 
(5.29) 
-1.22 
(-3.25) 
1.73 
(4.64) 
γ  0.0014 
(4.04) 
 0.203 
(2.88) 
 
2
adjR  0.402 0.385 0.398 0.377 
LR Test 0=δ  (5% 
critical value 3.84) 0.369 3.33 
LR Test 0== γβ  (5% 
critical value 5.99) 
7.02 12.2 
Eq. (3.2), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral GDP 
Constant ( 0c ) 0.173 
(4.82) 
0.163 
(4.48) 
0.172 
(4.71) 
0.162 
(4.46) 
Deviation E from E* 
( 1c ) 
-0.110 
(-2.39) 
-0.053 
(-1.22) 
-0.087 
(-1.94) 
-0.051 
(-1.16) 
GDP per capita ( 2c ) -0.0051 
(-3.75) 
-0.0047 
(-3.40) 
-0.0051 
(-3.66) 
-0.0046 
(-3.39) 
Sectoral GDP share 
( 3c ) 
0.058 
(0.73) 
0.059 
(0.74) 
0.057 
(0.71) 
0.060 
(0.75) 
World trade ( 4c ) -0.302 
(-2.35) 
-0.303 
(-2.34) 
-0.302 
(-2.34) 
-0.303 
(-2.34) 
World tr., 2 year lag 
( 5c ) 
0.405 
(3.20) 
0.417 
(3.27) 
0.410 
(3.23) 
0.417 
(3.27) 
World tr., 4 year lag 
( 6c ) 
0.374 
(3.19) 
0.390 
(3.31) 
0.382 
(3.26) 
0.391 
(3.31) 
2
adjR  0.788 0.783 0.786 0.782 
EXTRA: Test of robustness  
Deviation E from E* 
( 1c ) 
-0.051 
(-1.19) 
-0.0057 
(-0.14) 
-0.032 
(-0.76) 
-0.0030 
(-0.075) 
Growth of empl. ( 7c ) 0.542 
(7.07) 
0.559 
(7.30) 
0.549 
(7.16) 
0.559 
(7.31) 
2
adjR  0.819 0.817 0.818 0.817 
Note: T-values in parentheses. The extra equation uses the same control variables as Equation (3.2). 
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Equilibrium equation (3.3) 
In Tables 3.2 and 3.3 estimation results are given for the four different specifications of 
the sectoral equilibrium rate of business ownership (3.3a)-(3.3d). Based on likelihood 
ratio tests we try to identify which specification fits the data best. To test the quadratic 
specification versus the inverse specification, we estimate an additional equation (3.1), 
where the equilibrium function is now specified as 
)YCAP/(YCAPYCAPYCAPE itititit
*
ijt 1
2 ++++= δγβα . The quadratic and inverse 
specifications are special cases of this (artificial) function: the quadratic equilibrium 
function corresponds to 0=δ , while the inverse specification corresponds to 0== γβ . 
In other words, the quadratic and inverse models are nested in the model and, hence, 
standard likelihood ratio tests apply. This holds analogously for the log-quadratic versus 
the log-inverse model. The LR test statistics are given in the tables. 
For manufacturing both null hypotheses 0=δ  and 0== γβ  cannot be rejected. This 
means that U-shaped equilibrium functions cannot be distinguished from L-shaped 
functions in a statistical sense. The inverse specification has the highest adjusted R2 
values, although the differences are small. The implied asymptotic value of 0.04 for this 
specification seems plausible. For services the likelihood ratio tests point in the 
direction of a U-shape: the null hypothesis 0=δ  is not rejected while the null 
hypothesis 0== γβ  is. This holds for both types of comparisons: quadratic versus 
inverse and log-quadratic versus log-inverse. So, after having reached a minimum level, 
the business ownership rate starts to rise again with increasing wealth (i.e. increasing 
GDP per capita). For the quadratic specification, the minimum γβ 2/−  is reached at 
18,129 U.S. dollar (1990 prices). The minimum business ownership rate equals 0.099. 
Based on this analysis, we will discuss the other estimation results for the specifications 
with the best statistical fit: L-shape for manufacturing (inverse or log-inverse) and U-
shape for services (quadratic or log-quadratic). 
Equation (3.1) 
From Tables 3.2 and 3.3 we see that error-correction processes are statistically 
significant for both manufacturing and services. However, the speed of adjustment is 
low: 16% for services and 9% for manufacturing. A speed of adjustment of 16% means 
that a deviation of the number of business owners from equilibrium at a certain point in 
time decreases with 16% in the succeeding four years. The low value of the speed of 
adjustment is not surprising. The convergence process of the actual business ownership 
rate towards the equilibrium rate is intrinsically slow because it involves structural 
changes on the supply side (setting up enterprises, investments in physical and human 
capital, divestments, etc.) as well as cultural and institutional changes. As some of these 
processes are especially slow in manufacturing, the lower speed of adjustment for this 
sector compared to services is not surprising. For instance, it is more difficult to start a 
business in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector, because on average more 
start-up capital is required.   
We find evidence for the unemployment push hypothesis. For services, every percent 
point rise in the unemployment rate leads to a rise of 0.11 percent point in the self-
employment rate in the succeeding four years. For manufacturing this effect is 0.06 
percent point. Again, the smaller effect for manufacturing may be explained by higher 
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set-up costs for starting a new business. A significantly negative sign of sectoral GDP 
share (parameter 3b ) is found only in case of the manufacturing sector. High shares of 
manufacturing in a country’s economy are associated with subsequently lower business 
ownership rates. This may reflect the importance of economies of scale in 
manufacturing.  
The estimated correction factor for the number of OMIBs, OMIBb , is plausible, both for 
manufacturing and services. In the equilibrium functions, the number of OMIBs as a 
proportion of other self-employed (unincorporated self-employed and unpaid family 
workers) equals 0.28 and 0.13 for manufacturing and services, respectively. The 
additional (unexplained) rise in business ownership for Italy is supported by our 
estimations: parameter ITAb  is significantly positive. The effect is much stronger for 
services though: the parameter is about five times higher for services compared to 
manufacturing.  
Equation (3.2) 
According to the significantly negative estimate of 1c , deviations between actual and 
equilibrium business ownership rates come at a cost of forgone growth. The effect is 
stronger for manufacturing than for services. Each percent point difference between E  
and *E  is associated with a loss of 0.5 percent point subsequent growth in value added 
(on a four year basis) in manufacturing. For services this effect is only 0.1 percent point. 
This suggests that deviating from the “optimal” firm size distribution is more important 
for manufacturing when compared to services. Either having too few or too many 
entrepreneurial ventures in manufacturing appears to be more damaging to economic 
performance than when this occurs in the service sector. When there are too few 
entrepreneurs this may come at the cost of the rate of radical innovations and 
consequently, economic growth. When there are too many entrepreneurs economies of 
scale may not be benefited from enough. In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 it is shown that for 
manufacturing the number of business owners is generally too low (consistent with a 
lack of incentives to innovate), while for services the number of business owners is 
generally too high. The latter observation implies that in many countries there are a lot 
of ‘marginal’ entrepreneurs, whose efforts and energy could be allocated more 
effectively working as wage earners. This is especially true for Italy. 
The estimations also find evidence for the convergence of countries: GDP per capita has 
a negative impact on subsequent growth (parameter 2c ), although the effect is 
significant only for services. For manufacturing there is a regression-to-the-mean effect: 
the parameter of sectoral GDP-share ( 3c ) is significantly negative. For services the latter 
effect is not found. Finally, we find a significant positive impact of the growth of world 
trade on sectoral growth. Looking at the combined effect (the sum of parameters 4c , 5c  
and 6c ) the effect is larger for manufacturing. Again, this is not surprising, given the 
bigger orientation on export in this sector. 
Test of robustness 
As a test of robustness, we also estimated the sector growth equation with employment 
growth included as an extra explanatory variable. See the last parts of Tables 3.2 and 
3.3. Note that, by and large, we thus measure labour productivity growth instead of 
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production growth. Although t-values become lower, the estimates of 1c  (growth 
penalty) remain negative. This gives us some confidence about the robustness of the 
growth penalty. The coefficient of employment growth 7c  is smaller than one, which 
suggests decreasing returns to scale. However, this is not necessarily the case. As 
employment is measured in persons, the low coefficient may reflect a relative increase 
in part-time workers (compared to full-time workers). This phenomenon may be 
stronger for services, considering the low value of the estimated coefficient 7c . 
Equilibrium curves 
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we show the equilibrium curves and the actual data for the G7-
countries. For the equilibrium curves we choose the specification with the best 
statistical fit: “Inverse” for manufacturing and “Quadratic” for services. For 
manufacturing, all G7-countries –except for Italy- are well below the “equilibrium” 
rate.44 According to the significant negative parameter estimate of 1c  in Equation (3.2), 
these deviations from equilibrium are penalised in the form of lower growth rates. So, 
apparently, there are too few self-employed in the manufacturing industries. Perhaps the 
low numbers of competitors and new entrepreneurial initiatives result in a lack of 
innovation incentives and therefore, in lower growth rates. Japan and Italy have been 
relatively close to the equilibrium curve. According to our model, the relatively high 
business ownership rate for manufacturing in these countries has favoured economic 
growth.  
                                                          
44 In Van Stel and Carree (2002) we provide additional empirical evidence for the validity of the 
equilibrium curve depicted in Figure 3.1. In particular, we show that allowing for country-specific (hence 
lower) equilibrium functions is unattractive, both statistically and theoretically. We find no growth 
penalty any more because structural differences between countries are removed and only time-specific 
deviations are left. 
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Figure 3.1 Actual and equilibrium business ownership rate for G7 countries, 1970-
1998, Manufacturing 
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Note: Actual and equilibrium business ownership rates are per total sector employment. Business owners 
include unpaid family workers and owner/managers of incorporated businesses. Equilibrium rate 
according to “Inverse” specification in Table 3.2. Data for Japan and Canada are raised by the estimated 
factor )1( OMIBb+ =1.281 to facilitate valid comparison of E  and 
*E . Per capita income YCAP  
expressed in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices. 
Contrary to manufacturing, the business ownership rates in most of the G7-countries are 
above equilibrium for services, the United States being the exception. The U-curved 
equilibrium function, which was clearly preferred over an L-shape, does not show in the 
actual business ownership rate data for the G7-countries. Only the United Kingdom and 
Canada have increasing business ownership rates. Note, however, that most countries 
still have levels of GDP per capita corresponding to the decreasing part of the curve. 
That is, they did not yet reach the per capita income corresponding to the minimum 
level of the parabola. For services, the business ownership rate of Italy lies far above 
equilibrium. The extremely low scale of operations in Italian service industries appears 
clearly sub-optimal. It suggests that the majority of these marginal self-employed 
individuals could work more effectively as wage-earners.45 
                                                          
45 Note that the large distance from equilibrium for Italy (Figure 3.2) is consistent with the high value of 
the Italy-dummy in Table 3.3, while the small distance from equilibrium for manufacturing (Figure 3.1) is 
consistent with the low value of the Italy-dummy in Table 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Actual and equilibrium business ownership rate for G7 countries, 1970-
1998, Services 
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Note: Actual and equilibrium business ownership rates are per total sector employment. Business owners 
include unpaid family workers and owner/managers of incorporated businesses. Equilibrium rate 
according to “Quadratic” specification in Table 3.3. Data for Japan and Canada are raised by the 
estimated factor )1( OMIBb+ =1.130 to facilitate valid comparison of E  and 
*E . Per capita income 
YCAP  expressed in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices. 
3.4.2 Effect on macro growth 
In the previous sections we analysed the relationship between business ownership and 
economic growth for manufacturing and services separately. We related deviations 
between the actual business ownership rate E  and the equilibrium or optimal business 
ownership rate *E  in one sector to value added growth of that same sector. In this 
section we look at the effect of deviations at the sectoral level to growth at the macro 
level. In this way we can determine whether deviations in one sector are more harmful 
to growth than deviations in another sector. We also consider (deviations from the 
average) sector structure as a possible determinant of economic growth at the macro 
level. In Table 3.4 we report the sector shares of manufacturing and services in 
economy-wide GDP for the 21 countries in our data set, for three years in the period 
1970-1998. 
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Table 3.4 Sector share in total economy (GDP) for 21 OECD countries, 1970-1984-1998 
Country Manufacturing Services 
 1970 1984 1998 1970 1984 1998 
Austria 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.40 0.46 0.49 
Belgium 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.52 1976 0.52 0.54 
Denmark 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.46 0.44 0.45 
Finland  0.22 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.38 
France 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.41 0.47 0.51 
West-Germany 0.38 0.33 0.27 1996 0.35 0.41 0.50 1996 
Greece 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.41 0.47 
Ireland 0.19 1976 0.21 0.30 1994 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Italy 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.42 0.47 0.50 
The Netherlands 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.48 0.52 0.57 
Portugal 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.48 0.43 0.48 
Spain 0.23 0.23 0.21 N.A. 0.49 1986 0.50 
Sweden 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.37 0.39 0.42 
United Kingdom 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.45 0.46 0.53 
Iceland 0.23 1980 0.20 0.16 0.39 1980 0.42 0.44 
Norway 0.23 0.15 0.11 0.49 0.46 0.44 
United States 0.20 0.18 0.22 1996 0.48 0.56 0.59 1996 
Japan 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.42 0.48 0.53 
Canada 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.38 0.44 0.48 
Australia 0.18 1974 0.16 0.13 0.60 0.63 0.68 
New Zealand 0.21 1978 0.22 0.18 0.51 1978 0.50 0.55 
Average * 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.44 0.47 0.50 
Source: EIM, based on OECD. Note: When 1970 or 1998 data are not available, the earliest or the most 
recent year available in the data set, are reported. *Excluding Ireland and Spain. 
The average sector structure 
In order to investigate the effect of sector structure on economic growth we introduce 
the concept of an average sector structure. Like the sectoral equilibrium business 
ownership rate equations (3.3), we choose a specification in which sector structure is 
dependent on GDP per capita. Because the two sectors manufacturing and services 
comprise almost all economic activity in most countries, we simply use GDP share of 
services in a country’s total GDP as indicator of sector structure. We choose a log-linear 
specification for the average sector structure function:   
 
(3.4) ( ) ititt,services,i YCAPlnshare_Y 31 εης +++= , 
 
where shareY _  and YCAP  are as defined in Section 3.2, and 3ε  is a disturbance term. It 
is well-known that the share of services in an economy rises with GDP per capita. 
Hence, the expected sign of η  is positive. As parameter ς  is interpreted as the share of 
services when per capita income equals zero, this parameter should also be positive. 
Equation (3.4) is estimated as a separate equation (again using weighted least squares) 
and residuals are interpreted as deviations from the average sector structure.46 Next, the 
                                                          
46 Because Equation (3.4) is estimated separately (i.e. not in an error-correction type of equation like 
(3.1)), the estimated function should not be interpreted as an equilibrium, but rather as an average. 
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absolute values of the residuals are inserted in the macro growth equation as an 
independent variable. Like deviating from an equilibrium business ownership rate, it 
could be the case that deviating from an average sector structure may hamper economic 
growth.47 However, this is far from certain because countries might also benefit from 
“specialization”. 
For our macro growth equation we use the equilibrium relations with the best statistical 
fit found in Section 3.4.1: inverse for manufacturing and quadratic for services. Next we 
estimate Equation (3.4), to obtain a function for the average industry structure. Finally, 
the variables thus obtained (deviations for sectoral business ownership rates and 
industry structure) are used as independent variables in the macro growth equation. This 
equation reads as follows. 
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where the subscripts manuf and serv stand for manufacturing and services, respectively, 
and where the variable *_ shareY  is formed by the fitted values of Equation (3.4). 
Equation (3.5) is chosen such that results of our macro growth equation are comparable 
to the sector results presented earlier. In Equation (3.5) we explain macro-economic 
growth (growth of GDP per capita) from deviations between actual and equilibrium 
business ownership rate in both manufacturing and services. Furthermore we include 
deviations from the average industry structure as an independent variable. Results are 
presented in Table 3.5. 
In Table 3.5, the results of the first estimated equation are taken from Tables 3.2 and 
3.3. Based on these equilibrium functions, deviations between actual and equilibrium 
business ownership rates are calculated. These deviation variables are used in the third 
estimated equation, along with the deviation from the average industry structure 
(residuals of Equation (3.4)). The estimation results of this latter equation are also in 
Table 3.5. The statistical fit of the average sectoral GDP-share of services is high with 
an adjusted R2 of 0.979. The estimated share of services in macro-GDP rises with per 
capita income as η  is estimated to be positive. 
 
                                                          
47 Empirical evidence of the impact of sectoral composition on economic growth can be found in 
Fagerberg (2000) and Carree (2003). They find evidence of countries which have a relatively large or 
growing share of the electronics industry to show relatively high subsequent productivity growth in 
manufacturing. 
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Table 3.5 Estimation results Model (3.1)-(3.3)-(3.4)-(3.5), Macro level  
Eq. (3.1)+(3.3), dependent variable four-year growth of sectoral bus. ownership rate 
 Manufacturing: inverse 
case (245 observations) 
Services: quadratic case  
(231 observations) 
Error correction ( 1b ) 0.087 
(5.61) 
0.164 
(9.11) 
Unemployment ( 2b ) 0.055 
(3.30) 
0.111 
(4.13) 
Sectoral GDP share ( 3b ) -0.037 
(-3.00) 
-0.0027 
(-0.14) 
OMIB-correction ( OMIBb ) 0.281 
(1.65) 
0.130 
(0.99) 
Italy-correction ( ITAb ) 0.0087 
(3.68) 
0.048 
(9.21) 
α  1.40 
(4.27) 
0.556 
(4.80) 
β  1.36 
(4.07) 
-0.050 
(-4.83) 
γ   0.0014 
(4.04) 
2
adjR  0.305 0.402 
Eq. (3.4), dependent variable GDP-share services in macro-GDP (227 observations) 
ς  0.011 
(0.32) 
η  0.171 
(13.6) 
2
adjR  0.979 
Eq. (3.5), dependent variable four-year growth of GDP per capita (227 observations) 
Constant ( 0c ) 0.307 
(3.96) 
Deviation E from E*, 
manufacturing ( 1c ) 
-0.248 
(-1.03) 
Deviation E from E*, 
services ( 2c ) 
-0.150 
(-0.99) 
Deviation from ‘optimal’ 
industry structure ( 3c ) 
-0.329 
(-1.04) 
GDP per capita ( 4c ) -0.011 
(-3.64) 
World trade ( 5c ) -0.444 
(-1.22) 
World tr., 2 year lag ( 6c ) -0.024 
(-0.067) 
World tr., 4 year lag ( 7c ) -0.083 
(-0.25) 
2
adjR  0.100 
Note: T-values in parentheses. Estimations of Equations (3.4) and (3.5) include all observations for which 
data of manufacturing and services are simultaneously available. 
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Estimation of the macro growth equation (3.5) results in negative parameter estimates 
for all three deviation variables. However, absolute t-values are around one.48 Although 
they are not significantly different from zero, the fact that all three coefficients are 
negative provides an indication that deviating from equilibrium business ownership 
rates or average sector structure might have a negative impact on per capita income 
growth. Of course, they are no more than indications because t-values are low. 
3.5 Discussion 
In this chapter we investigate the development of business ownership (self-
employment) rates over time and the effect of business ownership on economic growth, 
both at the sectoral level. In an earlier exercise, Carree et al. (2002) presented a two-
equation model to analyze the interrelationship between economy-wide business 
ownership rates and economic development. They apply the model to a data set of 23 
OECD-countries for the period 1976-96. The paper showed empirical evidence for a 
(slow) error-correction process for business ownership rates: countries with business 
ownership rates more or less than the "equilibrium" value for the specific stage of 
economic development of these countries showed, on average, convergence towards the 
"equilibrium". In addition, it was found that the "equilibrium" relationship between 
business ownership rate and stage of economic development (as proxied by GDP per 
capita) was declining for the larger part of the range of GDP per capita but had the 
tendency to rise for the highest levels of GDP per capita. The study also provided 
evidence that countries that had an out-of-equilibrium value of business ownership rate 
suffered in terms of economic growth foregone.  
The analysis performed by Carree et al. (2002) raises an important research question: to 
what extent do differences in business ownership at the economy-wide level reflect 
differences in the sectoral structures of economies or differences in business ownership 
rates at the sectoral level? It is well known that the average business ownership rate in 
the service sector is much higher than that in the manufacturing sector. Data in the 
current chapter show that the average rate (including unpaid family workers) for OECD-
countries was almost 20% in 1984 for the service sector, while it was less than 7% for 
the manufacturing sector. This has important consequences for the analysis previously 
performed. The tendency of business ownership rates to increase may be due just to a 
shift of economic activity from the manufacturing sector towards the service sector in 
the course of economic development. As a consequence, the penalty found for deviating 
from the "equilibrium" value of (economy-wide) business ownership may really be a 
penalty for deviating from a certain structural composition of the economy. This study 
investigates the "equilibrium" relationship between business ownership rates and 
economic development, the speed of the error-correction process and the existence (and 
severity) of the growth penalty when deviating from "equilibrium" for both the 
manufacturing sector and the service sector for the OECD-countries in the period 1970-
98. 
The chapter develops an adjusted two-equation model relating business ownership rates 
and economic growth rates at the sectoral level. Specific attention in the model is paid 
to whether national statistical agencies have reported to include owner/managers of 
                                                          
48 This is not caused by multicollinearity as mutual correlations between the three variables are low. 
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incorporated business into the data. Four different types of "equilibrium" relations 
between business ownership rate and GDP per capita are investigated, two of which 
have a U-shape (first declining and then rising ownership rates) and two of which have 
an L-shape (ownership rates continuously declining towards an asymptotic minimum 
rate). We have collected data for 21 OECD-countries for the years 1970-1998, as far as 
the data were available according to uniform definitions. The data show that, on average 
for OECD-countries, business ownership rates in manufacturing have been largely 
stable at 7%, while they have, on average, been decreasing for the service sector from 
22% in 1970 to 19% in 1998. However, in several important industrial economies such 
as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia, business ownership in 
manufacturing has gone up. Ownership rates in manufacturing remain lower than 
ownership rates in services though. This confirms that at least part of the increase in the 
economy-wide share of business ownership is due to the sectoral shift towards the 
service sector in developed economies. 
Results show that the empirical fit of the four different types of "equilibrium" 
relationships is not too different, both for the case of manufacturing and that of services. 
However, results for the speed of error-correction are hardly affected by which type is 
chosen. The estimated speed of error-correction for the manufacturing sector is about 
8.5% for a four-year period. This estimated speed is twice as high in the service sector: 
about 16%. Both in the manufacturing sector and for services there is a positive effect of 
(lagged) unemployment: countries with high unemployment show higher subsequent 
business ownership rates both in manufacturing and services. The results show that 
there is a significant penalty of the business ownership rate deviating from 
"equilibrium" for manufacturing for each of the four types of the "equilibrium" 
relationship. For the service sector also a negative effect on growth is found, but it is not 
always significant and it is far smaller than that for manufacturing. 
The analysis confirms the empirical evidence provided by Carree et al. (2002) that 
differences in business ownership rates matter and disappear over time slowly. The 
general idea behind the model is that there can be both too many and too few 
businesses. Too many businesses may mean that economies of scale and scope are not 
benefitted enough from and that there are probably many "marginal" ventures. Too few 
business may imply that there is not enough entrepreneurial activity.  
The results presented in the current chapter make a contribution to the international 
debate on increasing entrepreneurship as a route to economic growth. For instance, one 
of the major objectives of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor research program is to 
gain more insight in the systematic relationship between entrepreneurship and national 
economic growth (Reynolds et al., 2002). Based on correlation analysis of nation-wide 
measures of entrepreneurship and economic growth, Reynolds et al. (2002) state that 
“evidence continues to accumulate that the national level of entrepreneurial activity has 
a statistically significant association with subsequent levels of economic growth” (p. 6). 
The current analysis shows that entrepreneurial activity as far as embodied in self-
employment rates may benefit economic growth, but is not always a route to growth. 
Our analysis suggests not only that economies can have too few or too many businesses, 
but also that the extent to which there are too many or too few businesses varies by 
sector. In particular, the estimated equilibrium curves suggest that having too few 
businesses is the more likely problem in manufacturing, while having too many 
businesses is the more likely problem in the service sector. It would suggest that, not 
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only, the economic benefits of government promoting new (and small) business may be 
country-specific, but also sector-specific. Such promotion seems most beneficial in the 
manufacturing sector of countries with very low business ownership rates (like the 
Scandinavian countries). It may be counter-productive to have similar promotion in the 
service sector of countries with very high business ownership rates (like Italy). 
3.A Appendix: Data availability 
The various estimations in this chapter were performed using data from the data base 
“BLISS Oeso Sectoraal”. As this is an unbalanced panel, different numbers of 
observations per country are used for different estimations. The exact data per country 
used in the various estimations are reported in this appendix.  
In Table 3.A the construction of the estimation samples used for the various estimations 
in this report is given. For manufacturing, there are 245 observations in total, and for 
services 231 (see Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5). The maximum number of observations for a 
country is 13 (1974-98; only even years).49 For countries having less than 13 
observations the exact years available are reported in the table. 
 
Table 3.A: Number of observations per country used for sector estimations 
Country Manufacturing Services 
Austria 10      (1980-98) 10      (1980-98) 
Belgium 13 10      (1980-98) 
Denmark 13 13 
Finland 13 13 
France 13 13 
West-Germany 13 13 
Greece 12     (1976-98) 12     (1976-98) 
Ireland   8     (1980-94) - 
Italy 13 13 
The Netherlands 13 13 
Portugal 11     (1978-98) 13 
Spain 12     (1976-98)   5     (1990-98) 
Sweden 13 13 
United Kingdom 12     (1976-98) 12     (1976-98) 
Iceland   8     (1984-98)   8     (1984-98) 
Norway 13 13 
United States 12     (1974-96) 12     (1974-96) 
Japan 13 13 
Canada 10     (1980-98) 10     (1980-98) 
Australia 11     (1978-98) 13 
New Zealand   9     (1982-98)   9     (1982-98) 
TOTAL 245 231 
Note: Maximum number of observations is 13 (1974-98). 
                                                          
49 Note that in these cases the actual number of available years is 15 (1970-98), due to the four-year lag in 
the model. 
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As we saw in Table 3.5, the number of observations used for the macro estimations is 
227. This number is obtained by taking the intersection of the manufacturing and 
services samples. In Table 3.A, compared to the services sample of 231 observations, 
only for Portugal and Australia there are missing observations for manufacturing (viz. 
1974 and 1976, for both countries).  
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Chapter 4 
Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty 
This chapter documents that a process of industrial restructuring has been transforming 
the developed economies, where large corporations are accounting for less economic 
activity and small firms are accounting for a greater share of economic activity. Not all 
countries, however, are experiencing the same shift in their industrial structures. Little is 
known about the cost of resisting this restructuring process. The goal of this chapter is 
to identify whether there is a cost, measured in terms of forgone growth, of an impeded 
restructuring process. The cost is measured by linking growth rates of European 
countries to deviations from the “optimal” industrial structure. The empirical evidence 
suggests that countries impeding the restructuring process pay a penalty in terms of 
forgone growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Audretsch, D.B., M.A. Carree, A.J. van Stel and A.R. Thurik (2002a), Impeded 
Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty, Kyklos 55, 81-98. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Explanations for economic growth have generally been restricted to the realm of 
macroeconomics (Romer, 1990; Krugman, 1991). However, a different scholarly 
tradition linking growth to industrial organization dates back at least to Schumpeter 
(1934). According to this tradition, performance, measured in terms of economic 
growth, is shaped by the degree to which the industry structure most efficiently utilizes 
scarce resources. But what determines this optimal structure? There is a long-standing 
tradition in the field of industrial organization devoted towards identifying the 
determinants of industry structure. As early as 1948, Blair stated that technology is the 
most important determinant of industry structure.50 Scherer and Ross (1990) and 
Chandler (1990) expand the determinants of optimal industry structure to include other 
factors as well as the underlying technology. Dosi (1988, p. 1157), in his systematic 
review of the literature in the Journal of Economic Literature, concludes that “Each 
production activity is characterized by a particular distribution of firms.” 
When the determinants of the underlying industrial structure are stable, the industry 
structure itself would not be expected to change. However, a change in the underlying 
determinants would be expected to result in a change in the optimal industry structure. 
Certainly, Chandler (1990) and Scherer and Ross (1990) identified a shift in optimal 
industry structure towards increased centralization and concentration throughout the 
first two-thirds of the previous century as a result of changes in the underlying 
technology along with other factors. 
More recently, a series of studies has identified a change in the determinants underlying 
the industry structure that has reversed this trend. The most salient point of this change 
is that technology, globalization, deregulation, labor supply, variety in demand, and the 
resulting higher levels of uncertainty have rendered a shift in the industry structure 
away from greater concentration and centralization towards less concentration and 
decentralization. So, the industry structure is generally shifting towards an increased 
role for small enterprises. However, the extent and timing of this shift is anything but 
identical across countries. Rather, the shift in industry structures has been 
heterogeneous and apparently shaped by country-specific factors (Carree et al., 2002; 
Thurik, 1996). Apparently, institutions and policies in certain countries have facilitated 
a greater and more rapid response to globalization and technological change, along with 
the other underlying factors, by shifting to a less centralized industry structure than has 
been the case in other countries. An implication of this high variance in industry 
restructuring is that some countries are likely to have industry structures that are 
different from “optimal”. 
While the evidence suggests that the restructuring paths of industry vary considerably 
across countries, virtually nothing is known about the consequences of lagging behind 
in this process. Do countries with an industry structure that deviates considerably from 
the optimal industry structure forfeit growth more than countries deviating less from the 
                                                          
50 See Blair (1948, p. 121): “The whole subject of the comparative efficiency of different sizes of business 
has long raised one of the most perplexing dilemmas in the entire body of economic theory.…But a 
beginning must be made sometime in tackling this whole size-efficiency problem on an empirical basis. 
The first step in any such undertaking would logically be that of studying the underlying technological 
forces of the economy, since it is technology which largely determines the relationship between the size 
of plant and efficiency.” 
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optimal industry structure? This question is crucial to policy makers, because if the 
opportunity cost, measured in terms of forgone growth, of a slow adjustment towards 
the optimal industry structure is low, the consequences of not engaging in a rapid 
adjustment process are relatively trivial. However, if the opportunity cost is high the 
consequences are more alarming. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the impact of 
deviations in the actual industry structure from the optimal industry structure on growth. 
In the second section of this chapter, the shift in industry structure away from more to 
less concentrated production is documented and underlying explanations provided. In 
the third section, we use a data base linking industry structure to growth rates for a 
panel of 18 European countries spanning five years to test the hypothesis that deviations 
from the optimal industry structure result in reduced growth rates. Finally, in the last 
section conclusions are provided. In particular, we find that deviations from the optimal 
industry structure, measured in terms of the relative importance of small firms, have had 
an adverse effect on economic growth rates. 
4.2 The shift in industry structure 
A wide range of studies identified systematic evidence documenting two imposing 
characteristics of industry structure over the first two-thirds of the previous century 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990; Chandler, 1990). The first is that the degree of centralization 
of production was steadily increasing over time. The second is that production was at its 
highest point of centralization and concentration in the 1970s. This reflected underlying 
technological and demand characteristics rendering large-scale production and 
organization more efficient. 
Until 1970s: large businesses as the engine of growth 
Giant corporations were seen as the sole and most powerful engine of economic and 
technological progress in the early post war period. Schumpeter (1950) provided an 
image of large corporations gaining the competitive advantage over small and new ones 
and of giant corporations ultimately dominating the entire economic landscape. This 
advantage would be due to scale economies in the production of new economic and 
technological knowledge. These scale economies would result from the organization of 
teams of highly trained specialists working on technological progress in a routinized 
fashion. The large corporation was thought to have both superior production efficiency 
and superior innovative efficacy. Galbraith (1956) pointed out that in his world of 
countervailing power large corporations are superior to small ones in nearly every 
aspect of economic behavior like productivity, technological advance, compensation 
and job security. In his world all major societal institutions contributed to the 
maintenance of the stability and predictability needed for mass production. In these 
worlds of Schumpeter and Galbraith there is little room for small scale, experimenting 
firms thriving on the uncertainty of technological advance, whimsical markets and the 
individual energy of an obstinate entrepreneur. Only large industrial units were thought 
to be able to compete on global markets producing global products.  
The exploitation of economies of scale and scope was thought to be at the heart of 
dictating an industry structure characterized by concentration and centralization (Teece, 
1993). Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of investment in production, 
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distribution, and management needed to exploit economies of scale and scope. 
Audretsch (1995) stresses the influence the image of the East-European economies and 
the perceived Soviet threat had on Western policy makers. An important concern in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s was the assumed strong technological progress emerging 
from huge and concentrated research and development programs being assembled in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was a period of relatively well-defined 
technological trajectories, of a stable demand and of seemingly clear advantages of 
diversification. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) characterize this period as one where 
stability, continuity and homogeneity were the cornerstones and label it the managed 
economy. Small businesses were considered to be a vanishing breed. 
From 1970s on: shift in economic activity toward small firms 
Perhaps it was the demise of the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union that made it clear that concentration and centralization were no 
longer the cornerstones of the most efficient industry structure. At the same time, more 
and more evidence became available that economic activity moved away from large 
firms to small, predominantly young firms. Brock and Evans (1989) provided an 
extensive documentation of the changing role of small business in the U.S. economy. 
They were the first to understand these new developments filling the void of economic 
research concerning formation, dissolution and growth of businesses and concerning the 
differential impact of regulations across business size classes. The new role of small 
firms and their new interaction with large ones is described in Nooteboom (1994). 
Various authors have provided empirical evidence for this new role. Blau (1987) 
showed that the proportion of self-employed in the U.S. labor force began to rise in the 
late 1970s. Acs and Audretsch (1993) and Carlsson (1992) provided a survey of 
evidence concerning manufacturing industries in countries in varying stages of 
economic development. Acs (1996) shows that the self-employment rate in OECD 
countries declined until 1977 and increased between then and 1987. Carree et al. (2002) 
show that for a sample of 23 OECD countries the average business ownership rate 
increased from 9.6% in 1976 to 11% in 1996. See also Van Stel (2003). 
There has been considerable documentation of the shift in the structure of American 
industry. Carlsson (1989) showed that the share of the Fortune 500 in total 
manufacturing employment dropped from 79% in 1975 to 73% in 1985. In the same 
period the share of these firms in total manufacturing shipments dropped from 83% to 
78%. More recently, he shows that the employment share of the Fortune 500 dropped to 
58% in 1996 and the latter to 75% (Carlsson, 1999). Unfortunately, similar 
documentation for Europe has not been possible due to the absence of systematic data 
that is comparable across countries. However, Eurostat has begun to publish yearly 
summaries of the firm size distribution of EU-members at the two-digit industry level 
for the entire private sector, see Eurostat (1994, 1996). The efforts of Eurostat are 
currently being supplemented by the European Network of SME Research (ENSR), a 
co-operation of 18 European institutes. This organization publishes a yearly report of 
the structure and the developments of the enterprise and establishment populations in 
the countries of the European Union.51 
Explaining the shift in industry structure 
                                                          
51 See the various editions of European Observatory which provide an account of the state of small 
business in Europe like, for instance, EIM/ENSR (1997). 
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Carlsson (1992) offers two explanations for the shift in the industry structure away from 
large corporations and towards small enterprises. The first deals with fundamental 
changes occurring in the world economy from the 1970s onwards. These changes relate 
to the intensification of global competition, the increase in the degree of uncertainty and 
the growth in market fragmentation. The second deals with changes in the character of 
technological progress. He shows that flexible automation has had various effects 
resulting in a shift from large to smaller firms. The shift in the nature of technological 
progress particularly involving flexible automation facilitated product differentiation 
and led to a new division of labor involving more cooperation and less competition 
between large and small firms. Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that in the 1970s firms and 
policy makers were unable to maintain the conditions necessary to preserve mass 
production. Mass production was based upon the input of special-purpose machines and 
of semi-skilled workers and the output of standardized products. A fundamental change 
in the path of technological development led to the occurrence of vast diseconomies of 
scale. This market instability resulted in the demise of mass production and promoted 
flexible specialization. Piore and Sabel use the term Industrial Divide for the “reversal 
of the trend” from that toward more large firms to that toward more small ones. Jensen 
(1993) refers to the Third Industrial Revolution when describing the same phenomenon. 
Meredith (1987) discusses the advantages of a range of recently developed flexible 
production techniques for small-scaled enterprises. Audretsch and Thurik (2000) point 
at the role knowledge plays when explaining the shift from the managed economy to the 
entrepreneurial economy. 
This shift away from large firms is not confined to manufacturing industries. Brock and 
Evans (1989) show that this trend has been economy-wide, at least for the United 
States. They offer four additional reasons as to why this shift has occurred: (1) the 
increase of labor supply; (2) changes in consumer tastes; (3) relaxation of (entry) 
regulations and (4) the fact that we are in a period of creative destruction. Loveman and 
Sengenberger (1991) stress the influence of two other trends of industrial restructuring: 
decentralization and vertical disintegration of large companies and the formation of new 
business communities. Furthermore, they emphasize the role of private and public 
policies promoting the small business sector.52 
The effect of the shift 
The extent to which this shift in industry structure has influenced economic 
performance has received limited attention. This has to do with a persistent lack in 
knowledge of market structure dynamics (Audretsch, 1995). In other words, there is a 
lack in knowledge concerning questions like who enters and exits, what determines this 
mobility and what are its effects, in particular on economic performance. Here we are 
concerned with a key question in economics: why do industries or economies grow? As 
discussed earlier, traditionally, the prevalent assumption was that large enterprises are at 
the heart of the process of innovation and creation of welfare. This assumption is 
generally referred to as the Schumpeterian Hypothesis. Recently, the focus of attention 
has shifted towards whether the process of decentralization and deconcentration, which 
                                                          
52 See also Carree et al. (2002) for a survey of the determinants of the shift away from a managed and 
toward an entrepreneurial economy. An important consequence of the shift in consumer tastes and the 
decentralization and vertical disintegration of large companies has been the increased share of the service 
sector. Because enterprises in the service sector are, on average, much smaller than in the manufacturing 
industry, this implies an increased share of small firms at the economy-wide level. 
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virtually every industrialized country has experienced in the last two decades, has had 
positive welfare implications. Audretsch (1995) calls this shift in orientation of our 
social-economic thinking ‘the new learning’. 
The link between the shift in the industry structure and subsequent growth can be 
investigated in two distinct ways. First, by investigating the range of consequences of 
the shift in the locus of economic activity. For instance, one may study whether this 
shift has been favorable to the rejuvenation of industries and the process of (radical) 
innovation.53 Alternatively, one may focus on the importance of the role of small firms 
in enhancing competition.54 A yet different perspective on the link between the shifting 
industry structure and performance has been to examine the relationship between small 
firms and job creation.55 Lastly, the role of small firms as a vehicle for entrepreneurship 
has been the focal point for a series of studies. For example, Baumol (1990) provides an 
extensive account of the role that entrepreneurial activities and their consequences for 
prosperity play throughout history. Acs (1992) brings it all together in a short 
descriptive manner in a survey of some consequences of the shift of economic activity 
from large to smaller businesses. He claims that small firms play an important role in 
the economy as they are agents of change by their entrepreneurial activity, as they are a 
source of considerable innovative activity, as they stimulate industry evolution and as 
they create an important share of the newly generated jobs. 
A second way to answer the question of how changes in the industry structure impact 
performance is to circumvent the intermediary variables of technological change, 
entrepreneurship, competitiveness and job generation to investigate a direct link 
between the shift and performance measures at the industry or economy-wide level. 
Some preliminary empirical results of the relation between changes in the firm size 
distribution and economic growth are presented in Thurik (1996). His analysis lacks a 
theoretical component but provides some indication of an increase in the economy-wide 
share of small firms positively affecting subsequent growth. Schmitz (1989) presents an 
endogenous growth model relating entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. An 
important implication of his model is that the equilibrium fraction of entrepreneurs is 
lower than the social optimal level, providing a rationale for policies stimulating 
entrepreneurial activity. Some evidence of a well-established historical (long-term) 
relationship between fluctuations in entrepreneurship and the rise and fall of nations is 
assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). In this respect we also mention the work 
of Eliasson (1995) on economic growth through competitive selection. He demonstrates 
that such a relation may be characterized by significant time lags up to a couple of 
decades.  
The evaluation of the various consequences of the shift in the locus of economic activity 
is necessary to establish whether it is desirable and whether it should be promoted by 
economic policy. However, this evaluation is complicated because none of these 
consequences is, in fact, independent of the other three and because the evaluation 
                                                          
53 See Acs and Audretsch (1990), Audretsch (1995) and Cohen and Klepper (1996). 
54 See Audretsch (1995), Oughton and Whittam (1997) and You (1995). Nickell (1996), Nickell et al. 
(1997) and Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) present evidence that competition, as measured by an 
increased number of competitors, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor productivity growth. 
55 Davis et al. (1996) and Carree and Klomp (1996) provide some insights in the relationship between 
small firms and job creation. 
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offers something of a series of trade-offs. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) contrast the 
most fundamental elements of the newly emerging entrepreneurial economy with those 
of the managed economy by identifying fifteen trade-offs that are essential for these two 
polar worlds. For instance, while total employment may rise due to new start-ups and 
declining average firm sizes, the lower average wages that small firms pay, may at least 
partly offset the welfare effect induced by the employment growth. By following the 
second way we are able to investigate whether there has been an overall growth-
enhancing effect of the shift in the locus of economic activity from ‘large’ to ‘small’. 
This is the subject of Section 4.3. 
4.3 Estimating the growth penalty 
In this section we test the hypothesis that the extent of the gap between the actual 
industry structure and the optimal industry structure influences subsequent growth. We 
start with the assumption that a country’s growth can be decomposed into two 
components: (i) growth that would have occurred with an optimal industry structure, 
and (ii) the impact on growth occurring from any actual deviations from that optimal 
industry structure. This can be represented by 
 
(4.1)  *ccp
*
cpcp SFPSFPGNPGNP −−∆=∆ −1γ , 
where the dependent variable is the actual rate of economic growth. *cpGNP∆  is the rate 
of economic growth in country c in the case where the actual industry structure, 
summarized by small firm presence ( cpSFP ), is at the optimal level at the start of the 
period p. For ease of exposition we assume that the optimal industry structure in a 
country remains constant for the total period under investigation. This is not vital to our 
analysis. Since we are considering only short-term periods (maximum five years) this 
may be a reasonable assumption. 
Industry structure is multidimensional and spans a broad array of characteristics that 
defy measurement by a single statistic. However, as explained elsewhere (Audretsch 
and Thurik, 2000, 2001), the most salient characteristic driving the shift in industry 
structure from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy is that the relative role of 
small and entrepreneurial firms has increased. Thus, we capture changes in industry 
structures by changes in the relative importance of small firms. 
In Equation (4.1) the parameter γ  is positive. Deviations of the actual industry structure 
from the optimal industry structure negatively affect economic growth, both when the 
industry structure consists of too few or too many small firms. In either case there is a 
deviation from the optimal industry structure and number of small firms. Taking the 
first difference of Equation (4.1) we obtain 
 
(4.2)  ( )*ccp*ccp*cpcpcp SFPSFPSFPSFPGNPGNPGNP −−−−∆∆+∆=∆ −−− 211 γ . 
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In case both 1−cpSFP  and 2−cpSFP  are above the optimal small-firm share, the expression 
between brackets reduces to 1−∆ cpSFP . Indeed, in case the small-firm share is too high, 
adding small firms to the industry structure reduces economic growth. In case both 
1−cpSFP  and 2−cpSFP  are below the optimal small-firm share, the expression between 
brackets reduces to 1−∆− cpSFP . An increase in the small firm share when this presence 
is below optimal enhances economic performance. Therefore, the sign of the parameter 
of 1−∆ cpSFP  reflects whether the small firm presence is below or above the optimal 
levels for the countries under consideration. In case the parameter is negative, the 
industry structure consists of too many small firms. In case the parameter is positive, the 
reverse holds and the industry structure consists of too few small firms. 
We will denote the parameter of 1−∆ cpSFP  as κ . Note that this is not the same 
parameter as γ , since the sign of κ  is dependent on whether the actual small-firm share 
is above or below the optimal one. So, κ  can be both positive and negative whereas γ  
is necessarily positive. 
We make some further assumptions to transform Equation (4.2) into an equation that 
can be estimated using the data at hand. First, we approximate 1−∆ cpSFP  by 
11 −− ∆−∆ cpcp LFSF  , the difference between the growth of small firms and large firms in 
terms of value-of-shipments. Second, we assume that *cpGNP∆  is idiosyncratic with 
respect to time and country. Therefore country dummies and time dummies (the last to 
correct for European wide business cycle effects) are included. Thus, *cpGNP∆∆  is 
approximated by time dummies only because the country dummies drop out when 
taking first differences. Third, we add an error term cpe . Summarizing we have 
 
(4.3) cpcpcp
P
p
ppcpcp eLFSFDGNPGNP +∆−∆++∆=∆ −−
=
− ∑ )( 11
1
1 κβ , 
where pD  denote dummy variables for periods Pp ,...,1= . Factors specific to each time 
period are reflected by pβ . A high value of this parameter indicates an unexplained 
increase in the extent of economic growth. In case of a low pβ  the reverse holds. The 
contribution of the shift in the size class distribution of firms to the percentage growth 
of GNP is represented by κ . The influence of this shift on GNP growth is lagged. This 
implies that Pp ,...,1=  runs from 1990 through 1994 when applying Equation (4.3) to 
our European data set. 
To estimate Equation (4.3), we use data provided by the European Observatory 
(EIM/ENSR, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997). The European Observatory provides data 
on the annual percentage growth of real gross value added of the (non-primary) private 
sector, the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of small- and medium-sized 
firms (with employment less than 250 employees), as well as the annual percentage 
growth of value-of-shipments of large firms (with employment of at least 250 
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employees).56 These data are available for five years (1989 through 1993) for all fifteen 
member countries of the European Union (Europe-15), Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland (including Liechtenstein).57  
Hence, our European data set consists of a total of 90 (18 countries times five years) 
observations. However, Germany had to be omitted for the entire period. Germany’s 
then recent unification led to specific economic perturbations that render it 
inappropriate for inclusion in the estimation model. The remaining 85 observations are 
used for computing the regression coefficients. The lowest values of cpcp LFSF ∆−∆  in 
the data set are –2.5%-point (Finland, 1993) and –1.8%-point (Norway, 1989), while the 
highest values are 2.1%-point (Finland, 1989) and 1.9%-point (United Kingdom, 1989). 
The mean value is –0.2%-point. The period 1990-1994 is characterized by relatively 
vehement cyclical movements with 1992 being a recession year and 1994 being a year 
with an exceptional strong recovery. 
In Table 4.1 the regression results for the period 1990-1994 are presented. Equation 
(4.3) does not contain country dummies. The ‘mean’ country effect is reflected by 
coefficient α  while 1991D  is left out of all computations to avoid full multicollinearity.
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The two dummy variables with a significant contribution are 1993D  and 1994D . This 
reflects the strong economic recovery after the recession of 1992. We present both 
results with all time dummies included and with the two insignificant dummies 
excluded. In the first part of Table 4.1 weighted least squares results are presented, with 
total employment as the weighting variable. In the second part of the table ordinary least 
squares results are presented. 
In each of the cases we find a significantly positive coefficient (at the 5% significance 
level) for κ . Its value ranges from 0.55 for the first column of Table 4.1 to 0.92 for the 
last column.59 
The empirical evidence suggests that the consequences for economic growth of not 
shifting the industry structure away from large business towards smaller ones are rather 
large. However, this result is qualified by the large standard deviation of the coefficient 
for κ . Another important qualification to these results is that measurement of the 
variables includes a number of estimates. Follow-up studies are required for 
                                                          
56 The European Observatory data are corrected for the so-called size distribution fallacy, i.e. the 
phenomenon that firms may cross size-class boundaries between year t and year t+1 (see e.g. Kleijweg 
and Nieuwenhuijsen, 1996). 
57 The European Observatory database is largely based on the Eurostat publication Enterprises in Europe, 
which contains harmonised information for each of the countries listed above on the number of 
enterprises, employment, turnover, value added and labour costs, by industry and size class. For some 
countries, estimates have been made in case of incomplete data. 
58 Instead of estimating coefficients for all P time dummies as suggested by Equation (4.3), we actually 
estimate P-1 dummy coefficients and a constant term α . 
59 To control for possible country selection effects, we have run the regression 17 times independently, 
each time with one country excluded from the sample and with a model specification with only dummies 
for the years 1993 and 1994 in Equation (4.3). The estimates of κ  range from 0.53 (t-value 1.71) to 0.68 
(t-value 2.67) using weighted least squares and from 0.73 (t-value 1.63) to 1.01 (t-value 2.43) using 
ordinary least squares. 
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corroboration of these results.60 Still, the estimated κ  is found to be significantly 
positive in all computations. We conclude, based on the empirical findings, that there is 
evidence that on average those countries that have experienced a shift in their industry 
structures away from large firms and towards small firms have also experienced greater 
economic growth, at least for a sample of Western European countries over a recent 
time period. Since our interpretation is that this shift is an indicator of the stage of the 
transition of the economy from a managed one to an entrepreneurial one, we conclude 
that European countries that progress on this transition track seem to have been 
rewarded with additional growth. 61 
One has to be careful interpreting the estimation results for different countries. The 
estimated positive value of κ  must be viewed as an average value of the (unobserved) 
cκ ’s of the different countries. So, the positive value found for κ  does not mean that in 
all countries in the sample an increase in small-firm presence is rewarded with 
additional growth. There may be countries in the sample where small-firm presence is 
indeed above the optimal level and consequently, a further increase in the number of 
small firms leads to a growth penalty instead of a growth reward. The estimation results 
do indicate, however, that for the majority of countries in the sample, the number of 
small firms was too low in the period under consideration. In translating the positive 
value of κ  in terms of implications for different countries, policy makers should 
compare small-firm presence in their own country with that in surrounding countries. If 
SFP  is relatively low, small-firm presence may be expected to be below optimum, 
given the positive value of κ . On the other hand, if SFP  is relatively high, small-firm 
presence might exceed optimum, despite the estimated κ  being positive. 
                                                          
60 Carree and Thurik (1998 and 1999a) provide complementary analyses showing the consequence of 
lagging behind in this restructuring process in manufacturing. Using a sample of 14 manufacturing 
industries in 13 European countries and 13 manufacturing industries in 12 European countries, 
respectively, they find that, on average, the employment share of large firms in 1990 has had a negative 
effect on growth of output in the subsequent four-year period.  
61 It is conceivable that there is reversed causality, i.e. that the degree of industry restructuring is 
dependent on the level of economic growth. To correct for business cycle effects, we estimate the 
following equation: cpcpcpcp GNPLFSF ενµ +∆+=∆−∆  for the period 1989-1993. The estimated 
residuals of this equation, cp
∧
ε , can be seen as the variable cpcp LFSF ∆−∆ , corrected for business 
cycle effects. Equation (4.3) is now estimated for the period 1990-1994 (note that there is lag in (4.3)), 
with cpcp LFSF ∆−∆  replaced by cp
∧
ε . The estimate of ν  is 0.00 (t-value 0.01) using WLS and –0.04 
(t-value –1.43) using OLS. As a consequence, the estimated value of κ  in Equation (4.3) is the same as 
in Table 4.1 using WLS and is 0.62 (t-value 1.45) using OLS (only dummies for 1993 and 1994). After 
correcting for reversed causality, the estimate of κ  equals 0.6 in all four versions of Table 4.1. We 
conclude that omission of the option of reversed causality hardly influences the size and sign of the 
effects as represented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Regression results for Equation (4.3): relating growth to structure1, 2 
 Weighted least squares3 Ordinary least squares 
α  -0.93 
(-2.30) 
-0.79 
(-3.38) 
-1.22 
(-1.84) 
-0.97 
(-2.56) 
1990β  0.52 
(0.89) 
 0.39 
(0.41) 
 
1992β  -0.08 
(-0.14) 
 0.37 
(0.39) 
 
1993β  1.32 
(2.26) 
1.20 
(2.50) 
2.19 
(2.32) 
1.94 
(2.53) 
1994β  4.35 
(7.40) 
4.25 
(8.74) 
4.72 
(4.91) 
4.48 
(5.65) 
κ  0.55 
(2.14) 
0.63 
(2.58) 
0.91 
(2.20) 
0.92 
(2.27) 
 
R2 0.441 0.422 0.318 0.317 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.401 0.275 0.291 
DW 2.05 2.04 1.72 1.72 
N 85 85 85 85 
1 Regression for 17 European countries over the period 1990-1994. 
2 DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. T-values between parentheses. 
3 Weighting variable for WLS is total employment. 
 
The regression results are illustrated using Figure 4.1. We have grouped the growth-
acceleration observations, 1−∆−∆=∆∆ cpcp GNPGNPGNP , on the basis of the degree to 
which the value-of-shipments shifted from large to small firms. That is, the GNP∆∆  
observations have been sorted in order of the values of the (lagged) structural change 
variable, LFSF ∆−∆ . Both variables have been computed in deviation of the mean per 
year in order to correct for specific year effects. The 85 sorted observations have been 
divided into five groups of 17 observations. The averages of both LFSF ∆−∆  and 
GNP∆∆  are displayed in Figure 4.1. We see that, on average, a larger shift toward 
smallness is associated with a higher growth acceleration.  
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Figure 4.1: Growth accelerations and the relative shift toward small firms 1 
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1 Averages of five groups of growth acceleration values (∆∆GNP), ordered on the basis of the degree of 
change toward small firms (∆SF-∆LF), both in deviation of yearly country-averages. Both axes are scaled 
in percentage points.  
4.4 Conclusions 
An extensive literature has linked the structure of industries to performance. However, 
little is known about the consequences of deviating from the “optimal” industry 
structure. The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that, in fact, there is a cost of 
not adjusting industry structure towards the “optimal”. This cost is measured in terms of 
forgone economic growth. 
Most developed countries have experienced a shift towards a more decentralized 
industry structure in the last several decades. The magnitude of this shift and speed of 
adjustment varies considerably across countries. The evidence suggests that those 
countries that have shifted industry structure towards decentralization in a more rapid 
fashion have been rewarded by higher growth rates.62 
Our analysis is based upon whether excess growth of small firms over their larger 
counterparts has led to additional macro-economic growth for member countries of the 
European Union in the early 1990. The results of this investigation are meant to 
                                                          
62 Fagerberg (2000) investigates the impact of a different dimension of industry structure, that of the 
distribution of economic activity across (manufacturing) industries. Using data for a sample of 37 
countries over the 1973-1990 period, he finds empirical evidence for increases in the shares of the 
electrical machinery industry (containing electronics) in the total manufacturing sector to positively affect 
productivity growth in manufacturing. Fagerberg argues it to be a consequence of this industry having the 
highest productivity growth (4.7% per annum), on average, of all manufacturing industries and of 
technological progress in electronics to spill over to other manufacturing industries. 
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supplement the intuition of many policymakers that the changes in industrial structure 
have had some real effects on economic performance.  
European public policy has been preoccupied with generating economic growth and 
reducing unemployment. The resulting policy debate has typically focused on 
macroeconomic policies and instruments. The results of this chapter suggest that an 
additional set of instruments may also be valuable in generating growth – policies 
focusing on allowing the industry structure to adjust. As the evidence shows, just as 
countries reluctant to shift their industry structures will be penalized by lower growth 
rates, those nations able to harness the forces of technology and globalization by 
transforming their industry structures are rewarded by growth dividends. 
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Chapter 5 
Knowledge Spillovers and Economic Growth 
The importance of knowledge spillovers for achieving innovation and economic growth 
is widely recognized. It is not straightforward which type of spillovers is most effective: 
intra-sectoral spillovers or inter-sectoral spillovers. We investigate this controversy 
using a model of regional growth. The model also deals with the impact of local 
competition on innovation and growth. The model is estimated using sectoral data for 
40 Dutch regions. We find that local competition is important particularly for economic 
growth in industry sectors (manufacturing and construction), while diversity, a proxy 
for inter-sectoral spillovers, is important particularly for growth in service sectors. We 
find no effect for specialization (a proxy for intra-sectoral spillovers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Van Stel, A.J. and H.R. Nieuwenhuijsen (2004), Knowledge Spillovers and Economic 
Growth: An Analysis Using Data of Dutch Regions in the Period 1987-1995, 
Regional Studies 38, 393-407. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Spillovers occur if an innovation or improvement implemented by a certain enterprise 
increases the performance of another enterprise without the latter benefiting enterprise 
having to pay (full) compensation. In the past decades there has been increasing 
recognition that spillovers contribute substantially to economic growth. According to 
the new growth theory (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986), spillovers are the engine of growth. 
Mackun and Macpherson (1997) conclude that the relative importance of firms’ in-
house R&D compared to external technical activity may be declining. They suggest that 
external inputs (for example in the form of spillovers) can increase the productivity of 
in-house initiatives of firms. 
There are various types of spillovers (transfers), viz. knowledge spillovers, market 
spillovers and network spillovers.63 The new growth theory primarily focuses on 
knowledge spillovers (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Aghion et al., 1997; Romer, 1986). 
Knowledge (obtained via, for example, R&D activities) accumulates, and this generates 
innovations in enterprises. Since enterprises benefit from each other’s innovations and 
ideas, an economy may grow even in the event of maximum input of labour and capital. 
In other words, spillovers explain part of the phenomenon that economies grow faster 
than might be expected on the basis of labour and capital input growth.64 The increasing 
role of knowledge and small firms in the modern economy (Audretsch and Thurik, 
2000, 2001) motivates the investigation of the effect of knowledge spillovers, as small 
firms usually are more dependent upon knowledge spillovers than large firms are.65 
Knowledge spillovers appear to be a local phenomenon (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
Interaction between people and enterprises located in each other’s proximity produce 
the highest likelihood of spillover effects. This seems surprising, considering the current 
state of information technology, where information can be diffused throughout the 
world at practically zero cost. Audretsch and Thurik (1999) refer to a paradox, which 
they explain by distinguishing between information and (tacit) knowledge. Information 
consists of facts and may be diffused simply and free of charge, with examples being 
the gold price in Tokyo, or the weather in New York. Knowledge, contrastingly, may 
not simply be coded. This is because knowledge is often highly specific in nature (think 
for instance of technical knowledge), and therefore difficult to transmit through formal 
means of communication. This makes that face-to-face contacts are important for the 
diffusion of knowledge. Knowledge diffusion primarily emerges by means of social 
contacts, for example during meetings or sales transactions.66 It may also emerge in a 
                                                          
63 For an extensive elaboration, see Jaffe (1996). In the present chapter, the term spillovers denotes 
knowledge spillovers, unless stated otherwise. 
64 In the new growth theory, knowledge spillovers are considered an example of (technological) external 
economies of scale. For an individual firm, average costs per unit of output decrease with growing output 
at the industry-wide level. An increase in industry output increases the stock of knowledge through 
positive information spillovers for each firm, leading to an increase in output at the firm level (Van Oort, 
2002, p. 42). 
65 Some authors investigate the relation between various aspects of innovation and firm performance, 
while taking size-class differences in the relation into account. See e.g. De Kok (2002) and Folkeringa et 
al. (2004). 
66 The distinction between knowledge and information as used in this paragraph is also known in the 
literature as the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge or that between implicit and explicit 
knowledge. 
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more structured fashion, as part of public-private initiatives explicitly focusing on 
knowledge dissemination between clustering firms. We describe a case study of such an 
initiative in Section 5.2. 
The contribution of knowledge spillovers to economic growth has been demonstrated by 
several authors (e.g. Griliches, 1992; Soete and Ter Weel, 1999). There are, however, 
various conflicting theories as regards the exact mechanisms of spillovers, with debates 
focusing on two questions. First, do spillovers primarily emerge within one sector or, 
alternatively, do spillovers emerge between different sectors? Second, how does local 
competition influence the amount of innovative activity and hence, economic growth? 
The present chapter focuses on these questions, using a model of regional growth based 
on Glaeser et al. (1992). The model examines three possible determinants of regional 
sectoral growth, viz. specialization, diversity and competition. Specialization is 
hypothesized to facilitate spillovers between firms from the same sector, while diversity 
is hypothesized to facilitate spillovers between firms from different sectors. The impact 
of specialization and diversity on growth, therefore, indicates the importance of intra-
sectoral and inter-sectoral spillovers, respectively. The third variable, competition, may 
have both positive and negative effects on the amount of innovative activity and hence 
on economic growth. In fact, this involves a trade-off between internalization of 
innovation externalities (local monopoly) and the necessity to innovate to remain 
competitive in the market (local competition). By including local competition as a 
possible determinant of economic growth, this trade-off can be tested. 
The model is estimated using data of 40 Dutch regions (spatial NUTS3 aggregation 
level), that provide information on the number of businesses, employment and real 
value added for six sectors, viz. mining, manufacturing, construction, the trades, 
transport&communication and financial services. The 40 regions cover the entire 
Netherlands. The data cover the period 1987-1995. 
We remark that the present study focuses on inter-firm spillovers, i.e. knowledge 
spilling over between different firms. Our focus is not on knowledge produced by 
universities or public research institutions spilling over toward private firms. Wever and 
Stam (1999) show that for their sample of Dutch high technology SMEs, “by far the 
most important external innovation impulses came from other firms ... (instead of 
knowledge centres such as universities)” (p. 396). 
The remainder of this chapter is set up as follows. In Section 5.2 three theories on 
knowledge spillovers and local competition are discussed. Also, to illustrate how 
spillovers may come about in practice, we describe a case study on ‘knowledge-
intensive industrial clustering’ in the Netherlands. Section 5.3 outlines the model which 
the theories are tested with. Also the hypotheses to be tested, the construction of the 
model variables, and the differences between the present chapter and the study of 
Glaeser et al. (1992), are dealt with. Section 5.4 discusses the modelling of spatial 
externalities. Section 5.5 describes the data employed. In Section 5.6 we present the 
estimation results. The final section contains a summary and some conclusions.  
5.2 Theory 
84 
The model of Glaeser et al. (1992) departs from the assumption that knowledge 
spillovers at the regional level are of major significance as regards innovation and 
economic growth. More precisely formulated, Glaeser et al. assume that sectors in 
different regions may have different growth rates because knowledge spillovers work 
out more effectively in one region than in another. This is because different types of 
knowledge spillovers may emerge in different regions, viz. intra-sectoral spillovers 
versus inter-sectoral spillovers. Furthermore, the intensity of local competition may 
differ between regions. The model examines three theories as to the impact of 
knowledge spillovers and local competition on regional growth. In this section these 
theories are discussed. Also, we describe how knowledge spillovers between firms may 
come about in practice, by means of a case study on ‘knowledge-intensive industrial 
clustering’. 
Three theories on knowledge spillovers and local competition 
The first theory is developed by Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), 
abbreviated as MAR. They assume that knowledge spillovers are most effective 
between homogeneous enterprises. So, spillovers primarily emerge within one sector. 
For a given region, this would imply that specialization in a limited number of activities 
may contribute to spillovers and growth. An example of this type of within-industry 
spillovers would be the microchip manufacturing industry in Silicon Valley (Glaeser et 
al., 1992, p. 1130). The MAR economists further assume that the situation of a local 
monopoly is beneficial for economic growth, since in that case, the vast share of the 
yields generated by innovation benefits the innovator itself. That is, the externalities 
associated with innovation are internalized by the innovator. This would produce an 
additional incentive to innovate. In the MAR theory, regional sectoral growth is 
maximized if the sector is dominant in the region, and if local competition is not too 
strong. 
The second theory is that of Porter (1990), who agrees with MAR that knowledge 
spillovers between firms in specialized sectors (sectors which are concentrated in 
certain regions) stimulate economic growth. In contrast to MAR, however, Porter 
assumes that local competition has a positive impact on growth. In his view, 
competition accelerates imitation and upgrades innovation. Although competition 
decreases the relative benefits for the innovator (due to larger spillovers flowing to 
competitors), the amount of innovative activity will increase, because enterprises are 
“forced” to innovate: enterprises that fail to improve products and production processes 
in due time will lose ground to their competitors and will ultimately go bankrupt. An 
example of fierce competition to innovate, resulting in growth, would be the Italian 
ceramics and gold jewelry industries (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1128). So, while MAR 
emphasize the negative effect of competition on the amount of innovative activity, 
Porter assumes that the positive effect is dominating. 
The third theory elaborating on the significance of local knowledge spillovers was 
developed by Jacobs (1969). Jacobs’ theory departs from the assumption that 
knowledge spillovers work out most effectively among enterprises that practise 
different activities. Primarily inter-sectoral knowledge transfers would thus be of 
significance. In her view, sectors will grow in regions where, besides the sector itself, 
various other sectors are important. In this philosophy, regions marked by a high degree 
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of variety (diversity) will thrive.67 As regards competition, Jacobs agrees with Porter, 
i.e. Jacobs assumes that local competition accelerates the adoption of new technologies 
and, consequently, stimulates economic growth. 
Knowledge spillovers in practice: the case of Océ 68 
The three theories discussed above all deal with the phenomenon of spillovers flowing 
between neighbouring firms. But how do these spillovers come about in practice? In the 
introduction to this chapter we already mentioned that face-to-face contacts are 
important, for example during meetings or sales transactions. However, this is still 
somewhat vague. As an illustration of how spillovers may work in practice, below we 
describe a case study on ‘knowledge-intensive industrial clustering’. 
In modern economies, many high-tech firms operate in highly competitive markets. In 
these markets it is crucial to constantly improve upon all parts of the production 
process. This is particularly important with the advent of low-cost but highly skilled 
competition in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia (Audretsch and Thurik, 
2001). Therefore, in some regions, innovative clusters of high-tech firms are formed. 
Wintjes and Cobbenhagen (2000) describe the case of Océ, a high-tech multinational 
making specialised copy machines, located in the Eindhoven-Venlo region in the 
Netherlands. In this region, as a public-private policy initiative, a cluster of (small) local 
suppliers was formed around Océ with the purpose of benefiting from each other’s 
expertise, by closely working together. Océ, whose core competence is product 
development (i.e. developing copy machines), outsourced their engineering tasks to the 
regional suppliers, thereby externalising part of the codification process to the region. 
The externalities were absorbed, accumulated and cultivated within the regional 
supplying firms. In this way these firms increased their innovative competences. In 
particular, the supplying firms, whose innovative capacity traditionally consisted of tacit 
knowledge built up by years of ‘learning by doing’, learned how to codify their 
knowledge. The supplier firms in the cluster used and socialised their tacit knowledge, 
in order to jointly transform a prototype of a new product or module into a 
manufacturable one. In this way, in its turn, Océ benefited from the supplier firms as 
these firms were now better equipped to codify their tacit knowledge and communicate 
their codified knowledge to Océ. Wintjes and Cobbenhagen show that proximity is 
crucial in these kind of processes as “the restructuring of a codification process requires 
intensive communicative interaction between heterogeneous knowledge resources”. 
5.3 Model, hypotheses, variables, and earlier work 
In this section the model to be estimated is described. Also the hypotheses to be tested, 
and the operationalizations of the variables specialization, competition and diversity, 
which are crucial in the model, are discussed. Finally, at the end of this section, we 
discuss the surplus value of this chapter with regard to the study of Glaeser et al. (1992). 
                                                          
67 An example of this type of inter-sectoral spillovers would be the following: “A San Francisco food 
processor invented equipment leasing when he had trouble finding financing for his own capital; the 
industry was not invented by the bankers” (Glaeser et al., 1992, p. 1132). 
68 The remainder of this section is based on Wintjes and Cobbenhagen (2000). 
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Model 
We use a simple model to test the three theories described above. The model assumes 
that each individual firm in a certain sector and region has a production function of 
output which depends on labour input and the overall level of technology. Each firm 
takes technology, prices and wages as given and sets labour input such that profits are 
maximized. Furthermore, the overall level of technology is assumed to have both 
national components and local components. Growth of local technology captures 
technological externalities present in the sector in the region. These externalities can be 
measured by variables such as specialization, local competion and diversity. Using these 
assumptions one can derive that growth in a sector in a region depends on wage growth, 
growth of national technology, and these measures of (local) technological externalities. 
For a formal derivation we refer to the Appendix to this chapter. 
The above framework leads us to an equation that we can test empirically by means of 
regression analysis. The dependent variable is value added growth in a sector in a 
region. The explanatory variables are specialization (S), local competion (C) and 
diversity (D), and a constant term. The constant term captures both growth of national 
technology and wage growth (see Equations (5.A9)-(5.A10) in the Appendix). We thus 
assume a national labour market instead of a local one. By including S, C and D in the 
regression equation, the empirical validity of the various theories from Section 5.2 can 
be tested.  
In our empirical application, regional sectoral economic growth is measured between 
1987 and 1995. Growth is analysed at the mid-term (we use an eight-year period), since 
it is assumed that the effects of knowledge spillovers are not immediately observable. 
Newly obtained knowledge has to be implemented in existing structures, etcetera. 
Obviously, economic growth cannot entirely be explained by the three variables S, C 
and D. Therefore, we employ a number of control variables, the most important being 
national sector-growth. This variable corrects for demand shifts. If the demand for 
products of a given sector changes (at the national level), then for a given region, the 
demand for the products of that sector is also likely to change. As a result, growth of 
that sector in that region will be affected. This has nothing to do with the spillover 
effects that we want to investigate, so we include national sector-growth as a control 
variable.69 By including this variable, merely regional sector-growth is left to be 
explained. Indeed, regional sector-growth is exactly what we want to explain (given the 
assumption that knowledge spillovers are a local phenomenon). So, national sector-
growth is a useful control variable. Besides, we also investigate whether there are 
region-specific effects not covered by the model. For this purpose, we include region-
dummies. As the regional dummies might be interpreted as an indicator of inter-
regional spillovers, we use dummies at various spatial aggregation levels to investigate 
the spatial extent of these inter-regional spillovers. This will be explained in Section 
5.4. The model reads as follows: 
(5.1)  ri
K
k kkNLiriririri
RyDCSy ,2,1,3,2,10, εγγββββ ++∆++++=∆ ∑ = , 
where: 
                                                          
69 The national sector-growth variable also controls for differences in internal production characteristics 
across sectors. 
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y∆ : average annual relative growth of real value added in the period 1987-1995 
S: specialization in 1987 
C: competition in 1987 
D: diversity in 1987 
R: region-dummy 
i: sectoral index (i=1,..,6) 
r: regional index (r=1,..,K; K dependent upon spatial aggregation level used) 
β : vector with parameters of main explanatory variables 
γ : vector with parameters of control variables 
ε : disturbance term 
NL: indicator for The Netherlands 
Hypotheses 
The outlined theories of MAR, Porter and Jacobs as regards the effects of S, C and D 
may now be expressed in model hypotheses in terms of expected signs of the 
parameters 1β  to 3β . In MAR’s theory, specialization has a positive effect on growth, 
and local competition a negative effect. According to Porter, both specialization and 
local competition positively affect growth. According to Jacobs, diversity as well as 
local competition generate positive effects on growth. In formulas (5.2a) to (5.4b), the 
various hypotheses are formally expressed in terms of null hypotheses 0H  and 
alternative hypotheses aH : 
(5.2a)  0:,0: 110 >= ββ aHH   (specialization; MAR) 
(5.2b)  0:,0: 220 <= ββ aHH   (competition; MAR) 
(5.3a)  0:,0: 110 >= ββ aHH   (specialization; Porter) 
(5.3b)  0:,0: 220 >= ββ aHH   (competition; Porter) 
(5.4a)  0:,0: 220 >= ββ aHH   (competition; Jacobs) 
(5.4b)  0:,0: 330 >= ββ aHH   (diversity; Jacobs). 
Note that the alternative hypotheses always assume a specific sign for the parameter 
value (positive or negative), hence the hypotheses have to be tested by means of one-
tailed test procedures. 
Operationalization of variables 
It is important how the variables specialization, competition and diversity are defined, 
as the estimation results of Equation (5.1) may be different for different variable 
operationalizations. The operationalizations employed in this chapter are discussed 
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below. The three variables are defined at the spatial NUTS3 aggregation level (i.e. 40 
regions for the Netherlands). 
Specialization is defined as the employment share of the sector in the region, relative to 
the share of that sector in the whole country (in our case The Netherlands). If a sector is 
overrepresented in a region (relative to the national employment share of that sector), 
then there are larger-than-average opportunities for within-sector spillovers to emerge, 
and according to MAR and Porter, this would stimulate growth of that sector in that 
region. The expression of specialization (S) reads as follows: 
(5.5)  
NLtotNLi
rtotri
ri EmplEmpl
EmplEmpl
S
,,
,,
, = , 
where “Empl” stands for employment and “tot” for total. The value of the variable is 
expressed as a quotient in deviation from one, which figure corresponds to the national 
average employment share of the sector. Note that the value of S for a given sector is 
independent of the shares of the other sectors in the same region. That is, for a given 
region, small sectors may have larger values of S than large sectors. This is because we 
are only concerned with the relative extent of regional concentration for the sector under 
consideration. According to formula (5.5), there are many possibilities as regards 
within-sector spillovers if relatively many employees work in the same sector. This may 
be the case if in a sector a few relatively large enterprises operate, or, alternatively, if 
relatively many small enterprises operate.70 
Competition is defined as the number of businesses in a sector in a region relative to the 
number of businesses in that sector in the whole country, adjusted for the size of the 
region. The (economic) size of a region is measured as total employment in that region. 
The variable assesses whether local (regional) competition is higher or lower than 
national competition. According to MAR, intensive local competition in a sector 
impedes economic growth in that sector. In case of intensive competition, MAR assume 
that enterprises limit their amount of innovative activities (e.g. by cutting down R&D 
expenses) because too much new knowledge spills over to competitors (i.e. externalities 
are considered too large). According to Jacobs and Porter, to the contrary, intensive 
local competition benefits economic growth, because enterprises are “forced” to 
innovate (the alternative being demise). The expression of local competition (C) reads 
as follows: 
(5.6)  
NLtotNLi
rtotri
ri EmplB
EmplB
C
,,
,,
, = , 
where B stands for the number of businesses. Local competition of sector i in region r is 
thus defined as the region-size-adjusted number of businesses in the sector relative to 
the nation-wide number of businesses in that sector. The value of the variable is 
expressed as a quotient in deviation from one, which figure corresponds to the nation-
wide (adjusted) number of businesses in the sector. 
                                                          
70 Of course, inter-firm spillovers can not occur if one very large enterprise were to operate alone. In that 
case, the specialization variable would have to be fixed at zero, considering that the variable is used as an 
indicator of the facilitation for intra-sectoral spillovers. Our dataset does not comprise such a case. 
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In our approach, specialization and competition are different concepts in that 
specialization deals with the clustering of workers while competition deals with the 
clustering of businesses (see formulas 5.5 and 5.6). Since the number of workers and the 
number of businesses may be positively correlated, the variables specialization and 
competition may also be correlated. In our dataset, the correlation between 
specialization and competition is 0.37. This value is low enough to ensure that our 
model outcomes do not suffer from multicollinearity. 
For a given sector in a given region, diversity is defined as the employment share of the 
three smallest sectors in the remaining five sectors in the region, adjusted for the 
employment share in the region of those five sectors.71 The first factor measures 
diversity of the region (excluding the sector of analysis). A larger share of the smallest 
sectors implies a more diverse sector structure. Adjustment for the employment share of 
the remaining five sectors is required, since large sectors can benefit relatively less from 
spillovers from the remaining sectors, plainly because these remaining sectors are 
relatively small compared to the (large) sector of analysis. In other words, assuming an 
identical structure of the remaining sectors, the potential to benefit from inter-sectoral 
spillovers is relatively higher for a small sector of analysis than for a large sector of 
analysis. According to Jacobs, higher degrees of diversity generate higher growth rates. 
The expression of diversity (D) reads as follows: 
(5.7)  
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where: 
rkiEmpl ],[−   Employment of k
th smallest sector in region r, sector i excluded, 
∑
−i riEmpl ,   Total employment in region r, sector i excluded. 
Formula (5.7) shows that the two factors may be rewritten as one expression: the share 
of the three smallest sectors (excluding the sector of analysis) in total regional 
employment (including the sector of analysis). The variable is expressed in percentages. 
Diversity is not to be interpreted as the counterpart of specialization. High levels of 
specialization may coincide with high levels of diversity. A sector may be relatively 
dominant in a region, while at the same time the remainder of that region may be 
characterized by a high degree of diversity. However, because employment of the sector 
of analysis is part of the denominator in (5.7), there will be some negative correlation 
between the variables specialization and diversity. In fact, in our dataset, the correlation 
is -0.26. Again, this does not lead to multicollinearity problems. 
Differences between present study and Glaeser et al. (1992) 
There are several ways to specify the concepts of specialization (S), competition (C) and 
diversity (D) in model variables. Glaeser et al. (1992), choose an alternative 
operationalization of local competition. They use the number of businesses per worker 
for a sector-region combination relative to the number of businesses per worker in the 
                                                          
71 In this chapter, the (nonagricultural) economy is disaggregated into six sectors. 
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entire sector (whole country). This variable measures the inverse average business size 
but this may not be appropriate as a measure of local competition.72 Furthermore, if a 
positive effect of this inverse business size measure on growth is found, one may have 
found merely the effect that small firms grow faster than large firms. See for example 
Kleijweg and Nieuwenhuijsen (1996). Also for specialization and diversity there are 
alternative operationalizations. Some measures are discussed in Nieuwenhuijsen and 
Van Stel (2000), pp. 29-37. Besides the operationalizations of the variables S, C and D, 
there are also other differences between the present study and that of Glaeser et al. 
(1992). While they investigate employment growth in the United States in the period 
1956-1987, the present chapter investigates value added growth in the Netherlands in a 
more recent, hence more knowledge-intensive period (1987-1995). Furthermore, while 
Glaeser et al. (1992), consider only large two-digit sectors, we consider firms from all 
sectoral sizes, albeit at a higher level of aggregation. Consequently, we also include 
small sectors, which -on average- have a relatively high small firm presence. This is 
important for the purpose of the present chapter, because small firms usually are more 
dependent upon knowledge spillovers than large firms are. 
5.4 Modelling spatial externalities 
In a recently held specialist meeting on the state of the art in modelling spatial 
externalities, both scale (level of spatial aggregation) and range (extent of spatial 
interaction) in the measurement of economic phenomena were identified as important 
aspects of incorporating space in economic models (Anselin, 2003a).73 In this section 
we discuss how we deal with these two aspects in our regression model. 
First, we describe the spatial aggregation level at which we measure economic 
phenomena. Second, we describe a new method to model inter-regional spillovers. This 
involves the use of regional dummies at various spatial aggregation levels. 
Investigating intra-regional spillovers: which spatial aggregation level to use? 
In this chapter we use a database with sector-information at the spatial level of the 40 
Dutch Corop regions, covering the period 1987-1995. The 40 regions cover the entire 
Netherlands. In terms of the international NUTS classification of regions, the Corop 
level corresponds to NUTS3 level.74 This level is appropriate to assess intra-regional 
knowledge spillovers, because the Corop regions are constructed so that most regions 
are characterized by some degree of clustering. Furthermore, the scale of Corop regions 
is such that personal contacts between regions are likely to occur less frequently than 
personal contacts within regions. Therefore it is plausible to assume that the vast share 
                                                          
72 For example, for a given sector in equally large regions, the inverse business size measure cannot 
distinguish between regions with 100 businesses with on average 5 workers, and regions with 20 
businesses, also with on average 5 workers. Clearly, competition is more intense in regions with 100 
businesses. The operationalization (5.6) employed in this chapter takes account of that. 
73 The proceedings of this meeting are included in a special issue of the International Regional Science 
Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, April 2003. 
74 For the Netherlands, the NUTS1 classification distinguishes 4 regions (Northern, Eastern, Western and 
Southern Netherlands), while the NUTS2 classification distinguishes 12 regions (the 12 provinces of the 
Netherlands). The Corop or NUTS3 regions are still smaller. 
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of spillovers emerges within these regions. Some support for this assumption is 
provided by Oosterhaven et al. (2001). Using bi-regional input-output data they are able 
to identify both intra-regional and inter-regional clusters of interrelated economic 
activity. They focus on three regions, of which two are defined at the NUTS3 level 
(Greater Amsterdam and Greater Rotterdam) and one is defined at NUTS1 level 
(Northern Netherlands). Even for the smaller NUTS3 regions, they find a substantial 
number of intra-regional clusters, including the important sea and air transport sector in 
Greater Rotterdam. 
Modelling inter-regional spillovers 
Although we argued above that the NUTS3 level is the appropriate level for 
investigating intra-regional spillovers, we acknowledge that there are also inter-regional 
knowledge spillovers. For instance, the above-mentioned study of Oosterhaven et al. 
(2001) also finds a number of inter-regional clusters, including linkages between 
Amsterdam business services and trade sectors on the one hand, and several other 
sectors in the rest of the Netherlands.  
A common way of modelling spillovers between regions is using spatial econometric 
models. This often involves the use of a spatial weights matrix W, which allows for 
explicit modelling of the spatial dependence structure. Typically, the weights matrix 
consists of positive elements for “neighbouring” locations, and zero elements for other 
pairs of regions (Anselin, 2003b). In modelling space, various spatial process 
specifications circulate, involving the use of spatially lagged dependent variables (Wy), 
spatially lagged explanatory variables (WX), and/or spatially lagged error terms (Wu).  
Concerning spatially lagged error models, different specifications correspond to 
different assumptions about the spatial extent of spillovers. Anselin (2003b) shows that 
the spatial covariance structure of the autoregressive model (SAR) corresponds to a 
global range of spatial dependence (all locations are related to each other) while the 
moving average model (SMA) corresponds to a local range of spatial dependence (only 
neighbouring locations within a limited number of “bands” are related). 
Besides the specification of the spatial process, assumptions about the range of 
spillovers can also be reflected by the choice of the weights matrix W. However, the 
proper specification of the spatial weights matrix is not always obvious. In this 
connection, Fingleton (2003a) poses the question “what is the theoretical and empirical 
basis of assumptions about the spatial reach of externalities, and how can this be 
enhanced?” (p. 205). More generally, it is often difficult to make a well founded choice 
concerning the spatial dependence structure. Indeed, at the specialist meeting referred to 
earlier, it was concluded that “Space is seen as crucial in the conceptualization of 
interaction and externalities, but the way in which space is modeled requires further 
consideration” (Anselin, 2003a, p. 150). 
We do not have an a priori assumption about the spatial extent of spillovers in the 
context of our regression model. Therefore, instead of using a spatial econometric 
model we choose a regional dummy approach to model inter-regional spillovers. Our 
method makes use of regional dummies at different levels of spatial aggregation, 
making the range of the spillovers an empirical matter rather than a theoretical one. This 
is explained below. 
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We compute regressions using regional dummies at the NUTS1 (4 regions), NUTS2 (12 
regions) and NUTS3 (40 regions) levels, and using no regional dummies at all. Next, 
making use of a standard model selection procedure (Schwarz information criterion), we 
establish the most adequate spatial aggregation level at which the regional dummies 
must be defined.75 The selected aggregation level may be interpreted as the range or 
spatial extent of the inter-regional spillovers. This can be seen as follows. Formally, a 
significant parameter estimate of a regional dummy explains part of the variation in the 
endogenous variable that can not be explained by the other model variables. Now, when 
the regional dummy is defined at higher aggregation level than the level at which the 
‘regular’ model variables are defined, a significant parameter estimate indicates that the 
underlying regions have ‘something in common’ that explains the regional variation in 
the endogenous variable.  
For example, if the selection procedure chooses the specification with NUTS2 level 
dummies, then apparently real value added growth 1987-1995 at NUTS3 level is partly 
explained by a factor that is common for all NUTS3 regions within a NUTS2 region. As 
intra-regional spillovers are captured already by the variables specialization, 
competition and diversity, it is not implausible to assume that the NUTS2 dummies 
reflect, among other things, inter-regional spillovers flowing between firms from 
different NUTS3 regions within the same NUTS2 region. 
In this line of reasoning, the spatial aggregation level selected by the Schwarz 
information criterion gives us an indication about the range of the inter-regional 
spillovers. For example, when a specification with NUTS2 dummies is selected, then 
apparently the NUTS3 regions are so uniform that the regional variations in economic 
growth not captured by the ‘regular’ model variables, can be explained by a common 
variable (i.e. a NUTS2 dummy). On the other hand the NUTS2 regions apparently are 
too different from each other to make a NUTS1 dummy specification appropriate. In 
terms of the range of spillovers, this example would be consistent with spillovers 
flowing between firms within the same NUTS2 region, but not with spillovers flowing 
between firms from different NUTS2 regions.  
So, we model inter-regional spillovers by investigating four possible specifications 
(NUTS1, 2 or 3 level dummies, or no dummies at all). The unexplained variation in the 
endogenous variable that is common for adjacent NUTS3 regions is captured by a 
higher level regional dummy. However, a potentially important drawback of using 
dummies concerns the issue of multicollinearity which may nullify the significance of 
certain variables of interest. This may be the case especially when variables vary a lot 
across (larger) regions but not so much across smaller regions within the (larger) 
regions at which the dummy variables are defined. As Fingleton (2003b) points out: “In 
the extreme case, consider a (hypothetical) variable which takes the same value in all 
regions within a given country, and which takes another value, which is constant across 
all regions in a second country, and so on across countries. It is then impossible to 
include this variable in the presence of country dummies because of aliasing due to 
perfect multicollinearity” (pp. 47-48). As it turns out, our estimation results do not 
suffer from this particular problem, as we will demonstrate in Section 5.6. 
                                                          
75 The Schwarz information criterion weighs the statistical fit against the number of parameters. The 
lower the Schwarz information criterion, the more ‘efficient’ the model specification. 
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We acknowledge that our method is a second best solution to the problem of spatial 
interaction. Although it models interaction between regions to some extent (viz. in 
terms of distance), it does not take account of other types of interaction between 
regions. For instance, distant regions may interact more than neighbours because they 
contain important cities and are well connected by communications networks. This type 
of interaction between regions can be modelled by choosing a proper specification of a 
weights matrix, whereas these effects are not captured by our dummy approach. 
Nevertheless, we think that our method does enable straightforward interpretation of 
estimated coefficients for the intra-regional spillover variables specialization, 
competition and diversity in our model, which is the main interest of the present study. 
5.5 Data 
In this section we give a description of our data. The regional information is 
disaggregated into six sectors (excluding agriculture): mining, manufacturing, 
construction, the trades, transport&communication and financial services. The data are 
obtained from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and the Netherlands Association of 
Chambers of Commerce (VVK). Table 5.1 illustrates the database variables adopted, as 
well as the respective source and the use in Model (5.1). 
Table 5.1: Variables; source and use 
Database variable  Years 
covered 
Source Use in Model 
(5.1) 
Number of 
establishments 
1987 VVK Competition 
Labour volume1 1987 CBS: Annual Regional 
Economic Data 
Specialization, 
competition, 
diversity 
Value added2 1987; 1995 CBS: Annual Regional 
Economic Data 
Growth value 
added 
Deflator value added 1987; 1995 CBS: National Accounts Growth value 
added 
1 Number of full-time jobs. 
2 Gross value added at factor costs (current prices). 
Nominal value added is deflated with help of a value added price index that is sector-
specific, not region-specific. The deflator is derived from CBS National Accounts. For 
more information on the data employed, see Nieuwenhuijsen et al. (1999). 
As we see from Table 5.1, enterprises are measured in terms of establishments. This 
may be a disadvantage, since one enterprise may consist of several establishments, and 
our study covers inter-firm spillovers and inter-firm competition.76 The problem is 
                                                          
76 In this chapter, we use the terms enterprises, firms and businesses interchangeably. 
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limited though, since the number of establishments and the number of enterprises are 
highly correlated. Furthermore, we consider local competition in the model. 
Establishments of one firm operating in different regions is not contradictory with the 
concept of local competition. Since most enterprises operating several establishments 
probably have their establishments dispersed throughout several regions, the 
competition variable (5.6) is hardly affected by the use of establishments instead of 
businesses.  
Basically, there are 240 observations available (viz. 6 sectors times 40 regions). 
However, a number of observations is not used in the determination of the parameter 
estimates. The sector mining is not used since in many regions there are no mining 
activities at all. For those regions with some form of mining activities, employment in 
this sector is considered too small. Of the remainder 200 observations, 3 extreme 
observations (outliers) are removed, leaving 197 observations in the data set. The model 
is estimated on the basis of these 197 observations. Table 5.2 presents some 
characteristics of the data set employed. 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of model variables (based on 197 observations) 
Variable 
 
Minimum Maximum Average Median Standard 
deviation 
Average annual growth 
real value added (%) 
-3.22 9.93 2.84 2.84 2.14 
Specialization  
(national average = 1) 
0.43 1.90 0.98 0.95 0.27 
Competition  
(national average = 1) 
0.50 2.15 1.07 1.04 0.29 
Diversity (%) 
 
10.94 38.00 21.44 20.23 6.12 
5.6 Estimation results 
In this section the estimation results are discussed. In the first instance, the model is 
estimated with data for all sectors included in the estimation sample. We call this the 
macro-estimation. However, we suspect that the spillover mechanisms may work out 
differently for different sectors of economy. Therefore, we also present estimation 
results for the sectors “Industry” and “Services” separately. 
Macro estimates 
Model (5.1) is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) and the results are in Table 
5.3. We have a sample of 197 observations (see Section 5.5). We estimated the four 
model variants described earlier, i.e. including regional dummies at NUTS1, NUTS2 
and NUTS3 level (model variants (5.1b) until (5.1d) in Table 5.3) and no regional 
dummies at all (model variant (5.1a)). From the Schwarz information criterion we see 
that NUTS3 level dummies are not appropriate; model variant (5.1d) has the highest 
value. So, apparently, variations in value added growth not captured by the ‘regular’ 
model variables can be explained satisfactorily by higher level regional dummies. This 
indicates that adjacent NUTS3 regions have ‘something in common’ explaining growth, 
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and, among other things, this may reflect inter-regional spillovers between firms from 
these adjacent regions.  
On the other extreme, the specification which includes no dummies at all is also not 
appropriate, as model variant (5.1a) has the second highest value for the Schwarz 
information criterion. So, at least some regional variation in value added growth is 
explained by regional dummies, possibly indicating that inter-regional spillovers do not 
occur at a country-wide level, but rather are restricted to smaller areas. 
Table 5.3:  Estimation results Model (5.1), all sectors, dependent variable average 
annual growth real value added; 1987-1995 1 
Explanatory variable  
(parameter) 
Model (5.1a) Model (5.1b) Model (5.1c) Model (5.1d) 
Constant   ( 0β ) -1.17 
(-1.39) 
-1.17 
(-1.45) 
-1.90 ** 
(-2.45) 
-0.97 
(-0.92) 
Specialization   ( 1β ) -0.34 
(-0.70) 
-0.25 
(-0.56) 
-0.11 
(-0.26) 
-0.056 
(-0.13) 
Competition   ( 2β ) 0.71 * 
(1.65) 
0.70 * 
(1.75) 
0.59 
(1.50) 
-0.15 
(-0.27) 
Diversity   ( 3β ) 0.034 * 
(1.76) 
0.041 * 
(2.28) 
0.050 ** 
(3.01) 
0.041 * 
(2.25) 
Macro growth sector   ( 1γ ) 1.09 ** 
(12.0) 
1.08 ** 
(12.9) 
1.08 ** 
(14.0) 
1.05 ** 
(13.5) 
Number of observations 197 197 197 197 
Regional aggregation 
level:2 
    
NUTS1 (4 regions)  X   
NUTS2 (12 regions)   X  
NUTS3 (40 regions)    X 
R2 0.469 0.547 0.640 0.713 
Schwarz info criterion 379.3 371.7 370.2 422.0 
1 T-values between parentheses. 
2 The model specifications (5.1a) until (5.1d) use 0, 3, 11, and 39 regional dummies, respectively. 
Dummy coefficients are not reported due to space limitations. 
* Significant at 5% level (one-tailed test). 
** Significant at 1% level (one-tailed test). 
 
Model variants (5.1b) and (5.1c) have the lowest Schwarz information criterion values, 
indicating that specifications which include regional dummies at NUTS1 or NUTS2 
level are statistically most efficient. We will now focus on the results for the intra-
regional spillover variables specialization, competition and diversity according to the 
statistically most efficient model variants (5.1b) and (5.1c). 
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Specialization 
From Table 5.3, we see that the estimate of the specialization parameter has a negative 
sign in both the model variants (5.1b) and (5.1c). This finding is in contrast to the 
theories of MAR and Porter who predict a positive sign (see hypotheses 5.2a and 5.3a). 
However, absolute t-values are well below unity. We may conclude that the effect of 
specialization on (regional) economic growth is small or absent. That is, spillovers 
between homogeneous enterprises do not contribute significantly to economic growth. 
By and large, this finding is in line with Wever and Stam (1999) who find that regional 
clusters of high technology small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) hardly exist in 
the Netherlands.77 They find that, even in regions where high technology SMEs are 
overrepresented, most of the customers and suppliers that the interviewed high 
technology SMEs consider relevant for their innovative development are located outside 
their own region. 
The finding that specialization has practically no impact on regional growth seems to 
contradict the experience that many regions are characterized by high levels of 
concentration of homogeneous enterprises. But many reasons other than growth 
opportunities may account for these high concentration levels. Marshall (1890) 
mentions the possibility to jointly utilize production factors (e.g. highly skilled staff). 
Henderson (1986) explains a high level of business concentration of a certain sector in a 
certain region by a relatively high demand for the products of that sector in that region, 
favouring business startups in such regions because of low transport costs. By and large, 
the above explanations state that specialization emerges because of the static efficiency 
thus achieved. The present study, however, investigates dynamic efficiency (i.e. 
growth). See also Glaeser et al. (1992), p. 1129. 
Competition 
The estimate of the competition parameter 2β  is positive in both model variants (5.1b) 
and (5.1c). We may conclude that MAR’s theory on competition is rejected, see 
hypothesis (5.2b). Enterprises do not limit innovative activity out of fear that their 
efforts employed will spill over to competitors. Instead, the results seem to confirm the 
theories of Porter and Jacobs, i.e. enterprises innovate to a higher extent so as not to 
incur a backlog compared to competitors. The higher levels of innovation, in turn, lead 
to higher growth rates. The t-value of the estimate of 2β  is not high though. The 
parameter estimate is significant at 5% level (one-tailed test) in model variant (5.1b), 
but only at 10% level in model variant (5.1c). So, we must be cautious when claiming a 
positive relation between local competition and growth. 
As regards the size of the effect, we compute the effect on average annual growth in 
percent points if competition were to increase by one standard deviation. We do this 
because the measurement unit adopted for the competition variable is not trivially 
interpretable (competition is expressed as a quotient in deviation from one), and 
standard deviations can be interpreted independently of the measurement unit 
employed. From Table 5.2, we see that the standard deviation of competition in our data 
set equals 0.29. The estimate of the competion parameter equals 0.70 (variant 5.1b 
                                                          
77 Wever and Stam define a regional cluster as “a geographical concentration of firms which exhibit a 
significant degree of intraregional linkages” (Wever and Stam, 1999, p. 393). Like this chapter, they 
apply the spatial level of the Dutch Corop regions (i.e. NUTS3 regions). 
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estimate). So, a ceteris paribus increase of one standard deviation has an effect on 
average annual growth of 0.29 × 0.70 = 0.20%-point. 
Diversity 
A diverse economic environment of a sector appears to have a positive effect on growth. 
The estimate of the parameter of diversity is significantly positive at 5% level in model 
variant (5.1b) and at 1% level in variant (5.1c). This result is consistent with Jacobs’ 
theory on diversity. Higher degrees of regional diversity generate higher spillovers and, 
therefore, higher growth rates. As many different enterprise types as possible should 
locate in each other’s proximity to enable enterprises to capitalize on ideas they do not 
develop themselves since they exercise very different business activities. According to 
the estimation results, a ceteris paribus increase of one standard deviation of the 
diversity variable has a positive impact of 6.12 × 0.041 = 0.25%-point.  
Multicollinearity issues 
For a proper interpretation of estimation results it is important that results are not 
influenced by model specification problems. In particular, in the context of our model, it 
is imaginable that certain non-significant results might have been caused by the 
inclusion of regional dummies, as we described in Section 5.4. When the dummies 
correlate strongly with the variables of interest, significance might be nullified due to 
multicollinearity (Fingleton, 2003b). However, our results do not suffer from this, as we 
will show below. 
Consider Table 5.3. The effect of specialization is non-significant in all four variants, 
including variant (5.1a), in which no regional dummies are included. The non-
significance is thus not caused by multicollinearity. For the competition variable we see 
that t-values are more or less the same for model variants (5.1a) until (5.1c) but 
significance is nullified in variant (5.1d). As in this variant regional dummies are 
defined at the lowest spatial aggregation level (39 dummy variables), it is likely that the 
non-significance is indeed caused by multicollinearity. However, as this variant turned 
out to be statistically inefficient (as indicated by a high value of the Schwarz criterion), 
we already left this result out of consideration in our interpretation. Finally, results for 
diversity are not affected by multicollinearity as the parameter estimate is significant in 
all four variants. 
Sector estimates 
It is possible that the spillover mechanisms work differently in different sectors of 
economy. For example, knowledge spillovers may be more important in manufacturing 
industries than in service industries, given the –on average- higher levels of R&D in 
manufacturing. Therefore we want to analyze the different sectors of economy 
separately. However, it is not possible to obtain separate reliable results for each of the 
five sectors in our data set, because of too few observations. Therefore, we subdivide 
our data set in two larger sectors, viz. “Industry” and “Services”. The industry-sector 
contains the observations of manufacturing and construction, while the services-sector 
contains the trades, transport&communication and financial services. Again, for both 
samples we computed the four model variants (5.1a) until (5.1d) described earlier. The 
estimation results are given in Table 5.4. To save space, for each sector we report only 
the two model specifications with the lowest value for the Schwarz information 
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criterion. This involves variants (5.1a) and (5.1b) for Industry and variants (5.1b) and 
(5.1c) for Services.78 
Table 5.4:  Estimation results Model (5.1), industry and services, dependent variable 
average annual growth real value added; 1987-1995 1 
Explanatory variable  
(parameter) 
Industry: 
Model (5.1a) 
Industry: 
Model (5.1b) 
Services: 
Model (5.1b) 
Services: 
Model (5.1c) 
Constant   ( 0β ) -1.05 
(-0.52) 
-0.43 
(-0.23) 
-0.49 
(-0.43) 
-0.35 
(-0.33) 
Specialization   ( 1β ) -0.076 
(-0.11) 
-0.61 
(-0.94) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.30 
(-0.48) 
Competition   ( 2β ) 1.91 ** 
(2.86) 
1.69 ** 
(2.81) 
-0.44 
(-0.81) 
-0.21 
(-0.41) 
Diversity   ( 3β ) -0.027 
(-0.44) 
0.011 
(0.20) 
0.075 * 
(1.92) 
0.092 ** 
(2.48) 
Macro growth sector   ( 1γ ) 0.74 * 
(2.10) 
0.92 ** 
(2.88) 
0.79 * 
(2.22) 
0.60 * 
(1.80) 
Number of observations 80 80 117 117 
Regional aggregation 
level:2 
    
NUTS1 (4 regions)  X X  
NUTS2 (12 regions)    X 
NUTS3 (40 regions)     
R2 0.253 0.424 0.421 0.587 
Schwarz info criterion 165.1 161.2 216.4 215.7 
1 T-values between parentheses. 
2 The model specifications (5.1a) until (5.1d) use 0, 3, 11, and 39 regional dummies, respectively. 
Dummy coefficients are not reported due to space limitations. 
* Significant at 5% level (one-tailed test). 
** Significant at 1% level (one-tailed test). 
 
Table 5.4 illustrates that the results are indeed quite different for different sectors of 
economy. For the industry-sectors, competition appears to be of particular importance 
as regards realizing regional economic growth. For the service sectors, on the other 
hand, diversity appears to have a positive impact on growth.  
These results may be interpreted as follows. In industry sectors, R&D expenses are 
relatively high in comparison with service sectors. Therefore, in industry sectors, 
growth mainly originates from the amount of firms’ own innovative activities, rather 
                                                          
78 As for the results at macro level, it can be shown that these results do not suffer from multicollinearity 
due to inclusion of regional dummies. 
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than from inter-firm spillovers. Indeed, the estimates of the parameters of both spillover 
facilitating variables specialization and diversity have t-values below unity, while the 
estimate of the competition parameter is significantly positive (1% level, one-tailed 
test). So, in the industry sectors, if local competition is intensive, innovation and rapid 
adoption of new technologies is required for firms in order to not lose ground to 
competitors. That is, intensive competition encourages a process that could be 
characterized as an “innovation race”. 
In contrast to the industry sectors, knowledge spillovers seem to be important in the 
service sectors. It concerns spillovers between heterogeneous enterprises rather than 
spillovers between homogeneous enterprises. Diversity appears to have a positive effect 
on growth (parameter estimate is significant at 1% level; model variant (5.1c)), while 
specialization again has a very low t-value. Note that, given the construction of the 
diversity variable (see formula 5.7), the positive effect of diversity does not necessarily 
imply that service sectors benefit from spillovers from industry sectors. It is also 
possible that, for instance, the financial service sector capitalizes on ideas originating 
from the transport&communication sector. However, given the higher amounts of R&D 
in the industry sectors, it seems plausible that service sectors benefit from spillovers 
from industry sectors rather than from other subsectors within the service industries. 
The non-significant estimate of the competition parameter suggests that it is not crucial 
for enterprises in these sectors to generate many innovations by themselves. If they were 
to lag behind in that field, they will not directly incur a critical backlog compared to 
their competitors. The combination of non-significant parameter estimates for 
specialization and competition and a significantly positive estimate for diversity 
suggests that innovation processes in service industries are more or less accidental in 
nature: there appears to be little competition in innovation and few spillovers 
originating from within the own sector. Instead, innovations or improvements at firms 
in the service sectors seem to be dependent on innovation-generating firms (which 
apparently are in the industry sectors) located nearby. So, for service industries, a high 
degree of diversity is especially important. 
5.7 Summary and conclusions 
In recent decades, the importance of knowledge spillovers for the processes of 
innovation and economic growth has been widely recognized. Firms can improve their 
performance by implementing innovative ideas that were not originally developed by 
themselves. In this way economies may grow without having to use additional labour 
and capital inputs. 
Although the importance of knowledge spillovers is undisputable, little is known about 
the size of spillover effects and what type of spillovers is more important for achieving 
growth: spillovers emerging within sectors or spillovers emerging between sectors. 
Furthermore, the impact of local competition on innovation and growth is not 
straightforward. All these issues are investigated in the present chapter, using a regional 
growth model that is based on Glaeser et al. (1992). In the model mid-term growth at 
sectoral and regional level is explained by specialization, competition, diversity and 
some controls. By including these variables in the model, the empirical validity of three 
theories about knowledge spillovers and innovation can be tested.  
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The first theory is that of Marshall, Arrow and Romer (MAR). According to these 
economists, important spillovers primarily emerge among homogeneous enterprises, 
implying a positive impact of specialization on economic growth. As regards the role of 
competition, they assume a negative impact, due to the limited possibilities to 
internalize the externalities associated with innovation in case of fierce competition. The 
second theory is that of Porter. He assumes, like MAR do, a positive effect of 
specialization. As regards competition, however, Porter assumes a positive impact on 
growth, resulting from the sheer necessity for firms to innovate, as the alternative to 
innovation is demise. The third theory is developed by Jacobs. Like Porter, she assumes 
a positive effect of local competition. As regards knowledge spillovers, however, she 
emphasizes the importance of spillovers emerging among heterogeneous enterprises, 
implying a positive effect of diversity on economic growth. 
We use a data set with information at six-sector level and at the spatial level of 40 
Dutch (so called Corop) regions, covering the entire Netherlands. Regional data are 
used because geographical proximity is considered important, as face-to-face contacts 
are assumed a necessary condition for knowledge spillovers to occur. 
We find no empirical evidence for a positive relationship between specialization and 
value added growth, suggesting that specialization contributes to static efficiency rather 
than to dynamic efficiency (i.e. growth). We find evidence for positive relationships 
between competition and value added growth and between diversity and value added 
growth. The empirical evidence supports the theory of Jacobs. It does not support the 
theories of Marshall, Arrow and Romer, whereas it is inconclusive regarding Porter’s 
theory. The estimation results further imply that local competition is particularly 
important for achieving growth in the industry sectors while diversity is particularly 
important for achieving growth in the service sectors. By and large, this can be 
interpreted as intensive competition in the industry sectors encouraging an “innovation 
race”, and high extents of diversity encouraging spillovers from industry sectors 
towards service sectors. 
There are a number of limitations to our approach which makes that the results 
presented in this chapter should be interpreted with some caution. First, this chapter 
investigates only one type of spillovers, viz. knowledge spillovers. As mentioned 
earlier, there exist other types of spillovers such as network spillovers and market 
spillovers. The latter type emerges through mutual supplies between firms (for example 
if a firm purchases a computer). But it is safe to assume that these other types of 
spillovers do not have a specific regional character, as face-to-face contacts are not 
crucial for these types of spillovers. If we assume that the network and market spillovers 
are distributed randomly across regions, we may claim that the model picks up the 
effects of knowledge spillovers adequately, accounting for growth differences between 
regions. 
Second, the sectoral aggregation level strongly determines the meaning of the variables 
specialization, competition and diversity. Interpretations of results are conditional upon 
the aggregation level applied. For example, as regards the competition variable, the 
question arises whether the six-sector classification adopted in this chapter is 
appropriate. By defining the entire manufacturing industry as one sector, one implicitly 
assumes that businesses in, for instance, the metal industry compete with businesses in 
the food industry. This is implausible. The high sectoral aggregation level even implies 
that a small proportion of the businesses within these broad sectors might be vertically 
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linked firms instead of local competitors. However, assuming this proportion constant 
across regions, our competition variable still validly measures regional differences in 
the amount of local competition. 
Despite these limitations, we argue that the present study provides some important 
insights concerning the effects of knowledge spillovers and innovation at the regional 
level. Future research should concentrate on performing comparable exercises for more 
countries as the results of the present study need to be confirmed for other countries as 
well. Policy makers may want to base policy measures concerning regional firm 
clustering on the empirical findings of more countries. Furthermore, as the sectoral 
aggregation level applied is crucial in this type of research, it may be worthwhile to 
perform the regressions while defining the variables specialization, competition and 
diversity at lower aggregation levels.  
5.A Appendix: Derivation of model 
In this appendix we provide a mathematical derivation of Model (5.1), based on Glaeser 
et al. (1992). 
Suppose that an individual firm in a certain sector and region has a production function 
of output, f , which depends on labour input, l , and technology, A , as follows: 
(5.A1) ( ) .10,, 1 <<= − ααlAlAf  
Each firm takes technology, prices, and wages, w , as given and maximizes profits with 
respect to labour input at time t: 
(5.A2) ( ) ttttl lwlAft −,max . 
The first order condition reads: 
(5.A3) ( ) ttt wlAf =,' , where 'f  represents the partial derivative with respect to l . 
We can rewrite (5.A3) in terms of growth rates as 
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This can be rewritten as  
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The level of technology, A , in a certain sector and region is assumed to have both 
national components and local components: 
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(5.A6) nationallocal AAA =  
The technological growth rate will then be the sum of the growth of national technology 
in the sector and the growth of local technology: 
(5.A7) 



+



=


 +++
tnational
tnational
tlocal
tlocal
t
t
A
A
A
A
A
A
,
1,
,
1,1 logloglog . 
The growth of national technology is assumed to capture the changes in the price of the 
product as well as shifts in nationwide technology in the sector, and the local 
technology is assumed to grow at a rate exogenous to the firm but depending on the 
various technological externalities present in the sector and the region. These 
externalities can be measured by variables such as specialization, local competition and 
diversity. See Equation (5.A8). 
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where ε  represents a disturbance term. 
Combining (5.A5), (5.A7) and (5.A8), we obtain the following equation: 
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Assuming that both wage growth and growth of national technology do not differ across 
regions, Equation (5.A9) implies that employment growth in a sector and region can be 
explained by a constant and the variables specialization, local competition and diversity. 
Next, because the dependent variable in our model is value added growth and not 
employment growth, we will show that value added growth in a sector and region can 
also be explained by a constant and the variables specialization, local competition and 
diversity. 
Growth of production (value added) can be written as  
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Making use of Equations (5.A7)-(5.A9) and the above mentioned assumptions about 
wage growth and national technology growth, Equation (5.A10) implies that value 
added growth in a sector and region can be explained by a constant and the variables 
specialization, local competition and diversity. 
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Finally, because we estimate our regression equations using pooled data, i.e. regions 
times sectors, we must control for region- and sector-specific influences. For this we use 
regional dummies and national sector-growth, respectively. In this way we arrive at 
Model (5.1) in Section 5.3. This equation can be estimated using OLS. 
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Chapter 6 
The Link between Firm Births and Job Creation 
This chapter examines the relationship between firm births and job creation in Great 
Britain. We use a new data set for 60 British regions, covering the whole of Great 
Britain, between 1980 and 1998. We find, for Great Britain as a whole, no significant 
relationship between startups and employment creation in the 1980s, but a negative 
relationship for the ‘low enterprise’ area of the North East of England. For the 1990s we 
find a significant positive relationship for Great Britain as a whole but for Scotland, 
which focussed policy on startups, a negative relationship. This raises questions over 
policies designed to raise rates of new firm formation as a strategy for employment 
creation, particularly in ‘low enterprise’ areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Van Stel, A.J. and D.J. Storey (2004), The Link between Firm Births and Job Creation: 
Is there a Upas Tree Effect?, Regional Studies 38, 893-909. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between new-firm startups and employment 
change in Great Britain. This relationship is of considerable policy importance, since 
national and sub-national governments in Britain have, for more than two decades, 
sought to raise business startup rates in order to enhance wealth- and job-creation. An 
example of a central government policy was the Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS). 
At its peak in 1987-88, public expenditure on EAS was virtually £200 million, 
subsidising more than 106,000 unemployed people to start a new business (Storey, 
1994). A second example is the Business Birth Rate Strategy initiated in Scotland in the 
early 1990s, which sought to raise new-firm formation rates. A third example was the 
Entrepreneurship Action Plan for Wales announced in 2001. Finally, in 2004, the UK 
government announced that “building an enterprise culture” and “encouraging a 
dynamic start up market” are the first two of the seven pillars of small business policy. 
The assumption of a strong positive relationship between increased new-firm startup 
rates and subsequent employment growth underpinned all such policies. 
This chapter tests for that underpinning. It begins by presenting the theoretical 
arguments for the presence of a relationship between startups and job creation, going on 
to provide an overview of current evidence. The central theme is that, with the 
exception of a recent paper by Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) for Germany, the 
relationship between startups and job creation has previously been examined either with 
no time-lag or with only a short period lag.  
The current chapter claims to make seven advances on prior work. First, to construct 
and use a long-run (1980-98) data set that facilitates a valid comparison between the 
results for Great Britain and Germany. A second innovation is the explicit choice of 
variables. It argues that the appropriate measure of new firm formation is the sectorally 
adjusted number of private sector new firms, normalised by the sectorally adjusted 
working population. It also argues that the appropriate measure of employment change 
is the sectorally adjusted private sector employment. Third, it incorporates, for the first 
time, data on private sector wages in the locality. Fourth, the chapter explicitly 
incorporates various tests for misspecification which virtually all models pass. Fifth, the 
chapter explicitly corrects for multicollinearity caused by strong intertemporal 
correlations between startup rates for different periods. Sixth, it utilises the concept of 
the “Upas Tree” to see whether Scotland and Wales differ from England in the 
relationship between startups and job creation. Seventh, it links the findings to changes 
in Enterprise Policy both for the UK as a whole and for Scotland in particular. 
The key results in the chapter call into question the impact of policies seeking to raise 
new firm formation, so as to enhance employment creation, particularly in areas where 
new firm formation rates are low. Specifically we find that, in the 1980’s when national 
public policy was focussed on raising new firm formation, there is no evidence that this 
led to increased employment creation during that decade.  Furthermore, although it is 
non significant for the UK as a whole in the 1980’s, it is significantly negative for the 
North East of England, an area with notably low rates of new firm formation. 
In the 1990’s, when UK national policy shifts away from stimulating new firm 
formation, a positive relationship emerges between firm formation and employment 
creation. Crucially, however, in Scotland which implemented a policy to stimulate new 
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firm births in the 1990’s, a significant negative relationship between new firm births 
and employment creation appears in this decade, although our data do not extend 
sufficiently in time to imply that Scotland’s business birth rate policy led to lower 
employment. 
6.2 The issues 
This section reviews the theoretical basis for believing a relationship exists between the 
extent to which a geographical area is “entrepreneurial” and the extent to which it is 
“economically successful”. We show there are a priori reasons for expecting a positive 
relationship, but that there are also reasons for expecting no relationship or, in extreme 
cases, a negative relationship. 
There are three reasons why more “entrepreneurial” areas might generate more jobs- 
where jobs are a measure of “economic success”. The first is that if “entrepreneurial” is 
reflected in “new-firm formation” then these new firms themselves create jobs directly 
and so add to the stock of jobs. The second is that the new firms constitute a (real or 
imagined) competitive threat to existing firms, encouraging the latter to perform better 
(Disney et al., 2003). Finally, new firms provide a vehicle for the introduction of new 
ideas and innovation to an economy, which has been shown to be a key source of long-
term economic growth (Romer, 1986). Indeed Audretsch and Thurik (2001) argue that 
the role of new firms in technological development has been enhanced by a reduced 
importance of scale economies and an increasing degree of uncertainty in the world 
economy, creating more room for innovative entry. 
The reasons for not expecting firm formation rates to be related to job creation are also 
three-fold. The first is that new firms directly contribute only a very small proportion of 
the stock of jobs in the economy (5.5% of the stock of UK employment in 1989 was in 
firms that had been born in the previous two years; Storey, 1994). Secondly, innovation 
is very much the exception rather than the rule amongst new firms. For example, during 
the 1990s, twice-yearly Surveys were taken of (primarily) small firms in the West 
Midlands.The proportion of firms claiming to have introduced a product or service new 
to the marketplace in the prior twelve months varied from 4% to 17% (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 1999). Third, the scale of job creation in new firms varies 
considerably from firm to firm. Storey and Strange (1992) show that 2% of all new 
firms created 33% of jobs in new firms, reflecting the extent of skewness in the 
distribution of employment. This skewness is taken to reflect differences in the human 
capital of founders (Frank, 1988) or their ability to learn (Jovanovic, 1982). For these 
reasons job creation, even in new enterprises, may be more strongly influenced by the 
human capital of the founders, than by the absolute number of startups (Cooper et al., 
1989; Van Praag and Cramer, 2001). 
The case for a negative relationship between new firm births and subsequent job 
creation derives from examining policies to stimulate new firm formation in 
“unenterprising” areas.  Since these are frequently areas where human capital is low, the 
new firms tend to be in easy to enter sectors such as vehicle-repairing, window cleaning 
and hairdressing (Storey and Strange, 1992). Subsidising entry means entrants 
temporarily have a competitive advantage over incumbents who are forced out of 
business. Once the subsidy is removed, the no-longer subsidised entrants may be forced 
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out either by newly subsidised entrants or by re-entrants. The effect of this ‘churn’ is to 
lower customer confidence leading to lower expenditure and hence lower employment 
(Greene et al., 2004). 
6.3 The evidence 
Prior empirical studies of the relationship between “entrepreneurship” and “economic 
success” have adopted different approaches, yielding different results. Three studies, 
albeit using very different dependent and independent variables, find a positive 
relationship. Reynolds et al. (2000) examine the relationship across 21 countries 
between “Total Entrepreneurial Activity” and per cent growth in GDP. They show that 
“Entrepreneurship is strongly associated with economic growth. Amongst nations with 
similar economic structures, the correlation between entrepreneurship and economic 
growth exceeds 0.7 and is highly significant” (p. 1). Second, Johnson and Parker (1996) 
find “robust evidence that growth in births (and reductions in deaths) significantly 
lowers unemployment” (p. 686; original emphasis). Finally, taking the period 1981-89, 
Ashcroft and Love (1996) find new-firm formation to be strongly associated with net 
employment change in Great Britain. 
Fritsch (1996), however, obtains more ambiguous results. In a pioneering study that can 
be considered as the fore-runner to this study, he examines 74 (former) West German 
planning regions, 1986-89. He finds “a positive statistical relationship between entry 
rates and employment change for manufacturing in the longer run, …(but)… this 
relationship proves to be negative for the service sector as well as for all sectors 
together” (Fritsch, 1996, p. 247). A recent paper by Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) 
provides new insights for (West) Germany. Taking the same 74 planning regions, they 
present three key findings. First, confirming the Fritsch (1996) findings, startup rates in 
the 1980s are found to be unrelated to employment change. Second, in the 1990s, those 
regions with higher startup rates have higher employment growth. Third, and perhaps 
most interesting, is that regions with high startup rates in the 1980s had high 
employment growth in the 1990s.  
In summary therefore the evidence to date generally points to a significant and positive 
relationship between new firm formation and measures of employment creation.  There 
seems no prior empirical support for a negative relationship, although some non-
significant relationships have been found. 
6.4 Modelling issues 
The relationship to be modelled is of the simple form in Equation (6.1) below: 
 
(6.1) ( )CONBIRfEMP tt ,1−=∆  
 
where  tEMP∆  = change in employment, 
1−tBIR = firm birth rate at start of period, 
 CON  = vector of control variables.  
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Choice of measures 
Whilst, in principle, the model is simple to estimate there are five clear problems of 
definition. The first relates to the measure of BIR to be used. Given that the units of 
account are geographical areas that vary in size, BIR needs to be normalised by a size 
measure. The denominator should both control for the different absolute sizes of the 
regions concerned, and represent the source from which startups or firm formations are 
most likely to come (Ashcroft et al., 1991). The two variables normally used as 
denominators are the stock of existing firms, and the size of the regional workforce 
(Keeble et al., 1993). This is called the Business Stock (BS) approach and the Labour 
Market (LM) approach, respectively. The BS approach assumes new firms arise from 
existing ones, whereas the LM approach assumes that new firms arise from (potential) 
workers. The choice of measure can be highly significant. For example, for a given 
number of startups, regions which are equally large in terms of workforce but which are 
different in terms of average firm size, will have the same startup rate according to the 
LM approach but different startup rates according to the BS approach. Garofoli (1994) 
makes a robust case in favour of LM over BS. The latter, he argues, is misleading in 
areas with small numbers of (generally large) firms. Here small numbers of new firms 
would provide an artificially high birth rate, primarily because of the small 
denominator. Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) also show that, in West Germany, the 
statistical relationship between unemployment and startup activity crucially depends on 
the BS or LM methods used to measure startup rates.79 We favour the Garofoli 
arguments and in this chapter present only results from the LM approach.80 
Lags 
The second key problem relates to the lag structure specified in Equation (6.1). The case 
for the lag is that the employment impact of new firms is not likely to be immediate. 
Storey (1985), for example, shows that new manufacturing firms are generally eight or 
nine years old by the time they reach their peak employment, at which time they are 
about twice the size they were at the end of Year 1. However, because of their high exit 
rates, total employment in a cohort of new firms is lower in Year 5 than in Year 1. This 
means that the maximum employment impact of a cohort depends on the scale of these 
two influences and is an empirical, rather than theoretical, issue. 
The above discussion is framed in terms of simple arithmetic, but more complex social 
processes could also influence the lag. For example, new businesses started in time 
period t may stimulate the formation of other new firms in period t+1. This may be 
because the t period firms constitute a market for the t+1 firms; alternatively the success 
of the t firms could stimulate individuals to seek to emulate them, so the t firms become 
“role-models”. In turn, the t+1 firms stimulate more firms in later time periods, with the 
result that employment in that economy in t+n is stimulated. Theory, again however, is 
not helpful in specifying the value of n.  
                                                          
79 In Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) the business stock approach is called the ecological approach. 
80 Analyses comparing the LM and BS approach are in Van Stel and Storey (2002). In that paper we also 
pay extensive attention to some other empirical matters discussed later in this section, such as the sector 
adjustment of the startup rates and the impact of public sector employment on regression results. 
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Nevertheless, the above theoretical arguments discourage the use of contemporaneous 
startup rate variables in the model, i.e. employment change in period t being explained 
by new-firm startups in period t. Although correlations might be significant, the implied 
causal relation from births to (immediate) employment growth is potentially misleading. 
Positive correlations between startup rates and growth in the same period are often due 
to reversed causality, i.e. regions with high growth attracting new firms.81 In our 
empirical work we will include lagged startup rates only, but the precise nature of that 
lag is the subject of tests. 
Sectoral comparisons 
A third problem relates to differences in industrial structure between regions. This raises 
the question of whether the different sectoral structures of regions should be taken into 
account, since this influences both the number of startups and also employment change. 
Taking only the difference between services and manufacturing, startup rates are higher 
in service industries than in manufacturing (Audretsch and Fritsch, 2002), partly 
because entry barriers are lower, Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) is also likely to be 
lower and, for some services, demand is high. For all these reasons, regions with a high 
share of services in the local economy are more likely to have higher startup rates than 
regions with a low service share.  
But this does not necessarily mean these regions are also more “entrepreneurial”, in the 
sense that startup rates are higher for each sector of the local economy (or most sectors 
of the local economy). Therefore, to correct for different sectoral structures, the 
Ashcroft et al. (1991) shift-share procedure is applied to derive a measure of sector-
adjusted startup activity. The sector-adjusted number of startups is defined as the 
number of new firms in a region that can be expected to be observed if the composition 
of industries was identical across all regions. Thus, the measure adjusts the raw data by 
imposing the same composition of industries on each region (Audretsch and Fritsch, 
2002). An identical process is used to derive a measure of sectorally adjusted 
employment change. Appendix 6.A1 provides an illustration of the shift-share 
procedure.  
Another sector issue concerns the impact of the public sector on estimated model 
coefficients. Ideally, analysis should be restricted to private sector enterprises and 
private sector employment. Unfortunately, however, both private and state-owned 
enterprises can be present within some SIC groups. Furthermore, SIC groups with a 
relatively large employment share of public sector organizations (such as universities 
and hospitals) may disturb estimations as changes in public sector employment may 
create a bias in the estimated employment effect of new-firm startups. Therefore, we 
eliminate SIC groups dominated by state-owned enterprises or other public sector 
organizations from our analysis.82 
‘Control’ variables 
                                                          
81 Even if there is a lag in this reversed causality process, the measured correlation is often still positive, 
because of path dependency in the growth performance of regions. 
82 This involves SIC92 industries L, M, and N (Public administration, defence and compulsory social 
security; Education; and Health and social work, respectively) for  post-1991 data, and SIC80 industry 9 
(“other services”) for pre-1991 data; we utilise data according to different SICs before and after 1991, see 
Tables 6.A2b and 6.A3 in Appendix 6.A2. 
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A fourth issue relates to the choice of control variables (CON) used in Equation (6.1). In 
addition to the sectoral composition effects, noted above, previous studies have shown 
urban and rural areas differ in both employment change and in new-firm formation 
rates. In their review of regional variations in firm birth rates, Reynolds et al. (1994b) 
pointed to urban areas consistently having higher formation rates in the 1980s than non-
urban areas. Employment change, however, has been more mixed, with an urban-rural 
shift in the 1970s and 1980s (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1979) but a more mixed picture in 
more recent times (Green and Turok, 2000). Account of urban/rural differences is taken 
by the inclusion of a population density variable, and by Standard Region dummies.83 
Another control factor is the nature of the labour market, reflected in local wage rates. 
Rees and Shah (1986) assume the welfare maximising individual chooses between 
utility in self-employment compared with paid employment, for which wages are taken 
as the proxy.  Hence rises in wage rates would be expected to lead to movements into 
wage-employment and out of self-employment, consistent with a positive effect on 
employment change (which in the present study is defined to include employees only). 
Furthermore, wage rises may also stimulate labour supply which could also lead to 
increased employment at the regional level.  However, there is also a possible negative 
effect as a higher price of labour may lead to a lower demand for labour (substitution 
between capital and labour).84 These opposite effects make the sign of wage rates 
indeterminate from theory. 
A further control factor relates to the issue of reversed causality discussed earlier. Even 
if we include lagged startup rates only, the employment impact of new-firm startups 
might be overestimated, due to positive path dependency in the economic performance 
of regions (i.e. the business cycle effect). We correct for this by including lagged 
employment growth.85 
Public policy and region-specific effects 
The 1980’s and 1990’s saw radical changes in Enterprise Policy in the UK. Greene 
(2002) argues that the decade of the 1980’s saw, following the election of a 
Conservative government in 1979, the first explicit attempt to create an enterprise 
culture in Britain. Policy was directed towards maximising the number of new business 
starts so as to achieve this ‘enterprise culture’ and to seek to create jobs so as to offset 
the high levels of unemployment. In the 1990’s, however, British policy changed 
towards a focus on established business with “growth potential”. This we refer to as the 
policy effect. 
                                                          
83 According to Audretsch and Fritsch (2002, p. 120), who also use population density as a control in their 
regressions for Germany, “Population density here represents all kinds of regional influences such as 
availability of qualified labour, house prices, local demand and the level of knowledge spillovers”.  
84 For a selection of European countries, Van Stel (1999) estimates the real wage elasticity (the response 
of labour demand on an exogenous rise in real wages at constant output level and price of capital) to lie 
between –0.2 and –0.4 in the period 1970-1994. 
85 The concept of using lagged dependent variables to correct for reversed causality is known in the 
econometric literature as Granger-causality. The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x 
causes y is to see how much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether 
adding lagged values of x can improve the explanation. y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in 
the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged x’s are statistically significant 
(Audretsch et al., 2001). 
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In addition we also argue for the presence of region-specific effects reflecting the major 
cultural differences, within Great Britain, in attitudes towards enterprise and self-
employment. We call this the Upas Tree effect. The term was originally used by 
Checkland (1976) to describe economic change in the city of Glasgow, and was derived 
from a description of the Upas Tree that was native to Java. According to legend, the 
Upas Tree was able to destroy other growths for a radius of 15 miles, and Checkland 
viewed it as analagous to the destructive effect that the heavy engineering sector had 
upon the growth of other industries in Glasgow for much of the twentieth century.86 We 
use it to characterise Scotland and Wales, both of which appear to have a long-standing 
antipathy to “entrepreneurship”, but also North East England (McDonald and Coffield, 
1992; Greene et al., 2004). 
However, the policy and the region-specific effects interact with one another. This is 
because, whilst Britain as a whole, in the 1990’s, was shifting its policy away from a 
focus on business start-ups, Scotland explicitly chose the opposite policy. It established 
a “business birth rate” strategy (Fraser of Allander Institute, 2001) the focus of which 
was to raise new firm formation in that country. Account therefore has to be taken of 
these very different policy environments in Britain in 1980’s and 1990’s and of the 
differences between Scotland and the rest of Britain in the 1990’s. 
We investigate the impact of new firms on employment change separately for the 1980s 
and the 1990s to see whether effects differ between these two decades. We also 
incorporate slope dummies for Standard Regions to see whether effects for certain 
regions deviate from the overall effect for Great Britain. 
6.5 Variables and data sources 
The data used is at the spatial aggregation level of NUTS3 regions in Great Britain.87 
This is county level in England and Wales, and local authority region level in Scotland. 
In this partitioning, Great Britain comprises 60 regions, each disaggregated by six 
sectors. This facilitates correction for sectoral differences between regions, i.e. to apply 
the shift-share procedure described earlier. Different regional and sectoral 
classifications in the original data files meant some linking operations were performed 
to ensure uniformity for the whole period 1980-98. These linking operations and the 
exact classification schemes employed are reported in Appendix 6.A2. The agricultural 
sector is excluded, as this sector is fundamentally different from the rest of the 
economy, having, during this period, exceptionally low startup and death rates. 
Variable definitions and their sources are now provided: 
- Sector adjusted (lagged) employment change. This is the change in regional 
employment, expressed in percentages (excluding agriculture). For each region, sectoral 
employment growth rates are weighted by employment per sector for Great Britain as a 
                                                          
86 To our knowledge Lloyd and Mason (1984) were the first to use Checkland's analogy in this context.  
87 To investigate the employment impact of new firms, using data at the firm level would be more 
convenient as the net job growth in a region could then be decomposed in (gross) job increases and 
decreases due to entry and exit, and changes in the number of jobs originating from incumbent firms. 
However, as we do not dispose of micro data, we are forced to use a more indirect approach, using data 
on number of startups and employment at the regional level. 
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whole. Data on employment are taken from the Census of Employment and the Annual 
Employment Survey and are supplied by Nomis. Employment figures include both full-
time and part-time employees, and exclude self-employed workers and unpaid family 
workers. Employment is measured in September of each year.  
- Sector adjusted startup rate. This is the sectoral startup rate, weighted by employment 
per sector for Great Britain as a whole . Using this weighting implies an identical sector 
structure for each region. Regional employment, rather than regional workforce, is used 
as the denominator for the LM approach, because of greater data reliability. Startups in 
the agricultural sector are again excluded. Startups are measured as VAT registrations 
and these data are supplied by Small Business Service. The consistency and general 
availability of this data source make it the most generally useful source of data on firm 
formation for the UK as a whole (Ashcroft et al., 1991). Startup rates are expressed as 
the number of startups per thousand workers (LM approach). 
- Population density. Data on both population and area of the regions are obtained from 
the Office for National Statistics. The variable is expressed in thousands of inhabitants 
per square kilometre. 
- Wage growth. This variable measures changes in regional wage rates. We use data 
from the New Earnings Survey Panel Data-set (NESPD), which is operated by the 
Office for National Statistics. The estimates of regional wage rates refer to average 
hourly earnings excluding overtime payments. The samples from which the mean wages 
are calculated relate to full time employees whose pay was unaffected by absence 
during the survey week (which falls in April of each year) and exclude those employed 
in agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
6.6 Research design and regression diagnostics 
In this section we describe our research design and several regression diagnostics that 
we will use in order to test validity of regression results. From Table 6.A2b in Appendix 
6.A2 we can see that we cannot utilise employment data for all the years in our sample 
period 1980-98. We also had to make several harmonizations to correct for changes in 
regional and sectoral classifications over time. Both these aspects hamper the use of 
panel data regression techniques. Instead, we estimate each regression cross-sectionally, 
i.e. using 60 observations (one for each region). Because of missing (employment) data, 
the region Orkney/Shetland/Western Isles had to be dropped, generating a total of 59 
observations. The models are estimated using OLS. 
We want to estimate separate models for the 1980s and the 1990s to see whether the 
relationship between firm births and job creation has changed over time. Given the 
(limited) availability of employment data and our preference to measure employment 
change in a period after the period in which we measure startups (to obtain the correct 
direction of causality), Table 6.A2b demonstrates that the most appropriate periods are 
1984-91 and 1991-98 for employment change in the 1980s and 1990s.88 In this way we 
make optimal use of the full time length of our data set. We measure startup rates in a 
                                                          
88 A further advantage of this choice is that the computation of employment change is not hampered by 
the change in sectoral classification in 1991, see Table 6.A2b. 
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period directly preceding the employment change periods. We use four-year averages in 
order to correct for outlier years. This results in startup rates for the periods 1980-83 
and 1987-90. In this way the 1980s and 1990s estimations are completely ‘symmetric’ 
(seven year period for employment change; four-year averaged startup rate in the 
preceding period), which enables comparison of the results for the two periods.  
Regarding control variables, population density is measured three years before 
employment growth. For wage growth and lagged employment growth some small 
inconsistencies concerning the ‘symmetry’ of the 1980s and 1990s models cannot be 
avoided, due to the unavailability of data prior to 1981. We measure wage growth over 
a period of four years, and we want the wage growth period to precede the employment 
growth period, if possible. Using a four year length this inevatibly results in the period 
1981-85. For the 1990s regression we experimented with the lag which resulted in 
inclusion of wage growth for the period 1985-89 (based on statistical fit). Regarding the 
lagged dependent variable we want to use the same length as the dependent variable 
(seven years). For the 1990s regression this results in the period 1984-91. For the 1980s 
regression however, the first available year in our data set is 1981 and therefore lagged 
growth is measured over the period 1981-84.  
In all instances, four regression diagnostics are presented. These are first, the Jarque-
Bera test on normality of the disturbances; second, the Lagrange Multiplier test on 
heteroscedasticity; third, the Ramsey RESET test on general misspecification of the 
model. To facilitate direct evaluation of these tests p-values are shown. For all three 
tests the null hypothesis corresponds to “correct estimates”, i.e. normality at the Jarque-
Bera test, no heteroscedasticity at the Lagrange Multiplier test and no sign of 
misspecification at the Ramsey RESET test. 
Finally, the fact that the data relate to spatial variations raises the potential problem of 
spatial autocorrelation, an issue “which has been widely ignored in the econometric 
literature, including most previous work on spatial variations in new firm formation” 
(Keeble et al., 1993, p. 34). Following Keeble et al., account is taken of this by 
including Standard Region intercept dummies in the equations.89 To see whether spatial 
autocorrelation is actually present in our regressions, we report the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. We test for positive spatial autocorrelation, implying that the null hypothesis of 
no spatial autocorrelation is accepted (not rejected) if the DW test statistic is greater 
than a certain upper bound for critical values, which depends on the number of 
observations and regressors.90 
When using the DW statistic we acknowledge this statistic is designed for times series 
analysis with observations being arranged along a ‘time line’. In other words, it is 
designed for one-dimensional concepts such as time. Space, however, is a multi-
dimensional concept. Following Ashcroft and Love (1996), we present the data to the 
estimation by county within each Standard Region. It follows that many adjacent 
observations are from contiguous counties. Therefore we argue that the DW statistic 
                                                          
89 For this purpose the county Greater London is added to the South East region. This is because there is 
only one county within the London region in our data set. 
90 We test for positive autocorrelation as neighbouring regions may be expected to benefit from each other 
(spillover effects). 
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should measure the degree of spatial dependence reasonably well. But even so, we 
recognise there remains some arbitrariness in the ordering of neighbouring regions.91  
6.7 Results 
To test whether startup activity has a different impact on employment growth in 
different time periods several models are estimated. Recalling that a key objective is to 
test for short or long-run relationships this section begins by examining the relationship 
between startups, 1980-83, on employment change 1984-91; then it examines startups in 
the period 1987-90 on employment change 1991-98. This provides an initial assessment 
of whether the short-term impact of startups differed between the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Next, we look at possible region-specific deviations in the effect of startups on 
employment growth. In the third subsection we investigate whether estimation results 
are affected by the periods in which startup rates are measured in terms of recession or 
boom  periods. The fourth subsection investigates long-run effects. We also pay 
attention to the interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated effects. Finally, we 
compare our results with other studies. 
Startups and employment change in the 1980s and the 1990s: short-term effects 
Table 6.1 presents the regression results for the 1980s and the 1990s. Startup rates are 
related to subsequent employment growth, while controlling for population density, 
wage growth, lagged employment growth, and regional dummies. All control variables 
are measured prior to the period of the dependent variable.  
The final rows show all diagnostic tests are passed (p-values are well above 0.05), 
except for the RESET test in the 1990s, possibly indicating a missing variable. As 
regards spatial autocorrelation, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is accepted (not 
rejected) as the DW test statistic exceeds the upper bound critical value (which is about 
2, in our case).92 
The impact of startup activity on subsequent regional employment change is different 
for the 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1980s startups and employment change are unrelated 
while in the 1990s startups have a significantly positive impact on employment growth. 
The bigger employment impact of 1987-90 births compared to 1980-83 births might 
reflect that the importance of new and small firms in the process of innovation and 
economic growth has increased in the last two decades of the 20th century. In this 
interpretation Great Britain would have moved from a more “managed” type of 
economy toward a more “entrepreneurial” type of economy (Audretsch and Thurik, 
2001). However, perhaps a more testable explanation is that the increased employment 
impact reflects “Enterprise Policy” changes, with public policy switching from being 
                                                          
91 For an alternative approach see the methods covered by Anselin (1988). 
92 The Durbin-Watson test should be interpreted with caution in the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable in the model (Stewart, 1991, p. 168). However, as the DW test statistic is clearly greater than the 
upper bound critical value, we think it is safe to assume that our estimates do not suffer from first-order 
spatial autocorrelation. Furthermore, when the Standard Region intercept dummies are removed, the DW 
test statistic falls to 2.10 for the 1980s regression and to 1.64 for the 1990s regression. The latter value 
falls within the inconclusive region, indicating that the regional dummies are indeed helpful in correcting 
for spatial autocorrelation. 
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quantity-oriented in the 1980s towards being more quality-oriented in the 1990s 
(Greene, 2002). 
As for the control variables, we see a significant negative impact of population density 
(in the 1980s), and a positive impact of wage growth (in the 1990s) and lagged 
employment growth. The latter effect points at positive path dependency. Regions that 
perform relatively well in a certain period, still perform relatively well in the next 
period. 
Table 6.1:  Determinants of regional employment growth (%), short-term equations 
1980s and 1990s 
 Employment growth 
1984-91 
Employment growth 
1991-98 
Constant 
 
 
5.5 
(0.5) 
-21.3 
(2.8) 
Average startup rate,  
   1980-83 (left column) 
   1987-90 (right column) 
-0.25 
(0.3) 
1.11 
(2.3) 
Population density, 
   1981 (left column) 
   1988 (right column) 
-4.6 
(3.2) 
-0.36 
(0.3) 
Wage growth, 
   1981-85 (left column) 
   1985-89 (right column) 
0.28 
(0.8) 
0.53 
(2.6) 
Lagged employment growth, 
   1981-84 (left column) 
   1984-91 (right column) 
0.46 
(2.1) 
0.20 
(1.8) 
Adjusted R2 0.281 0.696 
JB test: [p-value] [0.517] [0.820] 
LM het. test: [p-value] [0.630] [0.264] 
RESET test: [p-value] [0.743] [0.015] 
DW test 2.23 2.18 
Note: Intercept dummies for Standard Regions not reported. Employment growth rates and startup rates 
are sector adjusted. Employment growth is measured exclusive of the non-private sector. Absolute t-
values in parentheses. 
Regional specific effects 
In this subsection we investigate whether certain regions deviate in the employment 
effect of new-firm startups. For this purpose we compute slope dummies (startup rate 
multiplied by regional dummy) for the (ten) Standard Regions. Given the specifications 
in Table 6.1 (hence, including all intercept dummies), we include, one at a time, a slope 
dummy for each Standard Region. Those slope dummies which are significant at 10% 
level when included separately, are included in Table 6.2. For the 1980s this is the 
North East region, and for the 1990s Scotland and Wales. The effects for the other 
regions are not significantly different from the overall effect. The improved value for 
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the RESET test for the 1990s regression (compared to Table 6.1) implies that the slope 
dummies for Scotland and Wales contribute to the validity of the model. 
For the 1980s, the overall effect of the startup rate is nil on employment in Great 
Britain. However, for North East England new-firm startups contribute negatively to 
employment growth in that region in the 1980s. For the 1990s the overall startup rate 
effect is positive (and stronger than in Table 6.1), but for Wales the effect is nil, and for 
Scotland the effect is negative.93  
Whilst the significant negative sign for North-East England in the 1980s may seem a 
surprise the plausible explanation comes from a reading of McDonald and Coffield 
(1992). They paint a picture of unemployed young people in North-east England with 
very modest human capital being press-ganged by public agendas into starting their own 
enterprise and ending up more disadvantaged than before they started. The effect is to 
erode confidence leading to declining economic performance.  
Matters change in the 1990s. In the right hand side of Table 6.2 it can be seen that it is 
Wales and particularly Scotland that exhibit the significantly negative signs. The 
common thread is that North-east England, Scotland and Wales all have rates of new 
firm foundation that are well below the GB average. Second, for two regions, the North-
east and Scotland, the negative deviation coincides with a policy thrust to raise new firm 
formation. This raises the question whether such policies are productive in 
‘unenterprising’ areas.  
It will be recalled that after October 1993 Scotland implements an active policy to raise 
business birth rates (BBRS) (Fraser of Allander Institute, 2001). Although the periods 
studied in the current chapter do not entirely coincide with the period during which the 
BBRS is active (from 1994 onwards), the negative value for the Scotland dummy 
indicates that the BBRS actually might have had a negative effect on job creation in 
Scotland. 
The results from Table 6.2 call into question the impact of policies seeking to raise new-
firm formation, for two reasons. First, in the 1980’s, when UK policy was to stimulate 
starts, there is no effect on employment in the UK as a whole, and even a negative effect 
for the North East. Second, in the 1990s there is a significantly positive overall effect 
after the UK policy changed towards more emphasis on established businesses with the 
potential to grow. However, for Scotland, which has a business birth rate strategy in the 
1990s, the effect is negative.  
                                                          
93 The slope dummies refer to the deviation from the overall effect. For instance, the significant parameter 
estimate for Wales means that the effect for Wales deviates significantly from England. It does not mean 
that it deviates significantly from zero. Indeed, the effect for Wales is –0.3 which is not significant (t-
value –0.3). The effect for Scotland is –2.7 which is significantly different from zero at 10% level (t-value 
–1.8). 
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Table 6.2: Examining region-specific deviations in employment impact of startups 
 Employment growth 
1984-91 
Employment growth 
1991-98 
Constant 
 
66.7 
(2.2) 
-28.9 
(3.9) 
Startup rate,  
overall effect 
-0.18 
(0.2) 
 
1.88 
(3.8) 
Startup rate, 
slope dummy North East 
 
-10.5 
(2.2) 
 
Startup rate, 
slope dummy Wales 
 
 -2.2 
(2.0) 
Startup rate, 
slope dummy Scotland 
 
 -4.6 
(2.9) 
Population density, -5.1 
(3.6) 
 
0.39 
(0.3) 
Wage growth, 
 
0.26 
(0.8) 
 
0.55 
(2.9) 
Lagged employment growth, 
 
0.54 
(2.5) 
0.25 
(2.5) 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.747 
JB test: [p-value] [0.493] [0.030] 
LM het. test: [p-value] [0.843] [0.534] 
RESET test: [p-value] [0.225] [0.576] 
DW test 2.30 2.22 
Note: Intercept dummies for Standard Regions not reported. Employment growth rates and startup rates 
are sector adjusted. Employment growth is measured exclusive of the non-private sector. Except for 
startup rate slope dummies, variable specifications are as in Table 6.1. Absolute t-values in parentheses. 
Recession births versus boom births 
In the previous sections we argued that the different short-term impacts of startups in 
the early and late 1980s may have been caused by “Enterprise Policy” changes. An 
alternative explanation is that the 1980-83 startups may be a different type of startups, 
compared with the 1987-90 startups. The obvious difference is that, while 1980-83 were 
recession years, 1987-90 was a “boom” period. During recessions, a higher proportion 
of startups may be from individuals with lower human capital, who find employment in 
the employee labour market more difficult (Cressy, 1996). These startups may be less 
likely to generate jobs. On the other hand, during a period of economic prosperity, it 
may be the more “entrepreneurial” type of person who starts a business. This type of 
startup may be more likely to generate jobs in the short and the long-run. So, while 
 119
recession births may be the result of “push”-factors being at work (possibly creating 
fewer jobs), boom births may be more “pull-factor” in nature (possibly creating more 
jobs).  
To test this we examine in Table 6.3 the relationship between firm births in the 1990s 
recession and short-term employment change. Using the same control variables as those 
reported in Table 6.2, we estimate a regression in which employment change in the 
period 1993-98 is explained by the average startup rate over the period 1990-93. To 
facilitate comparison, the results from the right column of Table 6.2 are reported again 
in Table 6.3. The results are similar: we find a significant positive impact, implying that 
the lack of a relationship in the 1980s is not because of the choice of recessionary 
years.94 Instead, it seems to be the case that (new) firms in the late 1980s and early 
1990s contribute more to employment change than firms started in the early 1980s 
irrespective of macro-economic conditions.  
                                                          
94 The estimated effect for the recession period is even stronger, although not significantly. As regards the 
dummy variables, the deviations of Wales and Scotland seem to be smaller compared to Table 6.2 (t-
values –1.3). However, the isolated effects are nil for both Wales (effect –0.8; t-value –0.4) and Scotland 
(effect –0.7; t-value –0.3), while the effect for the English regions is significantly positive. This implies 
that Wales and Scotland still lag behind in the employment effect of new firms started in the period 1990-
93. 
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Table 6.3: Examining the impact of recession or boom period 
 Employment growth 
1991-98 
Employment growth 
1993-98 
Constant 
 
 
-28.9 
(3.9) 
-26.8 
(4.0) 
Startup rate, overall effect 
   1987-90 (left column) 
   1990-93 (right column) 
1.88 
(3.8) 
2.39 
(4.1) 
Startup rate, 
slope dummy Wales 
-2.2 
(2.0) 
-3.2 
(1.3) 
Startup rate, 
slope dummy Scotland 
-4.6 
(2.9) 
-3.1 
(1.4) 
Population density, 0.39 
(0.3) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
Wage growth, 
 
0.55 
(2.9) 
0.52 
(2.5) 
Lagged employment growth, 
 
0.25 
(2.5) 
0.15 
(1.4) 
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.737 
JB test: [p-value] [0.030] [0.473] 
LM het. test: [p-value] [0.534] [0.289] 
RESET test: [p-value] [0.576] [0.534] 
DW test 2.22 2.51 
Note: Intercept dummies for Standard Regions not reported. Employment growth rates and startup rates 
are sector adjusted. Employment growth is measured exclusive of the non-private sector. Except for 
startup rate slope dummies, variable specifications are as in Table 6.1. Absolute t-values in parentheses. 
A long-term effect? 
In this subsection we test for long-run effects. Given our data set we can only test for 
long-run effects for employment growth in the 1990s, as we have no startup data prior 
to 1980. The easiest way to test for long-run effects is to run separate regressions which 
include different lags of the startup rate. Using the same control variables as in Table 
6.2, the coefficients of startup rate in separate regressions explaining employment 
change 1991-98, are 1.88 for for 1987-90 startups, 2.25 for 1984-87 startups, and 2.44 
for 1980-83 startups. So, the impact increases with the lag, seemingly indicating that the 
long-run effect exceeds the short-run effect. 
However, we must be cautious in comparing these coefficients. To avoid 
multicollinearity we estimated the impact of the startup rates from different periods in 
separate regressions. A disadvantage of this approach is that, because of the strong 
intertemporal correlation between startup rates (correlations of up to 0.9), the estimated 
startup rate coefficient may pick up some of the effect of startup activity from other 
periods. This means comparing coefficients of the long-term and short-term equations is 
complex. 
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A better way of establishing the individual impacts of startup rate variables from 
different periods draws upon the distributed lag literature (Stewart, 1991). By including 
startup rates from different periods in one regression, but imposing restrictions on the 
individual parameters, an accurate approximation of the shape of the lag response can 
be obtained. In the Almon method, parameter restrictions are imposed in such a way 
that the coefficients of the lagged variables are a polynomial function of the lag length. 
In this way the startup rate coefficients are reparameterized in a “smooth” way.  
We apply the Almon method for a quadratic polynomial function (i.e. a polynomial of 
second degree). This choice corresponds to imposing one parameter restriction.95 The 
results are shown in Table 6.4, with further details presented in Appendix 6.A3.  
                                                          
95 This can be seen as follows. In the unrestricted regression three startup rate variables are included in the 
model, while in the first unrestricted regression column, only two variables are included (COMBI1 and 
COMBI2 in Table 6.4). In the second unrestricted regression column, only one startup rate variable is 
included (COMBI3), and this corresponds to two parameter restrictions. The startup rate coefficients in 
the restricted regressions are linear combinations of the combinatory variable coefficients. See Equation 
(6.A3) in Appendix 6.A2. 
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Table 6.4: Examining the lag structure 
 Employment growth 1991-98 
 
 Unrestricted 
regression 
Restricted 
regression 
(one restr.) 
 
Restricted 
regression 
(two restr.) 
COMBI1 = X-1+2X-2+3X-3 
 
 1.29 
(0.9) 
 
 
COMBI2 = X-1+4X-2+9X-3 
 
 -0.39 
(0.6) 
 
 
COMBI3 = -2(X-1+X-2) 
 
  -0.53 
(3.8) 
 
Startup rate 1987-90 (X-1) 1.2 
(0.8) 
0.89 
(1.1) 
 
1.06 
(3.8) 
Startup rate 1984-87 (X-2) 0.48 
(0.2) 
 
1.00 
(2.6) 
1.06 
(3.8) 
Startup rate 1980-83 (X-3) 0.47 
(0.3) 
 
0.32 
(0.2) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.737 0.743 0.748 
JB test: [p-value] [0.062] [0.087] [0.069] 
LM het. test: [p-value] [0.554] [0.578] [0.581] 
RESET test: [p-value] [0.657] [0.661] [0.642] 
DW test 2.21 2.21 2.22 
Validity Almon restrictions: 
F-test statistic 
Critical value (5% level) 
 
  
0.062 
4.1 
 
0.053 
3.2 
Note: Except for startup rates, model specifications are as in right column Table 6.2. Intercept dummies 
for Standard Regions, startup rate slope dummies for Scotland and Wales, and coefficients of 
population density, wage growth, and lagged employment growth are not reported. Absolute t-values in 
parentheses. Null hypothesis for JB test, LM het. test, RESET test, and DW test is “correct model 
specification”. Null hypothesis for F-test is “valid restrictions”. Critical values for F-tests are according 
to F(1;41) and F(2;41) distributions. Bold-printed coefficients are restricted parameter estimates. 
In Table 6.4, regression results using unrestricted regression (i.e. free estimation) and 
restricted regressions (i.e. using the Almon method) are presented. For the unrestricted 
regression we see that t-values of the separate startup rates are low. This is due to 
multicollinearity. In the first restricted regression column a corrected lag pattern is 
presented. We see that the impact of the startup rate 1984-87 is strongest. The impact of 
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1980-83 startups, however, is zero: the t-value is extremely low.96 This pattern suggests 
that the lag is approximately 4 to 7 years. The validity of imposing the Almon 
restriction is formally confirmed by the F-test on parameter restrictions. 
However, as t-values for both combinatory variables are low, we suspect that 
multicollinearity may still influence results in the middle column to some extent. 
Therefore, we test an additional restriction. As both parameter estimate and t-value of 
1980-83 startup rate are low, we impose the effect of 1980-83 startups to be zero. This 
extra restriction, which can be written as 03 =β , also implies that the employment 
impacts of 1987-90 startups and 1984-87 startups are equal.97 In the last column we see 
that both the unrestricted and the restricted parameter estimates are significant. Also, the 
F-test on valid restrictions is not rejected. We therefore conclude that the employment 
impact of 1980-83 startups is zero and that the employment impacts of 1987-90 startups 
and 1984-87 startups are equal and significantly positive. 
Using the estimation results from the last column in Table 6.4, the employment impact 
of the startup rate can be written as a function of the lag length of the startup rate as 
( ) ( )2** 353.0358.1* iii −=β , where *i  is the lag length in years.98 The employment 
impact of startup rates is maximised after 4.5 years and extinguished after 9 years, 
counting backwards from 1991.99 So, according to this formula, startups from 1986-87 
contribute most to employment growth 1991-98, whereas new-firm startups founded in 
1983 or earlier do not contribute to employment growth beyond 1991.  
The different results for the unrestricted and restricted regression clearly demonstrate 
the necessity to take account of intertemporal correlations between the different lags of 
the startup rate.  
Magnitude of the effects 
We now examine the magnitude of the effects. The coefficients from “separate 
regressions” overestimate the employment effect as these coefficients partly reflect the 
impact of new-firm startups from different periods, as was shown above. To establish 
the correct average impact of one new-firm startup, we use the coefficients from the last 
column of Table 6.4. The estimated parameter of the sector adjusted startup rate 1987-
90 is 1.06. But this requires interpretation. The dependent variable equals 
( ) 199119911998100 EmplEmplEmpl − , where Empl stands for employment. The 
                                                          
96 Recall that in the restricted regression columns in Table 6.4, the coefficients of the startup rate variables 
1987-90, 1984-87, and 1980-83 are linear combinations of the coefficients of the combinatory variables 
COMBI1, COMBI2, and COMBI3. In other words, the bold-printed coefficients are restricted parameter 
estimates.  
97 This is clear when the restriction 03 =β  is substituted in Equation (6.A3) in Appendix 6.A2: this 
results in 221 2γββ −== . Again, we refer to Appendix 6.A2 for further details. 
98 The lag length in years is denoted as *i . One unit in i  corresponds to a period of three years, i.e. 
3*ii = . Again, details are in Appendix 6.A2. 
99 Fritsch and Mueller (2004) apply the Almon method for West-German regions in the period 1983-
2002. Using a polynomial of third degree, they find an optimal lag of eight years. 
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independent variable equals ( )1987
1990
1987
41000 EmplNFF
i
∑
=
, where NFF stands for new-
firm formation. 
Due to data limitations we use four times 1987-employment, instead of the sum of 
employment over the years 1987-1990. For simplicity we assume that employment in 
1987 equals employment in 1991, so the impact of one new-firm startup on absolute 
employment change is (1.06×(1000/4))/100=2.7. So, ceteris paribus, one new firm 
started in the period 1987-90 on average created 2.7 net new jobs in the period 1991-
98.100 The employment impact of 1984-87 is also 2.7 jobs per startup. Note that these 
jobs are additional to the jobs created by the 1987-90 startups. 
Comparing these results with those from other studies 
Our findings for Great Britain show similarities to those of Audretsch and Fritsch 
(2002) for German regions. They also find no short-term effect on employment of 
startups in the early to mid 1980s, but they do find a short-term employment effect of 
the early 1990s startups.101 The common finding, for both Britain and Germany, is that 
the short-term effect of new-firm startups is higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s. 
Our results for the 1980s, however, differ from those of Ashcroft and Love (1996) for 
virtually the same British counties. As noted earlier, they find a strong positive effect of 
new firms started in the period 1980-88 on net employment change in the period 1981-
89. They employ a model in which both employment change and new-firm formation 
are explained with only a one year lag, allowing for interdependencies between these 
two variables. The employment effect in their study is certainly stronger than our short-
term result for the 1980s. 
One possible explanation for the differences may again be the different lag structures 
employed in the two models. In their model Ashcroft and Love relate new-firm 
formation 1980-88 to net employment change 1981-89, whereas in this chapter the lags 
are of a minimum of three years (taking the mid year of our startup rate variables as 
reference year).102 Given the findings of this chapter that the relationship strengthens 
over time, we believe our results to be more robust. 
6.8 Discussion and implications 
                                                          
100 It is important to realize that these 2.7 jobs do not necessarily have to be created in the new firms 
themselves. It is also possible that (part of) these jobs are created in incumbent firms, but that this is 
induced by competitive pressure from the new entries. In other words, the 2.7 jobs is the total net effect; 
we cannot distinguish between direct and indirect employment effects. 
101 Audretsch and Fritsch however do not control for region-specific effects (by means of regional 
dummies), or wage growth. 
102 Note that a lag of three years in the present chapter is not comparable with the one year lag used by 
Ashcroft and Love. In their method, the one year lag is counted backward from the end year of the 
employment change period, whereas we count back from the start year of the employment change period. 
So the lags in this chapter are considerably larger than the difference between 3 and 1 year suggests. In 
fact, in Ashcroft and Love, the years in which employment change and startup activity are measured 
display an 80% overlap, possibly resulting in the reversed causality problems described earlier. In the 
present chapter we deliberately choose non-overlapping periods. 
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In contrast with the expectations of the policy makers at the time, this chapter finds no 
evidence that changes in GB new firm formation rates in the 1980-83 period explained 
changes in employment 1984–91. Indeed for the “unenterprising” and high 
unemployment area of the North East of England, raising rates of new firm formation is 
associated with employment reduction. It is only later in the decade that increased rates 
of new firm formation nationally appear to lead to job creation. Nevertheless the 1980’s 
was a decade in which national policy focussed on raising new firm formation as a key 
strategy for creating jobs and lowering unemployment. 
That policy, however, began to be reviewed in the early 1990’s and, by 1993, had been 
radically switched. Instead of a focus on startups, British policy, with the exception of 
Scotland, was directed towards, established, rather than new firms, and the job creation 
impact of new firms in that decade, nationally, was positive and significant.  
Scotland, however, adopted the reverse strategy. It sought, explicitly, to raise new firm 
formation rate as a mechanism to promote job creation. We show that, in GB, new firm 
formation in the 1987-90 period was significantly positively associated with 
employment growth in the 1991-8 period. In Scotland however, increases in new firm 
formation led to falling employment. The results for Scotland therefore provide no 
support for policies which seek to raise new firm formation as a mechanism for 
stimulating job creation, particularly in areas deemed to be “lacking in enterprise.” Our 
interpretation is that the ineffectiveness of the Business Birth Rate Strategy in Scotland 
(Fraser of Allander Institute, 2001) was probably a blessing in disguise since a rise in 
new firm formation would, on these grounds, have led to falling employment.  
Overall, our findings are important for public policy makers for several reasons. First, 
the considerably bigger short-term (and possibly long-term) employment impact of 
1990s births, compared with early 1980s births, is likely to reflect “Enterprise Policy” 
changes. As Greene (2002) argues, the 1980s in Britain was a decade in which the key 
objective was to maximise the number of business startups. In contrast, the 1990s saw a 
shift towards policies to improve the “quality” of the SME sector as a whole. Given that 
major policy shift it is unsurprising -although reassuring- to observe bigger employment 
impacts in the 1990s, than in the previous decade. 
Nevertheless this chapter makes it clear that increases in birth rates can lead to 
additional job creation in the short and medium term. Much less clear is whether a 
public policy-induced increase in birth rates is a consistently cost-effective way of 
enhancing employment in the medium term. Our interpretation of our findings is that it 
is not for two reasons. The first is that the only area, in the 1990s, with a clear (public) 
policy to promote new-firm births was Scotland. Yet it was Scotland, (along with 
Wales), where the job creation impact of a new startup was significantly lower than 
elsewhere.103 The fact that the business birth rate policy is implemented in 1993 – after 
the 1990-93 period when we measure birth rates – means that the definitive link cannot 
be made . However, given the evidence presented in the chapter the likelihood that the 
business birth rate policy was effective in terms of job creation seems very small. 
                                                          
103 In 2002 Scottish Enterprise announced the effective abolition of its Business Birth Rate Strategy, 
replacing it with a greater focus on SMEs with potential for growth. However, in 2001, an 
Entrepreneurship Action Plan for Wales was announced with a £300 million budget, one key element of 
which was to raise birth rates of firms in Wales to the UK average by 2006 (National Assembly for 
Wales, 2001). 
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The second key finding is that startups had a much greater impact on job creation in the 
1990s than in the 1980s, even though raising the startup rate was the key policy 
objective in the 1980s. Our interpretation is that “birth rate policies” lead to individuals 
with limited human capital -who are often unemployed- being encouraged to start in 
business. Such individuals are likely to be very transitory business owners and very 
unlikely to start and develop businesses with employees (Storey and Strange, 1992; 
Greene et al., 2004). This suggests that, if the objective is to enhance employment, 
implementing old- fashioned “birth rate” policies is difficult to justify from this 
research. 
Unfortunately current UK policy documents appear to signal a return to such policies. 
HM Treasury and Small Business Service (2002) refer consistently to an “enterprise 
gap”, and in its Foreward says “...and across the UK, start-up rates in the best 
performing areas are ten times those of the worst, contributing to an enterprise gap in 
our inner cities of 88,000 companies, £5 billion in turnover and tens of thousands of 
jobs… we cannot close that overnight”. In 2004 the focus on startups and enterprise 
culture is apparent in the government’s seven pillars of policy (Small Business Service, 
2004). The clear implication is that it is current policy to seek to close the gap by raising 
new firm formation, particularly in “unenterprising” areas. The lessons from this 
chapter are that public policies to raise new firm formation, particularly in 
“unenterprising” areas are likely to be unproductive at best and counter-productive at 
worst. 
6.A1 Appendix: Illustration shift-share procedure 
In this appendix we illustrate the shift-share procedure, used in this chapter to compute 
sector-adjusted startup rates, by means of a numerical example. Basically, the shift-
share procedure imposes the same sector structure (that of the country as a whole) on 
each region. Sector structure in this chapter is measured in terms of employment (labour 
market approach). As an illustration, we show the calculation of both the unadjusted and 
the sector-adjusted average startup rate 1980-83 for Derbyshire. This county is chosen 
because of the relatively large difference between the two types of startup rate for this 
region. 
In the second column of Table 6.A1 the startup rate (averaged over the years 1980-83) 
is reported for each sector of economy (except for agriculture which is excluded from 
the current study). The startup rate of a region is a weighted average of the sectoral 
startup rates. The difference between the unadjusted startup rate and the sector-adjusted 
startup rate of a region is the weighting scheme applied to the sectoral startup rates. For 
the unadjusted startup rate, the employment shares of the sectors of the region under 
consideration (in this case Derbyshire) are taken as weights. This results in a value of 
6.890. For the sector adjusted startup rate of Derbyshire, we take the sectoral 
employment shares of Great Britain as a whole as weights. This results in a value of 
8.392.  
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The difference between the sector-adjusted and the unadjusted startup rate is equal to 
21.8%, which is quite large.104 Closer inspection of Table 6.A1 reveals that the 
differences between the employment shares of Derbyshire and Great Britain as a whole, 
of especially the sectors production and trade and catering, account for the large 
difference between the unadjusted and the sector-adjusted startup rates. The relatively 
large share of production in Derbyshire (a sector with a low startup rate) and the 
relatively small share of trade and catering (a sector with a high startup rate) account for 
the lower value for the unadjusted startup rate, compared to the sector-adjusted startup 
rate.  
Table 6.A1: Illustration shift-share procedure; the case of Derbyshire, 1980-83 
sector average 
startup rate 
1980-83,  
by sector 1 
employment share 
1981, Derbyshire 
employment share 
1981, Great Britain 
production 1.519 0.470 0.323 
construction 23.294 0.049 0.052 
trade and catering 24.478 0.145 0.196 
transport and communic. 7.559 0.054 0.067 
other services 3.848 0.282 0.363 
average unadjusted startup rate 
1980-83, Derbyshire 
6.890 
 
average sector-adjusted startup rate 
1980-83, Derbyshire  
8.392 
1 Number of VAT registrations per 1000 workers. 
6.A2 Appendix: Data sources 
The startup rate and employment change variables used are all constructed from a data 
base which contains four basic variables: startups, closures, number of enterprises, and 
employment. This database was constructed by EIM. These four variables are available 
at the sectoral (1-digit) and regional (NUTS3) aggregation level for the period 1980-99. 
Except for employment, each of these four variables is available on a yearly basis 
according to uniform regional and sectoral classifications, for the whole period 1980-99. 
Achieving this uniformity is not straightforward, since the crude data were delivered 
according to different regional and sectoral classifications. In this appendix the exact 
regional and sectoral aggregation levels, at which the four variables are available in the 
EIM-data set, are presented. Furthermore, the data sources and some characteristics of 
the variables are described.  
Basic data 
In Tables 6.A2a and 6.A2b, we give an overview of the different classifications 
(regional and sectoral), according to which the four variables are available in the basic 
                                                          
104 In our data set the difference between the sector-adjusted and the unadjusted startup rate ranges from –
20.9% to +21.8%. 
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data files. Also, the exact years for which the variables are available (for employment 
there are some missing years), are tabulated. 
Table 6.A2a:  Available years and classification schemes in basic data files: 
startups, closures and number of enterprises a 
Period Available years Regional 
classification 
Sectoral 
classification 
1980-1993 All pre-LGR b VTC c 
1994-1999 All post-LGR SIC92 
a The figures of these variables are supplied by Small Business Service. 
b LGR = local government reorganisation 1995-98. 
c VTC = VAT Trade Classification. This is effectively SIC68. 
 
Table 6.A2b:  Available years and classification schemes in basic data files: 
employmenta 
Period Available years Regional 
classification 
Sectoral 
classification 
1980-1991 1981; ’84; ‘87; ’89; ‘91 pre-LGR b SIC80 
1991-1999 1991; ’93; ’95-‘98 pre-LGR SIC92 
a The figures of this variable are supplied by Nomis. 
b LGR = local government reorganisation 1995-98. 
 
Startups, closures and number of enterprises: source and description 
The figures on startups, closures, and number of enterprises are supplied by Small 
Business Service. This organisation publishes yearly figures on VAT registrations, VAT 
deregistrations, and the stock of VAT registered enterprises, based on data from the 
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR; this register is administered by the Office 
for National Statistics). See Small Business Service (2000). The VAT-registrations and 
VAT-deregistrations represent the number of enterprises registering and de-registering 
for VAT each year. Because there is a turnover threshold for VAT (£52,000 in 2000, for 
example), the very smallest one person businesses are excluded from the figures. The 
stock of VAT registered enterprises represents the number of enterprises registered for 
VAT at the start of the year.  
Employment: source and description 
The figures on employment are taken from the Census of Employment (until 1993) and 
the Annual Employment Survey (from 1995 onwards) and are supplied by Nomis. The 
employment figures only relate to employees. Self-employed workers and unpaid 
family workers are thus excluded from the data. The employment figures include both 
full-time and part-time employees, and relate to the situation in September of each year. 
Regional aggregation level and classification schemes 
The regional aggregation level employed in our data set is the British NUTS3 level. 
This is county level in England and Wales, and local authority region level in Scotland. 
We thus have data at the level of the 64 regions which are listed in Table 2 of Ashcroft 
et al. (1991, p. 397). In the period 1995-98, a local government reorganisation took 
place in Great Britain. The five tier NUTS level classification was reviewed, and the so-
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called unitary authorities (UAs) were introduced. As a result, geographical boundaries 
of some regions have changed. This implies that we have to adjust the data from before 
and after the reorganisation so that they become comparable (see Table 6.A2a). For the 
English regions, this is easy, since the data in the basic file are given in terms of both 
the new and the old regions (“former counties”). But for Wales and Scotland no 
variables for the period 1994-99 are given in terms of the old classification. Closer 
inspection of the boundaries of the unitary authorities reveals that the Scottish regions 
can remain unchanged but that some Welsh regions have to be aggregated into larger 
regions, due to overlapping “new” and “old” areas. In particular, the “old” counties 
Gwynedd, Clwyd, and Powys are combined into one region (which might be labeled 
North/Mid Wales), and the “old” counties Mid Glamorgan, South Glamorgan, and 
Gwent are also combined (South/East Wales). This implies that the total number of 
Welsh regions reduces from eight to four (Dyfed and West Glamorgan remain 
unchanged), and the total number of British regions in our data set from 64 to 60. These 
60 regions comprise 46 English counties, 4 Welsh regions, and 10 Scottish local 
authority regions. In the latter group of regions, the Orkney, Shetland and Western Isles 
are combined into one region. The 60 regions cover the whole of Great Britain.  
Sectoral aggregation level and classification schemes 
At the regional aggregation level described above, the four variables are all available at 
the sectoral 1-digit level. However, from Tables 6.A2a and 6.A2b, we see that three 
different sectoral classifications circulate: SIC68, SIC80, and SIC92. These 
classifications are all different, see Table 6.A3.  
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Table 6.A3: Three Standard Industrial Classifications: 1-digit level labels  
SIC68 
 
SIC80 SIC92 
- agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
0  agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
AB  agriculture; forestry 
and fishing 
- production 1  energy/water supply 
industries 
CE  mining and quarrying; 
electricity, gas and water 
supply 
- construction 2  extraction/manufacture: 
minerals/metals 
D  manufacturing 
- motor trades 3  metal goods/vehicle 
industries, etc 
F  construction 
- wholesale 4  other manufacturing 
industries 
G  wholesale, retail and 
repairs 
- retail 5  construction H  hotels and restaurants 
- catering 6  distribution, 
hotels/catering; repairs 
I  transport, storage and 
communication 
- transport and 
communication 
7  transport and 
communication 
J  financial intermediation 
- finance and professional 
services 
8  banking, finance, 
insurance, leasing, etc 
K  real estate, renting and 
business activities 
LO  public administration; 
other community, social 
and personal services 
- business and other  
personal services 
9  other services 
MN  education; health and 
social work 
Note: In this table, similarities in covered parts of the economy across columns are coincidental. 
As was the case for the regions, some sectors have to be combined to make sectors 
comparable across different SICs. This results in the six-sector classification in Table 
6.A4. In this table, corresponding parts of economic activity across SICs are in the same 
rows. By and large, there are no overlapping sectors in this six-sector classification. As 
mentioned earlier, we do not use the data for agriculture, forestry and fishing in our 
analyses.  
Table 6.A4: Link between SIC68-SIC80-SIC92 classifications (1-digit level) 
SIC68-sectors SIC80-sectors 
(codes) 
SIC92-sectors 
(codes) 
agriculture, forestry and fishing 0 AB 
production 1, 2, 3, 4 CDE 
construction 5 F 
trade and catering a 6 GH 
transport and communication 7 I 
other services b 8, 9 JKLMNO 
a  This is an aggregate of four SIC68 sectors: motor trades; wholesale; retail; catering. 
b This is an aggregate of two SIC68 sectors: finance and professional services; business and other 
personal services. 
To summarize, the EIM-data set for Great Britain contains the four variables startups, 
closures, number of enterprises and employment. Apart from some missing years for 
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employment, these variables are available on a yearly basis for the whole period 1980-
1999, at relatively disaggregated sectoral and spatial aggregation levels (6 sectors, 60 
regions), and according to uniform sectoral and regional classifications. 
6.A3 Appendix: The Almon method 105 
The Almon method is a reparameterization method that corrects for correlation between 
different time lags of an exogenous variable (distributed lags). Correlation between 
exogenous variables in a regression model is not desirable as it causes multicollinearity. 
This problem is often prevalent in the context of distributed lags. When the distributed 
lag variables are highly correlated, it is difficult to estimate individual response 
coefficients accurately and regular t-tests on the significance of individual parameter 
estimates are unreliable. The Almon method assumes that there is some “smoothness” 
in the lag distribution. By imposing a specific structure in the lag distribution, the 
multicollinearity problems inherent to free estimation can be solved. In particular, the 
Almon method suggests approximating the lag structure by a polynomial function. This 
is explained below. 
Suppose we have a model of the form represented by Equation (6.A1). 
 
(6.A1) tststtt uZXXXY ++++++= −− δβββα ...110 , 
 
where the X  variables are the distributed lags, with maximum lag length s , and Z  is 
a vector of other exogenous variables (either lagged or unlagged). It is clear that in 
our model the distributed lag variables correspond to the startup rate variables from 
the various periods. 
Due to high correlation between the X  variables with different lags, free estimation of 
(6.A1) suffers from multicollinearity. In the Almon method a “smooth” lag distribution 
is obtained by imposing restrictions on the parameter vector β . In particular, the Almon 
method suggests approximating the graph of iβ  against the lag length i  by a continuous 
function of the form 
 
(6.A2) sriii rri ≤++++= ;...2210 γγγγβ , 
 
where r  is the degree of the polynomial (6.A2) and s  is the maximum lag length.  
Imposing a structure like (6.A2) on the estimated parameters is implemented by 
estimating a restricted model. The restricted model is obtained by writing explicit 
expressions for (6.A2), and rearranging the distributed lag variables, as we will show 
below for our employment growth model. First, we establish the time periods that 
correspond to the lags 0, 1, ..., s . A straightforward application of our model suggests 
that lag 0 corresponds to the period 1991-1998, while the lags 1, 2, and 3 correspond to 
the periods 1987-1990, 1984-1987, and 1980-1983, respectively. So s  equals 3. Taking 
the mid years of these periods, i.e. 1988, 1985, and 1982, we see that in terms of 
Equation (6.A2), the values i =1, 2, and 3 correspond to time lags of 3, 6, and 9 years, 
                                                          
105 This appendix is based on Stewart (1991, pp. 180-182). 
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respectively, measured from 1991 backwards. In other words, one unit of i  corresponds 
to a lag length of three years. Second, we have not included a startup rate with lag 0 in 
our model, so 0β =0. This restriction reflects our argument that startup rates do not have 
an immediate (i.e. contemporaneous) effect on growth and inclusion of an unlagged 
startup rate in the model leads to problems of reversed causality. Third, we choose r =2, 
i.e. a quadratic polynomial form.106 Writing out (6.A2) with r =2, s =3, and 0β =0 
results in  
 
(6.A3) 21321221100 93;42;;0 γγβγγβγγβγβ +=+=+=≡=  
 
Substituting (6.A3) in (6.A1) and rearranging terms results in  
 
(6.A4) ( ) ( ) tttttttt uZXXXXXXY ++++++++= −−−−−− δγγα 32123211 9432  
Equation (6.A4) can be estimated using OLS. The (restricted) parameters of the startup 
rate variables are obtained by substituting the estimates of 1γ  and 2γ  back into Equation 
(6.A3). The corresponding standard errors are obtained using the ANALYZ command 
in TSP 4.5.  
To test the validity of the parameter restrictions imposed by the Almon method a 
standard F-test of the form  
 
(6.A5) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]knSrsSSF R −−−= //   
can be applied, where RS  and S  are the restricted and unrestricted residual sum of 
squares, respectively, r  is the degree of the polynomial (6.A2), s  is the maximum lag 
length in Equation (6.A1), n  is the number of observations, and k  is the number of 
regressors in the unrestricted model. Under the null hypothesis of valid restrictions, the 
test statistic under (6.A5) has an F  distribution with rs −  and kn −  degrees of 
freedom.  
In our first application, the number of restrictions rs −  equals 3-2=1, while the 
expression kn −  equals 59-18=41. The critical value of the F(1;41) distribution at 5% 
level is 4.1. From Table 6.4 we see that the value of the test statistic equals 0.062, so the 
null hypothesis of valid restrictions is not rejected.  
In our second application, where we put the employment impact of 1980-83 startups on 
employment growth 1991-98 equal to zero, the number of restrictions equals two. The 
extra restriction can be written as 03 =β . Substitution in Equation (6.A3) results in 
22121 2;3 γββγγ −==−= . So, the extra restriction also implies that the employment 
impacts of lags 1 and 2 (startups 1987-90 and 1984-87) are equal. Another implication 
is that the optimum lag is 1.5 (or 4.5 years). In this case the F-test statistic has an 
F(2;41) distribution (critical value 3.2). The test statistic equals 0.053. So, the restriction 
03 =β  is valid. 
                                                          
106 We consider a first degree polynomial (i.e. a straight line) too restrictive. 
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Chapter 7 
Total Entrepreneurial Activity Rates and Economic Growth 
Entrepreneurial activity is generally assumed to be an important aspect of the 
organization of industries most conducive to innovative activity and unrestrained 
competition. This chapter investigates whether total entrepreneurial activity influences 
GDP growth for a sample of 36 countries. We test whether this influence depends upon 
the level of economic development measured as GDP per capita. A range of alternative 
explanations for achieving economic growth is adjusted for by incorporating the Growth 
Competitiveness Index. We find that entrepreneurial activity affects economic growth, 
but that this effect depends upon the level of per capita income. This suggests that 
entrepreneurship plays a different role in countries in different stages of economic 
development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Van Stel, A.J., M.A. Carree and A.R. Thurik (2004), The Effect of Entrepreneurship on 
National Economic Growth: An Analysis Using the GEM Database, Paper 34-2004 
on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy, Jena: Max Planck Institute for 
Research into Economic Systems. 
A revised version is to be published in Small Business Economics. 
134 
7.1 Introduction 
There are many factors that influence the speed of economic progress. Such factors may 
include climate, education, property rights, saving propensity, presence of seaports, etc. 
The empirical growth literature has suggested a large number of economic and non-
economic variables that may influence economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1997 and 
Bleaney and Nishiyama, 2002). Entrepreneurship has failed to enter this list of variables 
(see e.g. Table 1 in Bleaney and Nishiyama, 2002). On the one hand, this is surprising 
since many economists would claim that entrepreneurial activity is vital to economic 
progress.107 They will, for example, refer to the demise of communist economies where 
entrepreneurial activity was about absent and contributions by Schumpeter (1934) and 
(neo-)Austrian economists (like Kirzner, 1973).108 On the other hand, it is less 
surprising since the measurement of the factor ‘entrepreneurship’ is far from easy. Most 
factors contributing to economic progress can be measured using existing secondary 
sources for a wide variety of countries. However, aside from self-employment 
measures, which are questionable measures of entrepreneurial activity, there were no 
sources up till recently to compare this activity across countries. The Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) has changed this. 
There are various ways in which entrepreneurship may affect economic growth. 
Entrepreneurs may introduce important innovations by entering markets with new 
products or production processes (Acs and Audretsch, 1990 and 2003). Entrepreneurs 
often play vital roles in the early evolution of industries, examples of such (successful 
American) entrepreneurs include Andrew Carnegie, Michael Dell, Thomas Edison, 
Henry Ford, Bill Gates, Ray Kroc and Sam Walton. Entrepreneurs may increase 
productivity by increasing competition (Nickel, 1996). They may enhance our 
knowledge of what is technically viable and what consumers prefer by introducing 
variations of existing products and services in the market. The resulting learning process 
speeds up the discovery of the dominant design for product-market combinations. 
Knowledge spillovers play an important role in this process (Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). Lastly, they may be inclined to work longer 
hours and more efficiently as their income is strongly linked to their working effort.  
In this chapter, we empirically investigate the effect of entrepreneurial activity on 
economic growth at the country level. We use recent and new material provided by the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). It contains the so-called Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rate measuring the relative amount of nascent 
entrepreneurs and business owners of young firms for a range of countries. This 
variable is (consistently) measured across a variety of countries and appears a useful 
                                                          
107 The recognition of the importance of entrepreneurial activity has been absent for a while in 
mainstream (theoretical) economics. Baumol (1968) complained that entrepreneurship, being hard to 
capture into mathematical equations, disappeared from mainstream (neo-classical) economics. Kirzner 
(1973) observed that the neo-classical model constrained the decision making of the entrepreneur, in 
terms of product quality and price, technology, within limits wholly alien to the context in which real 
world entrepreneurs characteristically operate. 
108 Schumpeter (1950, p. 13): “The function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of 
production by exploring an invention, or more generally, an untried technological possibility for 
producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way… To undertake such new things is 
difficult and constitutes a distinct economic function, first because they lie outside of the routine tasks 
which everybody understands, and secondly, because the environment resists in many ways.” 
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index for measuring the extent of ‘entrepreneurship’. An important element in our 
analysis is to consider whether entrepreneurial activity plays a similar growth-
stimulating role in highly developed economies (relatively rich countries) and in less 
developed economies (relatively poor countries, including both transformation 
economies and developing countries). Carree and Thurik (1999a), for example, indicate 
that the presence of small firms in manufacturing industries benefits growth for the 
richest among EU-countries, but not for EU-countries with somewhat lower GDP per 
capita, like Portugal and Spain. This is in line with the regime shift introduced by 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001). They argue that there has been a shift from a model of the 
‘managed economy’ towards that of the ‘entrepreneurial economy’ in highly developed 
economies.   
Our test of the influence of ‘entrepreneurship’ is based on a statistical analysis of 
whether Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) influences GDP growth in the 1999-2003 
period for a sample of 36 countries. We test whether this influence depends upon the 
level of economic development measured as GDP per capita. We also distinguish 
between the extent of influence of ‘entrepreneurship’ for three groups of countries, viz. 
highly developed economies, transition economies and developing countries. Although 
the limited number of observations does not allow for many competing explanatory 
variables, we include the so-called Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) into our model. 
This variable captures a range of alternative explanations for achieving sustained 
economic growth. In addition, we incorporate the initial level of economic development 
to correct for convergence.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 the relation between 
entrepreneurial activity and economic growth and its dependence on the stage of 
economic development are discussed and the TEA and GCI rates are introduced. In 
Section 7.3 we present our model and a description of the variables. Section 7.4 is used 
for results and Section 7.5 concludes. 
7.2 Entrepreneurship, competitiveness and growth 
There have been efforts to empirically investigate the importance of the impact of 
entrepreneurship on economic performance, especially at the firm, region or industry 
level (e.g. Audretsch, 1995, Audretsch and Fritsch, 2002 and Caves, 1998).109 However, 
contributions at the level of the nation state are limited. Two recent exceptions are 
studies into the effect of self-employment rates on economic growth figures: 
Blanchflower (2000) and Carree et al. (2002). Even in these cases it is questionable 
whether self-employment rates are an adequate measure of entrepreneurial activity. This 
chapter is a first attempt to investigate whether differences in the start-up activity and 
presence of young firms across countries has an impact on their economic performance. 
The last two decades have witnessed both large (conglomerate) companies to 
increasingly concentrate on core competences and experiencing mass lay-offs 
(especially in traditional manufacturing industries) and high-technology innovative 
small firms having come at the forefront of technological development in many (new) 
                                                          
109 See Carree and Thurik (2003) for a survey of studies of the impact of entrepreneurship on growth at 
various levels of observation. 
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industries. These developments would suggest the key importance for modern economy 
of a sound entrepreneurial climate to achieve economic progress. In particular, 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) have argued that highly developed economies have 
experienced a shift from a model of the ‘managed economy’ towards that of the 
‘entrepreneurial economy’. The model of the ‘managed economy’ is the political, social 
and economic response to an economy dictated by the forces of large-scale production, 
reflecting the predominance of the production factors of capital and (unskilled) labor as 
the sources of competitive advantage. By contrast, the model of the ‘entrepreneurial 
economy’ is the political, social and economic response to an economy dictated not just 
by the dominance of the production factor of knowledge – which Romer (1990, 1994) 
and Lucas (1988) identified as replacing the more traditional factors as the source of 
competitive advantage – but also by a very different, but complementary, factor they 
had overlooked: the presence of entrepreneurial activity to accommodate knowledge 
spillovers (see Acs and Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). 
The transition as described by Audretsch and Thurik (2001) can also be described in 
more ‘Schumpeterian’ terms.110 In Schumpeter (1934) the role of the entrepreneur as 
prime cause of economic development is emphasized. Schumpeter describes how the 
innovating entrepreneur challenges incumbent firms by introducing new inventions that 
make current technologies and products obsolete. This process of creative destruction is 
the main characteristic of what has been called the Schumpeter Mark I regime. In 
Schumpeter (1950) the focus is on innovative activities by large and established firms. 
Schumpeter describes how large firms outperform their smaller counterparts in the 
innovation and appropriation process through a strong positive feedback loop from 
innovation to increased R&D activities. This process of creative accumulation is the 
main characteristic of what has been called the Schumpeter Mark II regime. The extent 
to which either of the two Schumpeterian technological regimes prevails in a certain 
period and industry varies. It may depend upon the nature of knowledge required to 
innovate, the opportunities of appropriability, the degree of scale (dis)economies, the 
institutional environment, the importance of absorptive capacity, demand variety, etc. 
Industries in a Schumpeter Mark II regime are likely to develop a more concentrated 
market structure in contrast to industries in a Schumpeter Mark I regime where small 
firms will proliferate. The distinction between the Schumpeter Mark I versus Mark II 
regimes is closely related to that of the ‘entrepreneurial’ versus ‘managed’ economy. 
These discussions suggest that the role and importance of entrepreneurial ventures may 
differ from one stage of economic development to another. Theoretical support for this 
idea is given by Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) who describe how an economy goes 
through various stages of economic development. Therefore, we should be careful in 
comparing countries in different stages of economic development. For example, high 
start-up rates in developing countries could be less a sign of economic strength when 
compared to such rates in highly developed economies. That is, a far smaller percentage 
of these start-ups in developing countries when compared to rich countries may develop 
into high-growth companies generating substantial value added. In particular, average 
human capital levels of entrepreneurs may differ between countries (shopkeepers versus 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs). High start-up rates, reported in individual surveys, may 
be a sign of a substantial ‘informal sector’ in developing countries, not being a 
characteristic of an economy in progress. The main argument of this chapter is that the 
                                                          
110 Other terms are also possible, like the transition from the fourth to the fifth Kondratiev wave (Freeman 
and Perez, 1988). 
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impact of ‘entrepreneurship’ on growth is different for countries at different stages of 
development. For highly developed countries we expect a positive impact of 
entrepreneurial activity on subsequent economic performance. For relatively poor 
countries it is more uncertain what high start-up rates stand for, in terms of an industrial 
organization conducive to innovation and economic growth. 
Countries, even in similar stages of economic development, differ strongly in the rates 
of entrepreneurial activity. The GEM Global Executive Reports show large differences 
between countries like Japan, France, Belgium and Sweden with low entrepreneurial 
activity and countries like the U.S., Canada, Australia and South Korea with high 
entrepreneurial activity. Some developing countries like Thailand and India top the list 
of countries with high entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurial activity is correlated 
with the self-employment rate (see e.g. Table I in Carree et al., 2002 and Table 2.1 in 
Audretsch et al., 2002b). However, there are exceptions to this rule. Japan, for example, 
has self-employment rates that are relatively close to those of the U.S. However, the 
new entry rate is far smaller in Japan, where there are many (inefficient) small 
establishments in the retail and wholesale sectors. Carree et al. (2002) show that 
countries may not only have too few self-employed, but may also have too many. Italy 
is given as an example for the latter situation.111  
In case entrepreneurial activity would be important for economic progress, we should 
find countries that are high on the list of countries ranked in terms of this activity to also 
grow relatively fast. The usual ceteris paribus condition applies here since there are 
many other factors that may explain economic progress. These include factors like 
schooling, inflation, investment in fixed assets, climate, institutional quality and 
property rights. It is important to gain insight in alternative explanations for economic 
growth next to entrepreneurial activity.  
In the present section we will discuss our two key variables, the TEA rate capturing 
elements of ‘entrepreneurial energy’ and the GCI rate encompassing a range of 
alternative explanatory variables.  
Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) 
Data on total entrepreneurial activity are taken from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) Adult Population Survey. This database contains various 
entrepreneurial measures that are constructed on the basis of surveys of -on average- 
some 3,000 respondents per country (37 countries in 2002). The total entrepreneurial 
activity rate (TEA) is defined as that percent of adult population (18-64 years old) that 
is either actively involved in starting a new venture or the owner/manager of a business 
that is less than 42 months old (Reynolds et al., 2002). In 2002 the TEA rate (per 100 
adults) ranges from values above 15 in Chile, Thailand and India, to 10.5 in the United 
States, to values below four in Russia, Belgium, France, Japan, Croatia and Hong Kong. 
See Appendix 1. For most countries, TEA rates in 2002 are lower than in 2001 due to a 
universal decline in economic growth rates in 2002 compared to 2001. The relative 
rankings between countries remained quite stable though (Reynolds et al., 2002). For 
the 28 countries that participated in GEM both in 2001 and in 2002, the rank correlation 
(Spearman’s ρ statistic) is 0.8. This indicates that total entrepreneurial activity may be 
seen as a structural characteristic of an economy. This makes the variable suitable for 
                                                          
111 See also Van Stel and Carree (2004) who distinguish between the manufacturing and service sector.  
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inclusion in models aiming to explain structural growth such as the model that we 
estimate in this chapter.  
Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
The Growth Competitiveness framework is employed by the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). A central objective of the GCR is to assess the 
capacity of the world’s economies to achieve sustained economic growth. In the GCR 
this is done by analyzing the extent to which individual national economies have the 
structures, institutions, and policies in place for economic growth over the medium term 
(McArthur and Sachs, 2002). These features of national economies are summarized in 
the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI). The GCR identifies three inter-related 
mechanisms involved in economic growth: efficient division of labor, capital 
accumulation (including human capital), and technological advance. Concerning the 
last-mentioned mechanism, a distinction is made between the creation of new 
technologies (technological innovation) and the adoption of technologies that have been 
developed abroad (technology transfer). In the GCR framework technological 
innovation is seen as the most important factor for achieving long-term economic 
growth. In this connection the GCR distinguishes between core economies (countries 
that are technological innovators) and non-core economies.112 The core economies are 
typically the richest countries. It is argued that economic growth is achieved in different 
ways in these two types of economies. In core economy countries, growth is powered 
by their capacity to innovate and to win new global markets for their technologically 
advanced products (technological innovation). High growth rates of non-core economies 
are often achieved by rapidly absorbing the advanced technologies and capital of the 
core economies, for example through high levels of foreign direct investment from 
high-tech multinationals of the core economies (technology transfer). This type of 
growth process is sometimes also called “catch-up growth”.  
Besides technology, two other major pillars of growth are identified in the Growth 
Competitiveness framework: the quality of public institutions and the macro-economic 
environment. Institutions are crucial for their role in ensuring the protection of property 
rights, the objective resolution of contract and other legal disputes, and the transparency 
of government. All these factors are important for achieving an efficient division of 
labor. Public institutions are also important for establishing societal stability required to 
achieve economic growth. The macro-economic environment relates to government 
monetary and fiscal policies and stability of financial institutions. It involves such 
things as budget balance, modest taxation, high rates of national savings and a realistic 
level of the exchange rate that preserves the competitiveness of the export sector. Again, 
these factors are important conditions for achieving capital accumulation and an 
efficient division of labor which in turn influence economic growth. 
In the GCR the growth potential of economies is measured by the Growth 
Competitiveness Index (GCI). This index aims to “measure the capacity of the national 
economy to achieve sustained economic growth over the medium term, controlling for 
the current level of economic development” (McArthur and Sachs, 2002). The GCI 
reflects the three major pillars of economic growth identified in the GCR framework: 
technology, public institutions, and the macroeconomic environment. It is argued that 
                                                          
112 A country is defined to be a core economy if it achieves at least 15 US utility patents per million 
population. Twenty-four countries met this criterion in 2000. 
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these factors play different roles at different stages of economic development, and 
therefore these factors (or sub-indexes) get different relative weights in constructing the 
overall GCI index for economies at different stages of development. In particular, for 
the so-called core economies identified in GCR the technology sub-index gets a higher 
weight compared to the non-core economies. This is because technology is the main 
source of competitiveness in modern economies. Likewise, within the technology sub-
index, innovation gets a higher relative weight compared to technology transfer in the 
core economies. For the construction of the GCI information from ‘hard’ data sources 
(international statistics) and information from the GCR Executive Opinion Survey are 
combined.113  
The GCI tries to capture factors determining economic growth. In a test regression for 
75 countries, McArthur and Sachs (2002) show that the 2001 GCI indeed has a 
significantly positive influence on economic growth over the period 1992-2000, while 
controlling for the catch-up effect as measured by initial income level of countries. This 
supports the view that the GCI indeed captures important factors determining the 
capacity of national economies to grow. However, a disadvantage of this approach is 
that the GCI is used to explain past growth instead of future growth, resulting in a clear 
direction of causality problem. In this chapter, we try to solve this causality problem.  
7.3 Model and data 
In this section we discuss our data and present our model. We make use of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), and 
other sources. Data on four basic variables are used in our model: total entrepreneurial 
activity, growth of GDP, per capita income, and the growth competitiveness index. The 
sources and definitions of these variables are listed below. 
Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA). Data on total entrepreneurial activity are taken 
from the GEM Adult Population Survey for 2002.  
Growth of GDP ( GDP∆ ). GDP growth rates are taken from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook database of the International Monetary Fund, version September 2003. 
Per capita income (GNIC). Gross national income per capita 2001 is expressed in 
(thousands of) purchasing power parities per US$, and these data are taken from the 
2002 World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. 
Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI). Data on the GCI 2001 are taken from page 32 of 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. The variable was described in Section 
7.2. 
In this chapter we investigate whether entrepreneurship may be considered a 
determinant of economic growth, next to technology, public institutions and the 
macroeconomic environment (which are captured in a combined way by the GCI). As 
both entrepreneurship and the factors underlying the GCI are assumed to be structural 
                                                          
113 The Executive Opinion Survey is a survey among firms within countries. The goal of the survey is to 
capture a broad array of intangible factors that cannot be found in official statistics but that nonetheless 
may influence the growth potential of countries. For details, see Cornelius and McArthur (2002). 
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characteristics of an economy, we do not want to explain short term economic growth 
but rather growth in the medium term. Therefore we choose average annual growth over 
a period of five years (1999-2003) as the dependent variable in this study.  
We stay close to the model of McArthur and Sachs (2002) who explain national growth 
rates over the period 1992-2000 by the GCI, and (the log of) initial income level of 
countries (catch-up effect). We add two new features to this model. First, we include 
the total entrepreneurial activity rate from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor as an 
additional determinant. Second, we try to solve the causality problem that arises by 
measuring growth rates in periods preceding the measurement of the GCI. We are not 
entirely successful in this respect since our dependent variable is measured over the 
1999-2003 period and the GCI is measured in 2001. Furthermore, we include a lagged 
dependent variable (i.e. lagged growth rates) as an explanatory variable to limit the 
potential impact of reversed causality (see also footnote 85). 
As mentioned, we assume that the impact of entrepreneurial activity is dependent upon 
the stage of economic development. TEA rates may reflect different types of 
entrepreneurs in countries with different development levels. There are two ways in 
which this hypothesis is tested. The first approach is to include an interaction term of 
the total entrepreneurial activity rate and per capita income. The model estimated is as 
follows (i is country index): 
(7.1) 
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The hypothesis is then that the value of c is positive. Alternatively, the effect of TEA 
for different groups of countries (rich versus poor; rich versus transformation versus 
developing) can be distinguished, this means that the interaction term is substituted for 
(A and B are groups of countries): 
(7.2) ittititi
B
ti
A
tiit GDPfeGCIGNICdcTEAbTEAaGDP ε+∆+++++=∆ −−−−− 1,1,1,1,1, )log(  
In case A is the group of relatively rich countries (and B the group of relatively poor 
countries), our hypothesis is that the value of b is larger than that of c.  
7.4 Results 
Regression results are presented in Table 7.1. The regressions use data for the 37 
countries that participated in GEM 2002, minus Croatia.114 These regressions use TEA 
2002 as entrepreneurship measure. The countries participating in GEM 2002 are listed 
in the Appendix to this chapter. There are five countries that we classify as transition 
economies, viz. China, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. There are seven 
countries that we classify as developing countries, viz. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, 
                                                          
114 Croatia is excluded because the Growth Competitiveness Index is not available. 
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Mexico, South Africa and Thailand. Eleven of these twelve countries are classified as 
(relatively) poor, the exception being Slovenia.115 
All model specifications in Table 7.1 use initial income and lagged growth as control 
variables. We present results for a model including the growth competitiveness index 
only (Model 1), a model including the GCI and a linear TEA term (Model 2), a model 
including GCI, TEA and the interaction term of TEA and per capita income (Equation 
(7.1), Model 3), a model including GCI, TEA for the twenty-five (relatively) rich 
countries and TEA for the eleven (relatively) poor countries (Equation (7.2), Model 4) 
and a model including GCI, TEA for the twenty-four highly developed countries (the 
rich countries except Slovenia), TEA for the five transition economies and TEA for the 
seven developing countries (Model 5).116    
In each of the models we find a negative effect of initial income (logarithm of GNIC), 
confirming a catch-up effect, and a positive effect of the GCI. The positive effect of the 
GCI is not significant, though. When we compare Model 2 to Model 1 we find that the 
addition of only a linear TEA term decreases the adjusted R2. The effect is also not 
significant. The addition of a linear term in combination with the interaction term 
increases the adjusted R2 considerably, compared to specifications using GCI only. The 
interaction term has the expected positive effect and this is significant at the 10% 
significance level.117 Hence, the impact of entrepreneurial activity increases with per 
capita income. The impact can be written as GNIC021.428. +− . This expression has 
value zero for a per capita income level of about 20,000 US$. Hence, only beyond this 
level, increasing levels of entrepreneurial activity benefit economic growth. For 
comparison, 20 out of the 36 countries in our data set have a 2001 per capita income 
level that is higher than 20,000 US$.118 
                                                          
115 The richest of the eleven relatively poor countries is Hungary with a 2001 per capita income of 12,570 
US $. The poorest of the twenty-five relatively rich countries is Taiwan with a 2001 per capita income of 
16,761 US $. Hence, there is a clear gap in between the two groups of countries in term of GNIC. 
Slovenia has a 2001 per capita income of 18,160 US $.  
116 Note that our specification in Models 4 and 5 is equivalent to including the variable TEA and slope 
dummies for rich countries (Model 4) or for transition and highly developed countries (Model 5). We 
choose to present coefficients and t-values in deviation from zero instead of presenting estimation results 
in deviation from a reference group. Furthermore, we assume a constant in Equation (7.2) equal for each 
of the groups of countries. In case the constant is assumed different for rich and poor countries, the 
difference of the effect of entrepreneurial activity between the rich and poor country groups remains 
significant. However, in case the constant is assumed different for the three groups of countries (highly 
developed, transition, developing), the difference of the effect of entrepreneurial activity between the 
groups fails to be significant. Likelihood ratio tests reveal that Model 2 (which has a log likelihood value 
of 96.5) is rejected in favour of a specification assuming the constant to be identical across the three 
groups of countries (but having different effects of entrepreneurial activity), but also in favour of a 
specification assuming identical effects of entrepreneurial activity (but having different constants). 
However, the log likelihood value of the former specification is higher (106.0 versus 105.3). Hence, we 
have decided to present these results. The evidence for the three groups of countries should however be 
interpreted with care. 
117 The correlation between TEA and the interaction term TEA*GNIC is only 0.35 suggesting no 
problems of multicollinearity. 
118 Spain is closest to the critical value with a 2001 per capita income of 20,150 US$. 
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Table 7.1:  Estimation results of Equations (7.1) and (7.2) over period 1999-2003 (36 
observations) 
 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
 
constant    0.011   0.018   0.098   0.105**  0.076 
    (0.2)   (0.4)   (1.5)   (2.2)   (1.5) 
 
TEA     -0.058  -0.428 
      (0.5)   (1.6) 
 
TEA*GNIC       0.021*   
        (1.9) 
 
TEA rich          0.161* 
          (1.8) 
 
TEA poor         -0.267* 
          (2.0) 
 
TEA highly dev.          0.188** 
            (2.1) 
 
TEA transition          0.080 
            (0.5) 
 
TEA developing         -0.183 
            (1.4) 
 
log (GNIC)    -0.025  -0.028  -0.060** -0.052** -0.041** 
    (1.5)   (1.3)   (2.1)   (2.5)   (2.3) 
 
GCI    0.017   0.018   0.021   0.014   0.013 
    (0.9)   (0.9)   (1.2)   (1.0)   (0.9) 
 
lag GDP growth  0.013   0.031   0.006   0.003  -0.059 
    (0.0)   (0.1)   (0.0)   (0.0)   (0.2) 
 
R2    0.212   0.224   0.363   0.512   0.543 
 
adj. R2    0.138   0.124   0.257   0.430   0.448 
Note: Absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values are between brackets. TEA is total entrepreneurial 
activity rate (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor), GCI is growth competitiveness index 2001 (Growth 
Competitiveness Report), GNIC is per capita income of 2001. Lagged GDP growth is average annual growth of 
GDP over the period 1994-1998. ** Significant at 0.05 level. * Significant at 0.10 level. 
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The two models in which the effect of TEA is allowed to be different for two or three 
groups of countries perform much better than Model 3 in terms of adjusted R2. The 
effect of TEA is found to be significantly positive for the relatively rich countries, while 
it is found to be significantly negative for the relatively poor countries. Model 5 shows 
that the latter effect is mainly due to the developing countries and not so much the 
transition economies. For the highly developed economies the effect of TEA is 
significant at the 5%-confidence interval. The fact that Models 4 and 5 provide a much 
better fit than Model 3 suggests that the impact of entrepreneurial activity does not 
change in a continuous way over the course of economic development, but is different 
in different stages of development (comprising broad ranges of GDP per capita). 
However, the results should be interpreted with care given the small number of 
countries (especially the transition and developing economies). In addition, the analysis 
has a cross-sectional nature and does not follow countries over the entire range of 
economic development.  
The effect of entrepreneurial activity is significant even after correcting for the GCI. 
This suggests that the two effects are complementary. The additional positive impact of 
entrepreneurship in highly developed economies may be caused by various factors. It 
may indicate that entrepreneurial activity is important in the process of the 
commercialization of new (technological) knowledge. It may also indicate that 
entrepreneurial activity is important for a healthy development of the business 
population. Eliasson (1995) shows that the absence of new entrants is expected to have 
a negative impact on the economic performance of the Swedish economy after about 
two decades. New firms are important in the introduction of various (non-technological) 
innovations and they may also serve as a vehicle of increased work effort since the 
reward for entrepreneurs is likely to be more effort-dependent than for employees. 
Entrepreneurs may also be more likely than incumbent firms to enter (or even create) 
new industries. The history of the software- and biotech-industries shows the 
importance of new firms in the early phases of the industry evolution. 
Because our entrepreneurship data are from 2002, and we want to measure the impact 
on medium term growth, we cannot avoid that the periods for which we measure 
economic growth and entrepreneurship partly overlap. This makes it difficult to assess 
the correct direction of causality. Therefore we have estimated various model 
specifications in which the lengths of the growth periods vary from two to five years. 
We also varied the most recent year for which we measure growth (2002 or 2003). This 
is because 2003 is a growth projection instead of a realization. Results of these exercises 
are presented in an early version of this chapter (Van Stel et al., 2004). The results 
imply that the longer the growth period, the less strong the business cycle effect (effect 
of lagged growth) is. For five-year periods the business cycle effect is almost absent and 
this may indicate that the length of the average business cycle is about five years. 
Obviously, for shorter periods the effect of the lagged dependent variable is stronger, 
leaving less room for the other variables to contribute to explained variation in growth 
rates. However, the general pattern is the same throughout all estimations. There is a 
positive effect on growth of GCI and an effect of TEA that increases with per capita 
income. Therefore we feel that our results are quite robust. 
7.5 Discussion 
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Entrepreneurship fails to be a well documented factor in the empirical growth literature 
because of difficulties defining and measuring entrepreneurship. The investigation of 
the impact of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth has been one of the main 
justifications of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project. In the present chapter we 
have critically analyzed whether the acclaimed impact of the Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) rate on economic growth stands the test of adding competing variables. 
There is an impact but not a simple linear one of the TEA rate on GDP-growth. We find 
that the TEA rate has a negative effect for the relatively poor countries, while it has a 
positive effect for the relatively rich countries.119 The results show that entrepreneurship 
matters. However, the effect of entrepreneurial activity on growth is not straightforward 
and can possibly be interpreted using the distinction between the Schumpeter Mark I 
versus Mark II regimes or the ‘entrepreneurial’ versus ‘managed’ economy.  
Most of the 20th century can be described as a period of accumulation. From the Second 
Industrial Revolution till at least the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s the 
large firm share was on the rise in most industries and the economy as a whole. It was 
the period of “scale and scope” (Chandler, 1990). It was the era of the hierarchical 
industrial firm growing progressively larger through exploiting economies of scale and 
scope in areas like production, distribution, marketing and R&D. The period has the 
characteristics of the Schumpeter Mark II regime. However, by the end of the 20th 
century things seemed to have changed (Carree et al., 2002). The results of the present 
study provide some support for such a regime switch. Even so, the small number of 
observations and the specificity of the time period under investigation do not allow for 
too strong conclusions. 
A striking result of our study is the negative impact of entrepreneurship on GDP growth 
for developing countries. The result that poorer countries fail to benefit from 
entrepreneurial activity does not imply that entrepreneurship should be discouraged in 
these countries. Instead, it may be an indication that there are not enough larger 
companies present in these countries. Large firms play an important role in the 
transformation process from a developing economy to a developed economy. Through 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope they are able to produce medium-tech 
products. Many local workers may be employed by the large firms and by training on 
the job these local workers may become more productive compared to when they would 
                                                          
119 As explained in Chapter 1, the results from the current chapter are consistent with those of Chapter 2 
concerning the different impact of entrepreneurship in economies of different stages of economic 
development. However, there are also some important differences. First, while Chapter 2 uses a model for 
a set of countries which are followed over time (i.e. a panel is used), this chapter uses a model for a set of 
countries at one point in time only (i.e. a cross-section is used). Hence, in Chapter 2 low incomes of 
countries partly refer to low incomes in earlier years, when technology was less advanced. However, 
given the state of technology at the time, the countries in the data set were among the most developed. To 
the contrary, low income countries in this chapter refer to countries lagging behind in economic 
development compared to other countries at the same point in time. In both situations large firms are 
important for achieving economic growth, but for different reasons. In Chapter 2 low incomes are 
associated with earlier points in time when large firms were important in creating new technology 
(Schumpeter Mark II regime or ‘managed’ economy). In this chapter low incomes refer to countries 
lagging behind at a recent point in time. In this situation large firms are important for their role in 
transfering existing technology to the poorer countries. Their role in creating new technology is less 
important though. A second difference is that the countries included in the model of this chapter show a 
higher variation in per capita income levels, compared to Chapter 2. In particular, a number of developing 
countries is included in the GEM data base, making the difference in estimated effects between low and 
high income countries more pronounced. 
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run a small store and struggle to survive as an “entrepreneur”. Furthermore, in the 
proximity of large firms, smaller firms may also flourish, as they may act as suppliers 
for large firms (outsourcing) and may learn a lot of the large companies.  
A second possible explanation for the negative effect in poorer countries is that the 
entrepreneurs have lower human capital levels compared to entrepreneurs in developed 
countries, as we hypothesized earlier. It is likely that the negative effect reflects the 
presence of many “marginal” entrepreneurs (shopkeepers) in small crafts who may be 
more productive as wage-earner in a bigger firm. To the contrary, in developed 
countries TEA may reflect more innovative entrepreneurs in new sectors (for instance 
software companies). Of course, the human capital levels of the entrepreneurs cannot be 
identified from the TEA variable, which hampers interpretation. For poorer countries, 
even if there are not many large firms and also not many people with high human 
capital levels, it may still be wise to encourage entrepreneurship if the alternative is 
unemployment. But perhaps entrepreneurship is not as productive then as in the 
presence of large firms. Small and large firms often complement each other (Rothwell, 
1983; Nooteboom, 1994; Freeman and Perez, 1988). It suggests that developing 
countries can benefit considerably from foreign direct investment by MNCs since this 
also increases potential economic contribution of local entrepreneurial activity. 
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7.A Appendix: Participating countries in GEM  
In this appendix we list the countries that participate in the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 2002. These are 37 countries. Croatia is excluded from the regressions because 
the Growth Competitiveness Index is not available for this country. The table also 
contains the values for the Total Entrepreneurial Activity index for 2002. 
 
Table 7.A: Countries participating in GEM, with values for TEA in 2002 
  1. United States (US) 0.105 20. Chile (CL) 0.157 
  2. Russia (RU) 0.025 21. Australia (AU) 0.087 
  3. South Africa (ZA) 0.065 22. New Zealand (NZ) 0.140 
  4. The Netherlands (NL) 0.046 23. Singapore (SG) 0.059 
  5. Belgium (BE) 0.030 24. Thailand (TH) 0.189 
  6. France (FR) 0.032 25. Japan (JP) 0.018 
  7. Spain (ES) 0.046 26. Korea (KR) 0.145 
  8. Hungary (HU) 0.066 27. China (CH) 0.123 
  9. Italy (IT) 0.059 28. India (IN) 0.179 
10. Switzerland (SW) 0.071 29. Canada (CA) 0.088 
11. United Kingdom (UK) 0.054 30. Ireland (IE) 0.091 
12. Denmark (DK) 0.065 31. Iceland (IS) 0.113 
13. Sweden (SE) 0.040 32. Finland (FI) 0.046 
14. Norway (NO) 0.087 33. Croatia (HR) 0.036 
15. Poland (PL) 0.044 34. Slovenia (SL) 0.046 
16. Germany (DE) 0.052 35. Hong Kong (HK) 0.034 
17. Mexico (MX) 0.124 36. Taiwan (TW) 0.043 
18. Argentina (AR) 0.142 37. Israel (IL) 0.071 
19. Brazil (BR) 0.135   
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Chapter 8 
Business Dynamics and Employment Growth 
This chapter examines the relationship between business dynamics (entry and exit of 
firms) and employment growth at the country-industry level. We use a cross-country 
data set with harmonized data on numbers of entries and exits for a selection of fast-
growing and innovative industries in six developed economies. In our regression 
analysis we allow for separate effects of both the extent of business dynamics (volatility 
of firms) and the composition of business dynamics (net-entry of firms). We also test for 
the existence of an ‘optimal’ level of business volatility, possibly indicating that entry 
and exit levels are too high in certain industries. We find positive employment effects of 
net-entry rates and volatility rates. These effects are found to be considerably stronger 
for manufacturing compared to services. We find no evidence for an ‘optimal’ level of 
business volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Van Stel, A.J. and B.J. Diephuis (2004), Business Dynamics and Employment Growth: 
A Cross-Country Analysis, Paper 32-2004 on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public 
Policy, Jena: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems. 
The chapter will also appear in Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 2004, published 
by the Arthur M. Blank Center for Entrepreneurship at Babson College, MA. 
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8.1 Introduction  
Several studies argue that in the last 25 years the innovative advantage has moved from 
large, established enterprises to small and new firms, because new technologies have 
reduced the importance of scale economies in many sectors (e.g. Meijaard, 2001). Also, 
an increasing degree of uncertainty in the world economy from the 1970s onwards has 
created more room for innovative entry (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). New firms 
challenge incumbent firms by introducing new inventions that crowd out current 
technologies and products. In Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction not only 
entries are important but also exits. A high number of exits in an industry might reflect a 
process of intensive competition, i.e. less-competitive incumbent firms being displaced 
by new firms. After exiting the market, the human and physical capital that was present 
in the displaced firms can be allocated more productively elsewhere in the economic 
process. Hence, both entry and exit are important aspects of business dynamics and both 
aspects may contribute to the economic performance of an industry. 
A commonly used measure of the extent of business dynamics in an industry is 
turbulence, defined as the sum of entries and exits scaled on some measure of the size of 
the industry. Several authors study the effect of turbulence on industry performance 
(e.g. Bosma and Nieuwenhuijsen, 2002). However, a pitfall of these studies is that the 
composition of turbulence is not taken into account: the separate numbers of entries and 
exits are not distinguished. This is important as the impacts of firm births and firm 
deaths are fundamentally different. For instance, the direct effect is positive for firm 
births and negative for firm deaths. The indirect effect (effect on incumbent firms) is 
also different.  
In the current chapter we analyse the effect of business dynamics on employment 
growth at the country-industry level, allowing for separate effects of both the extent and 
the composition of business dynamics. The extent of business dynamics is an adjusted 
measure of turbulence, called volatility, while the composition is measured as net-entry 
(entry minus exit). Using both these measures enables to distinguish between situations 
of high net-entry and low volatility, possibly indicating high survival rates, and 
situations of low net-entry and high volatility, possibly indicating lower survival rates 
but more fierce competition (displacement). As these situations may have very different 
implications for economic growth, it is important to measure the effects of net-entry and 
volatility separately. 
The current chapter claims to make three advances on prior work. First, we make a 
distinction between the extent and the composition of business dynamics and include 
measures for both these aspects of business dynamics in a multiple regression model 
explaining employment growth. Second, we use a unique cross-country data set with 
harmonized data on numbers of entries and exits for a specific selection of fast-growing 
and innovative industries. It may be argued that the impact of business dynamics on 
growth is particularly important for these industries. Third, we test for the existence of 
an ‘optimal’ level of business dynamics. Such an optimal level might exist in certain 
industries if entry and exit levels are too high, possibly indicating that survival 
probabilities of new firms are too low. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 8.2 we give an overview of the 
theory and earlier work. Section 8.3 provides a discussion of the pros and cons of 
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various business dynamics indicators. Next, we present our data and discuss our model. 
Results are presented in Section 8.5, while the final section is used for discussion. 
8.2 Theory and earlier empirical findings 120 
The role of business dynamics (entry and exit of firms) in economic development was 
first studied by Schumpeter (1934). According to his theory of creative destruction, 
growth, innovation and business dynamics are inherently connected. The economy 
develops through a process of competition and selection. Firms gain an advantage 
through innovation and in doing so they achieve excess profits, which encourages 
imitation and entry. As a result, average profits drop and the firms are stimulated to 
innovate again. As not all firms have the ability to innovate, selection occurs. From this 
point of view the entry of new firms is essential because entrants bring with them new 
ideas, methods and products. Besides, they may force incumbents to perform better 
because of intensified competition.121 Hence, the newcomers do not have to be 
successful themselves in order to contribute to economic development. As far as entry 
induces improvements on the side of the incumbents, it generates positive effects for the 
economy even if the new businesses fail and have to exit the market soon after entry 
(Fritsch and Mueller, 2004). Exiting firms are also important because they create room 
for new entries. Hence, exiting firms may also contribute to economic growth although 
their contribution is indirect. In sum Schumpeter states that a high level of business 
dynamics contributes to economic growth because of its role in selection and 
innovation. 
Several studies have investigated the impact of business dynamics on economic growth. 
However, the empirical evidence is mixed. This may be caused by the use of different 
measures for business dynamics as well as for economic growth (Fritsch and Mueller, 
2004). Furthermore, the relationship may change over time. Most studies use the 
regional gross startup rate (number of startups scaled on some measure of the size of the 
region) as measure of business dynamics. Positive associations between this measure of 
business dynamics and regional employment change are found for the United States by 
Reynolds (1999) and Acs and Armington (2004). Ashcroft and Love (1996) find a 
positive effect for Great Britain in the 1980s. However, Van Stel and Storey (2004), 
investigating the same relationship for Great Britain, find no such positive effect for the 
1980s. Moreover, for one region, the North East of England, they find a negative effect. 
For the 1990s however, Van Stel and Storey do find a significantly positive effect of the 
number of startups on regional employment change in Great Britain. Audretsch and 
Fritsch (2002) find similar results for West-Germany: no effect in the 1980s and a 
positive effect in the 1990s. The above findings illustrate that there is no consensus in 
the empirical literature about the exact nature of the relationship.  
                                                          
120 The first paragraph of this section is based on Bosma and Nieuwenhuijsen (2002). 
121 For instance, incumbents imitate innovations made by new firms. The incumbent firms are also 
stimulated to innovate themselves. Furthermore, to resist the threat of startups, incumbents lower their 
prices, which, in turn, increases demand for products and services. An overview of the various ways in 
which incumbents are influenced by startups is provided by Verhoeven (2004). He also presents a 
scenario analysis of how startups may affect aggregate labor productivity, taking into account both direct 
and indirect effects (influence on incumbents). 
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A further reason for the mixed results between different studies, even when the same 
countries and the same periods are investigated, may be the different modelling of the 
time lag involved in the relationship between business dynamics and economic growth. 
It takes time for new firms to actually contribute to economic growth. According to 
Caves (1998) turnover from entry and exit makes only a small contribution to economic 
performance of industries in the short run, but the contribution of entry-exit turnover is 
far more important in the long run. Two aspects are involved here. First, it may take a 
new firm a couple of years to expand. Second, it also takes time to become competitive 
enough to actually challenge the incumbent firms, forcing the latter to perform better.122 
Hence, it may be important to account for a considerable time lag when modelling the 
relationship. Whereas in most studies the relationship is examined either with no time-
lag or with only a short period lag, two recent studies explicitly investigate the time lag 
of the effect of new firm formation on regional employment change. Van Stel and 
Storey (2004) report that the effect of new firms is strongest after five years for Great 
Britain, while Fritsch and Mueller (2004) report an optimal lag of eight years for West-
Germany.  
Although most studies investigate the relationship between business dynamics and 
economic growth at the economy-wide level, some studies investigate the relationship 
also at the sectoral level. For instance, Bosma and Nieuwenhuijsen (2002) investigate 
the impact of turbulence (sum of entries and exits) on growth of total factor productivity 
for Dutch regions in the period 1988-1996. They find a positive effect for services and 
no effect for manufacturing. Acs and Armington (2004) find a similar result for regions 
in the United States in the period 1991-1996. According to Geroski (1995) entry is not 
important for employment growth in manufacturing. 
Because of these observed differences between services and manufacturing, these 
sectors will be studied separately in this chapter. For a more extensive overview of the 
empirical evidence we refer to Carree and Thurik (2003) and Verhoeven (2004). 
8.3 Measuring business dynamics 
Both entries and exits are important aspects of business dynamics. New-firm startups 
(entries) contribute to economic growth by increasing competition and introducing new 
innovative products. Exiting firms are also important, as high numbers of exits might 
reflect a process of intensive competition, i.e. incumbent firms being displaced by new 
firms entering the market or non-surviving newcomers forcing incumbents to perform 
better (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004). Three indicators are often used in empirical work 
relating the extent of business dynamics to the level of economic growth. These 
indicators are turbulence (entry plus exit), net-entry (entry minus exit) and gross-entry. 
Although various studies use turbulence or net-entry as indicator for business dynamics, 
it should be noted that there are important disadvantages attached to using combinations 
of entry and exit. This relates to the fact that employment impacts of births and deaths 
are fundamentally different. The biggest difference in the employment impact of births 
and deaths is obvious from the direct effect. The direct employment effect of births is 
                                                          
122 In the Netherlands, it takes 7 to 8 years before the productivity level of a new-firm startup equals that 
of an average firm (Verhoeven, 2004). 
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positive whereas the direct effect of deaths is negative. The different employment 
impacts of births and deaths make combined indicators like net-entry or turbulence less 
appropriate, as various authors report. Ashcroft and Love (1996, p. 491) state that “a 
given change in the stock of firms may have a different impact on employment 
according to the composition of the stock change. The net employment impact of births 
and deaths is likely to differ so it is inappropriate to constrain their individual effect to 
be the same, which is the consequence of defining firm births in net terms”. In a study 
for West-Germany, Fritsch (1996) considers turbulence, net-entry and gross-entry. He 
states that, due to the often observed high correlation between entries and exits 
(reflecting processes of displacement and replacement), “the turbulence indicator 
primarily represents the impact of entries on economic development” (p. 247).  
These problems involved in using combinations of entry and exit can be avoided by 
using the gross startup rate, which is indeed used in most studies investigating the 
relationship between business dynamics and economic development. However, this 
measure may still reflect different economic situations. For instance, a relatively high 
number of startups might reflect that there were too few firms in the market to begin 
with, i.e. that the ‘carrying capacity’ of the market was not yet reached (Carree and 
Thurik, 1999b). Alternatively, it might reflect fierce competition between newcomers 
and incumbents, battling for market share. In the latter case, the number of exits is 
expected to be higher than in the former case. The two situations might have very 
different implications for economic growth and hence, using the gross startup rate is 
still not ideal. 
Ideally, in a regression model explaining some measure of economic growth, a 
researcher would like to incorporate both a measure of the extent of business dynamics 
(e.g. turbulence) and a measure of the composition of business dynamics (e.g., net-
entry) in the model, as both aspects are important in their own right. However, in 
reality, net-entry and turbulence are heavily correlated which makes inclusion of both 
these measures inappropriate due to multicollinearity (note that the absolute value of 
net-entry is a lower bound for turbulence). 
We will use a measure of turbulence that is corrected for the value of net-entry. This 
corrected measure is called business volatility and is defined as turbulence (entries plus 
exits) minus the absolute value of net-entry. It is supposed to reflect the degree of 
turbulence that did not account for the observed changes in the number of firms 
(Audretsch and Fritsch, 2002). Using this measure enables to include both the extent of 
business dynamics (volatility) and the composition of business dynamics (net-entry) in a 
single regression model. 
8.4 Data and model 
International benchmark study 
In this section we discuss our data. The various measures of business dynamics are 
constructed from data on numbers of entries and exits taken from a comparative study 
of seven countries in the period 1992-1999, conducted by EIM (Verhoeven and Bruins, 
2001). In this benchmark study entry and exit data were gathered for a specific set of 15 
industries within manufacturing and services, that were considered to be either 
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innovative or fast-growing industries. The industries had to be young, innovative, 
and/or oriented on competition from abroad (either through import or export), in order 
to be selected. The 15 industries are listed in Table 8.1. The impact of business 
dynamics on competitiveness was thought to be especially important for these industries 
(as they met the above-mentioned criteria). Hence, this selection of industries seems 
particularly appropriate for the purpose of our study.  
For the selected industries data on numbers of entries and exits were gathered from 
research institutes in six countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and the United States.123 Data were taken from Chambers of Commerce, 
VAT-registers and social security records of these countries. As each country uses its 
own definition of entry and exit, the data had to be harmonized in order to be 
comparable across countries. For instance, in some countries formations of merger 
companies or movements of businesses to other regions are counted as new entries, 
while in other countries these types of changes in business demographics are not 
counted as new entries. 
EIM harmonized the data and used as definition of entry the start of a new economic 
activity by a new entrepreneur in a new business (startup) or the start of a new economic 
activity by an incumbent firm in a new subsidiary company. Furthermore, new firms 
had to be active in order to be counted as entry. Per week, at least one person 
(owner/manager or employee) has to work in the new business for at least one hour and 
the business must generate positive turnover. In this way, merger companies, holding 
companies, corporations that were formed strictly for legal purposes, and the like, were 
not counted. The definition of exit was chosen consistent with the entry definition.  
We use the entry and exit data on the 15 industries reported in Table 8.1 for the six 
countries from the benchmark study. More details on this data set on entries and exits 
are in Verhoeven et al. (2001).124 
                                                          
123 The United Kingdom was also included in the benchmark study of EIM. However, we exclude the 
U.K. as there were too many missing data for the purpose of our study. In particular, there were no data 
on business dynamics for the period 1994-1996. 
124 An alternative cross-country data set on firm demographics is introduced by Bartelsman et al. (2003). 
They present a harmonized time series data base for ten OECD countries, containing information on 
entry, exit, survival and employment growth at the firm-level. Their analysis reveals that high technology 
manufacturing industries and some ICT related industries have higher entry rates than average. In 
particular, several of the industries listed in Table 8.1 are reported to have higher than average entry rates. 
This supports our idea that the selection of industries used in the present chapter may be particularly 
appropriate for studying the relationship between business dynamics and employment growth. An 
important difference between the data set used in the present chapter and the data set used in Bartelsman 
et al. is that firms without employees are included in the present study whereas they are excluded in 
Bartelsman et al. Actually, many of the data sets on startups that are used in the literature exclude firms 
without employees, such as, for instance, the data set used by Fritsch and Mueller (2004) for Germany, 
and the data set used by Acs and Armington (2004) for the United States.  
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Table 8.1 Industries used in this chapter 
Nace revision 1.1 code Industry 
 Manufacturing: 
2416/17 Manufacture of plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms 
2441/42 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
3001/02 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
3110/20 Manufacture of electric motors, generators, and transformers, 
and electricity distribution and control apparatus 
3210/20/30 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
3310/20/30/40 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments 
3530 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 
37 Recycling 
15-37, excluding above 
eight industries 
Other manufacturing 
  
 Services: 
51.6 Wholesale of machinery, equipment and supplies 
64.2 Telecommunications 
7210/20/30/40/60 Computer and related activities (excluding maintenance and 
repair of office machinery) 
7310 Research and experimental development on natural sciences 
and engineering 
7420/30 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical 
consultancy; and technical testing and analysis 
72-74, excluding above 
three industries 
Other business services 
Source: EIM. 
Model 
In our multiple regression analysis we will explain the variation in employment growth 
rates by net-entry and volatility.125 Furthermore, country dummies and lagged 
employment growth are used as control variables. The dummy variables are included to 
control for country-specific effects not covered by the model.126 We also include lagged 
employment growth as an independent variable to correct for reversed causality, i.e. 
                                                          
125 Data on value added growth or productivity growth were not available. Employment growth may not 
be the most ideal dependent variable. Although the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction leads to 
a replacement of less efficient firms with more efficient ones, these efficiencies may manifest themselves 
in terms of labour-saving productivity. Nevertheless, while such a labour-saving effect may occur, it also 
concurrently results in improved competitiveness as incumbent firms are forced to perform better in order 
to survive. This, in turn, may lead to rising market shares, for instance by way of a larger supply of 
different goods through innovation. These indirect supply-side effects make that the impact on industry 
employment can still be positive (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004). 
126 We do not include industry dummies. Structural differences between industries are partly captured by 
the lagged dependent variable. Also, the model is estimated separately for manufacturing and services. 
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country/industry combinations with high growth attracting new businesses. Even though 
we include lagged business dynamics indicators only, the employment impact of net-
entry or volatility might be overestimated, due to positive path dependency in the 
economic performance of country/industry combinations (reflecting business cycle and 
industry life-cycle effects). We correct for this by including a lagged dependent variable 
(see also footnote 85). 
Although distinguishing between net-entry and volatility gives more insight than just 
using turbulence, interpretation of regression results is still not straightforward, 
particularly for net-entry. For instance, if a positive effect of net-entry on employment 
growth is found, what does that mean? It is conceivable that, in that case, new firms in 
industries with high net-entry rates are –on average– of a higher quality than new firms 
in industries with low net-entry rates. In this interpretation a higher net-entry rate would 
be consistent with a higher proportion of the new-firm startups surviving. This would 
signal a higher quality of the new firms, which, in turn, would have a positive impact on 
growth. In addition, the higher number of competing firms, which results from a high 
net-entry rate, positively affects industry growth. However, we have to be careful with 
this interpretation, for two reasons. First, a low net-entry rate does not necessarily mean 
that relatively many new firms did not survive. It may also reflect that incumbent firms 
were forced out of the market by the increased competition by the new firms. These 
possibilities cannot be distinguished using our data. Second, a positive effect of net-
entry may also reflect an industry life-cycle effect. If demand for products and services 
produced by a certain industry is growing, then both the number of firms and 
employment in the industry increase, consistent with a positive coefficient. This would 
not necessarily imply that the new firms are of an above-average quality. However, the 
industry life-cycle effect is –at least in part– captured by the lagged dependent variable. 
Variables and sources 
The definitions of the variables used in this chapter and their data sources are listed 
below. 
- Average annual employment growth rates are measured over the period 1997-2000 
(dependent variable) and 1994-1997 (lagged dependent variable). 
- Turbulence rate: this is the summation of the numbers of entries and exits, scaled on 
the stock of businesses. 
- Net-entry rate: this is the difference between the numbers of entries and exits, scaled 
on the stock of businesses. 
- Volatility rate: this is turbulence minus the absolute value of net-entry, scaled on the 
stock of businesses. 
The three indicators of business dynamics are all measured over the period 1994-1996. 
We use a three-year average to correct for outlier years, and we measure business 
dynamics in a period prior to employment growth (i.e. we use a time-lag) in order to 
obtain the correct direction of causality. 
The source of all four above-mentioned variables is the international benchmark study 
conducted by EIM (Verhoeven and Bruins, 2001). 
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Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned, we use data for six countries and 15 industries, yielding a maximum 
number of observations of 90. However, for some country/industry combinations data 
on business dynamics were missing, especially for Japan. Furthermore, there was one 
clear outlier, the telecommunications industry in the United States, which has values for 
turbulence and volatility greater than one.127 This observation is removed as well. We 
end up with a data set of 78 observations.  
Means and standard deviations of business dynamics indicators for our sample are 
presented in Table 8.2, both by country and by sector. We see that turbulence, net-entry 
and volatility are higher for services industries than for manufacturing industries. This 
reflects the fact that it is easier to start a new business in services than in manufacturing, 
as –in general– less startup capital is required.  
When looking at the data per country, we notice two interesting cases. The United 
States shows a very high value of volatility and a below-average value of net-entry.128 
This pattern might reflect a process of intense competition where the strongest firms are 
selected through the market mechanism. This, in turn, might result in high growth rates. 
Alternatively, however, it might reflect that survival rates of new firms are (too) low, 
for instance because entry barriers are too low. This would imply lower growth rates. 
For the Netherlands we see a reverse pattern: volatility is relatively low while net-entry 
is relatively high. The high net-entry rate might reflect a higher probability of survival 
of new firms, possibly indicating a higher quality of the new firms.129 However, the low 
volatility might point to a lack of competition, possibly indicating that there is not 
enough pressure from the market for new and incumbent firms to increase their 
performance. 
In our empirical analysis we try to find out which of the two patterns is more conducive 
to economic growth. To this end we will include both net-entry and volatility in our 
regression model.  
                                                          
127 In their study for ten OECD countries Bartelsman et al. (2003) also find very high entry rates for this 
industry. They give two explanations for this: first, the privatization of telecoms in a number of countries 
that has led to the entry of a number of new private operators, and second, the rapid increase in the 
number of firms operating in the communications area, related to the spread of Internet and e-commerce 
activities. 
128 Germany has a relatively high average volatility rate as well. This is caused mainly by two industries 
with values above 0.6: telecommunications and recycling. 
129 It may also reflect industry life-cycle effects. 
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Table 8.2 Means and standard deviations of business dynamics indicators by sector 
and country 
 Turbulence rate 
 
Net-entry rate Volatility rate 
Manufacturing (46) 0.160 
(0.128) 
0.022 
(0.054) 
0.122 
(0.110) 
Services (32) 0.288 
(0.184) 
0.085 
(0.080) 
0.202 
(0.143) 
TOTAL (78) 0.212 
(0.165) 
0.048 
(0.073) 
0.155 
(0.130) 
Belgium (15) 0.129 
(0.061) 
0.027 
(0.046) 
0.095 
(0.039) 
Denmark (14) 0.184 
(0.084) 
0.023 
(0.096) 
0.127 
(0.059) 
Germany (15) 0.295 
(0.261) 
0.082 
(0.074) 
0.213 
(0.194) 
Japan (6) 0.121 
(0.051) 
0.018 
(0.055) 
0.080 
(0.042) 
Netherlands (15) 0.206 
(0.123) 
0.083 
(0.074) 
0.123 
(0.065) 
United States (13) 0.293 
(0.186) 
0.033 
(0.046) 
0.257 
(0.167) 
TOTAL (78) 0.212 
(0.165) 
0.048 
(0.073) 
0.155 
(0.130) 
Source: EIM. Note: Figures between brackets are numbers of observations (first column) or standard 
deviations (second to fourth column). Statistics for manufacturing and services are based on pooled 
country/industry data of the respective industries listed in Table 8.1 (unweighted averages). 
 
Correlations between business dynamics indicators 
In Section 8.3 it was described that turbulence and net-entry should not be used in one 
and the same regression model because of problems of multicollinearity. Therefore, we 
use a corrected measure of turbulence, volatility. As an illustration Table 8.3 presents 
correlation coefficients between turbulence, net-entry and volatility for our data sample 
of 78 observations. We see that correlations between net-entry and turbulence are 
indeed strong and highly significant, while the correlation between net-entry and 
volatility is much weaker. This underlines the need to correct the turbulence rate for the 
impact of net-entry. 
 
Table 8.3 Correlations between business dynamics indicators, by sector 
 Manufacturing (46 observations) Services (32 observations) 
 Turbul. Net-entry Volatility Turbul. Net-entry Volatility 
Turbulence 1   1   
Net-entry 0.519 *** 1  0.669 *** 1  
Volatility 0.942 *** 0.274 * 1 0.911 *** 0.304 * 1 
*** Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. * Significant at 0.10 level. 
 157
8.5 Results 
The regression model is estimated separately for manufacturing and services, using 
OLS. For both sectors we use a pooled estimation sample, containing the respective 
industries for the six countries listed in Table 8.1. Results are shown in Tables 8.4 and 
8.5. Each table contains four model specifications. We start by including net-entry only 
(Model I). Next, we add volatility (Model II).  
Extremely high entry and exit rates in an industry may reflect that survival probabilities 
are too low, and that the industry attracts too many ‘marginal’ entrepreneurs, absorbing 
capital and human energy that could have been allocated more productively elsewhere 
(Carree et al., 2002). This would imply that volatility can actually be too high (possibly 
indicating that entry barriers are too low), and that from a certain level of volatility 
onwards, further increases may have a negative effect on growth. This would be 
consistent with the existence of an optimal level of volatility. To test this we also 
include a squared volatility term (Model III). If the parameter estimate of the linear 
volatility term is positive and the estimate of squared volatility is negative and 
significant, this implies that there is a level of volatility beyond which further increases 
negatively influence growth.130 
Although the absolute value of net-entry is corrected for in the volatility rate, the two 
measures are still correlated, both for manufacturing and services (see Table 8.3). 
Therefore, we are also interested in the results when including a combined measure such 
as turbulence. This enables comparison between specifications using measures for both 
the composition and the extent of business dynamics on the one hand, and specifications 
using a combined measure on the other hand. The results of the turbulence specification 
are in the last column of Tables 8.4 and 8.5 (Model IV). 
Manufacturing 
Model IV in Table 8.4 shows that turbulence has a significantly positive effect on 
employment growth for manufacturing industries. From Model II we see that this result 
reflects positive effects of both net-entry and volatility. The positive effect of net-entry 
might reflect that high survival probabilities are important for achieving industry 
growth. However, as described in Section 8.4, we have to be careful in interpreting the 
effect of net-entry. The positive effect of turbulence (volatility) suggests that a process 
of ‘creative destruction’ as described by Schumpeter (1934), may indeed be a 
requirement in manufacturing industries of modern economies for achieving growth. 
Innovating new firms challenge incumbent firms by introducing new inventions that 
render current technologies and products obsolete. The significantly positive effect of 
volatility underlines the importance of variety and selection through the market in this 
process. Strong competition between new ideas (either new products or new processes) 
being exploited by different firms, makes that the best ideas, and hence the best firms, 
survive in the market.131 The high quality of the surviving firms, in turn, positively 
affects economic growth.  
                                                          
130 This optimal level could then be calculated as -b/2a, where a and b are the parameter estimates of 
volatility squared and volatility, respectively. At this volatility level the effect on growth is maximised. 
131 Indeed, the manufacturing sector is known as a very competitive sector in the sense that there is not 
only domestic competition but also a considerable amount of competition from abroad. Hence, both new 
firms and incumbents have to be innovative in order to survive. 
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From Model III –which includes volatility squared– it is clear that we have not found 
evidence for the existence of an ‘optimal’ level of volatility in manufacturing. Inclusion 
of the squared term does not lead to an increase of adjusted R2 and t-values for both the 
linear and the squared term are low. Hence, there are no indications that volatility levels 
are too high for the manufacturing industries in the countries that we consider.  
Table 8.4: Estimation results Manufacturing, dependent variable growth of employment  
 Model I Model II Model III  Model IV 
 
Constant -.005 
(0.2) 
-.055 
(1.6) 
-.029 
(0.6) 
 -.054 
(1.6) 
Net-entry .48 * 
(1.8) 
.45 * 
(1.8) 
.44 * 
(1.7) 
  
Volatility  .28 ** 
(2.3) 
.012 
(0.0) 
  
Volatility squared   .45 
(0.7) 
  
Turbulence     0.28 ** 
(2.5) 
Lagged growth 
 
.23 ** 
(2.0) 
.12 
(1.0) 
.094 
(0.8) 
 .16 
(1.3) 
      
Adjusted R2 .163 .253 .243  .223 
Observations 46 46 46  46 
Note: Absolute t-values are between brackets. Dependent variable is average annual employment 
change 1997-2000. Lagged growth is average annual employment change 1994-1997. Turbulence, net-
entry, and volatility rates are averages over the period 1994-1996. Country dummies not reported. 
*** Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. * Significant at 0.10 level. 
 
Services 
Model IV in Table 8.5 shows that there is also a positive effect of turbulence on 
employment growth for services industries. Again, this reflects positive effects of 
volatility and, to a smaller extent, net-entry (Model II). The coefficient of net-entry is 
not significant though. Model III provides no evidence for the existence of an ‘optimal’ 
volatility rate in the services industries, as t-values for both the linear and the squared 
term are low.132  
                                                          
132 In part this is caused by the removal of the US telecommunications industry from the sample (see 
Section 8.4). Estimation results of a test regression for a sample which included this observation, implied 
that for telecommunications in the United States the volatility rate could be considered suboptimal (i.e. 
too high).  
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Table 8.5: Estimation results Services, dependent variable growth of employment 
 Model I Model II Model III  Model IV 
 
Constant .045 * 
(2.0) 
-.003 
(0.1) 
.026 
(0.5) 
 -.005 
(0.2) 
Net-entry .24 * 
(2.0) 
.16 
(1.4) 
.13 
(1.0) 
  
Volatility  .14 * 
(1.7) 
-.060 
(0.3) 
  
Volatility squared   .31 
(0.9) 
  
Turbulence     .15 *** 
(2.8) 
Lagged growth 
 
.21 * 
(1.7) 
.21 * 
(1.8) 
.22 * 
(1.8) 
 .21 * 
(1.9) 
      
Adjusted R2 .339 .394 .388  .420 
Observations 32 32 32  32 
Note: Absolute t-values are between brackets. Dependent variable is average annual employment 
change 1997-2000. Lagged growth is average annual employment change 1994-1997. Turbulence, net-
entry, and volatility rates are averages over the period 1994-1996. Country dummies not reported. 
*** Significant at 0.01 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. * Significant at 0.10 level. 
 
Comparing Tables 8.4 and 8.5 we notice that the effects of business dynamics on 
employment growth are stronger for manufacturing than for services. The coefficients 
for the business dynamics indicators are considerably higher for manufacturing in all 
four model specifications. Significance levels are also higher (Model II). The weaker 
effect for services may be related to the different character of innovation in services, 
compared to manufacturing. In particular, innovations in service industries are often 
non-technological and they mostly involve small and incremental changes in processes 
and procedures (De Jong et al., 2003, p. 16). To the contrary, innovations in 
manufacturing require more R&D and are more radical in nature. In modern economies 
radical innovation is more conducive to economic growth than incremental innovation. 
This is because industry life-cycles are shorter and hence, at a given point in time, more 
(niche) markets are in an early stage of the life cycle where R&D is highly productive 
and the costs of radical innovation tend to be relatively low (Audretsch and Thurik, 
2001). Hence, a lack of business dynamics in manufacturing industries may be 
particularly damaging to economic performance, as it may imply a lack of incentives to 
create (radical) innovations.  
We have seen that both net-entry and volatility contribute positively to growth at the 
country-industry level. Hence, judging from Table 8.2, countries like Belgium and 
Japan should improve on both these aspects. We also observe that, although the United 
States is often considered the world’s most dynamic economy (in terms of turbulence 
this is correct), there is still room for improvement as the US has a below-average value 
of net-entry (both for manufacturing and for services).133 
                                                          
133 Bartelsman et al. (2003) report that entry size in the United States is smaller compared to that of most 
other countries in their data set and conclude that entrant firms in the United States are further away from 
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8.6 Discussion 
In this chapter the relationship between business dynamics and employment growth has 
been examined for 15 fast-growing and innovative industries in six developed 
economies. Harmonized data on numbers of entries and exits are used from an 
international benchmark study conducted by EIM in 2001. In our multiple regression 
analysis we allow for separate effects of both the extent of business dynamics (volatility 
of firms) and the composition of business dynamics (net-entry of firms). We also test for 
the existence of an ‘optimal’ level of business volatility, possibly resulting from too 
high levels of entry and exit prevailing in certain industries. We find positive 
employment effects of net-entry rates and volatility rates. These effects are found to be 
considerably stronger for manufacturing compared to services. We find no evidence for 
an ‘optimal’ level of volatility. 
Our study has two important research implications. First, in investigating business 
dynamics, it is important to make a distinction between the extent of business dynamics 
(volatility of firms) and the composition of business dynamics (net-entry of firms). We 
have shown that the relative importance of volatility and net-entry may differ across 
sectors. A second research implication is that the relationship between business 
dynamics and growth may be industry-specific, even within broader sectors such as 
manufacturing and services. For instance, the positive effect for manufacturing found in 
this chapter is in contradiction with earlier studies that did not find an effect of business 
dynamics on performance for manufacturing (Acs and Armington, 2004; Bosma and 
Nieuwenhuijsen, 2002). However, these two studies used the manufacturing sector as a 
whole as unit of analysis, while the present chapter used a specific selection of fast-
growing and innovative industries. The industries in our study are young, innovative, 
and/or oriented on competition from abroad (either through import or export). The 
difference between the non-result in the earlier studies and the highly significant 
positive result found in the present study suggests that the process of creative 
destruction as described by Schumpeter may be particularly prevalent for manufacturing 
industries with these characteristics (i.e. industries that are fast-growing and/or 
innovative). More research at sufficiently low sectoral aggregation levels is needed to 
be able to draw definitive conclusions about this conjecture.  
Also some policy implications arise from our study. It is often argued by scholars and 
policy makers that high levels of business dynamics foster economic growth. This 
conjecture is confirmed by the results of the present chapter. We find that both net-entry 
and volatility are important for achieving growth. The positive effect of net-entry 
suggests that for the (manufacturing) industries used in this chapter, it may be good 
policy to focus on the quality of new-firm startups in order to increase survival 
probabilities of the new firms. For instance, a larger initial size of the startups might 
have a positive impact on the chances of survival, and ultimately on the performance of 
the industry (see Verhoeven, 2004, for evidence for the Netherlands). The positive 
effect of volatility implies that a process of competition between new ideas and market 
selection of the most innovative firms contributes positively to economic growth. To 
stimulate this process, entry barriers such as high administrative burdens and limited 
access to finance should be reduced in order to enable as many entrepreneurs as possible 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the minimum efficient scale than entrant firms in most other countries. However, they also report higher 
post-entry employment growth amongst surviving firms in the United States, compared to other countries 
in their data set. 
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to pursue commercialization of their idea in the market. This stimulates the market 
selection process, which, in turn, positively affects the performance of the industry. A 
mixture of these different policies is probably the best way to go. 
We also find evidence that the importance of business dynamics for achieving growth is 
higher for manufacturing than for services. The stronger effect for manufacturing may 
be related to the different character of innovation in manufacturing (more often radical), 
compared to services (more often incremental). In modern economies radical innovation 
is more conducive to economic growth than incremental innovation (Audretsch and 
Thurik, 2001). Hence, a lack of business dynamics in manufacturing industries may be 
particularly damaging to economic performance, as it may imply a lack of incentives to 
create radical innovations.  
One has to bear in mind that the results found in this chapter apply to a specific set of 
industries (see Table 8.1). Future research should investigate the relationship between 
business dynamics and growth for more industries at low sectoral aggregation levels. In 
this way we can see whether the results found in this chapter may be generalized to the 
manufacturing and services sectors as a whole. 
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Chapter 9 
COMPENDIA: Harmonizing Business Ownership Data 
This chapter presents a harmonized data set over the period 1972-2002, containing two-
yearly data on the number of non-agricultural business owners and the size of the labour 
force for 23 OECD countries, as well as the quotient of these two variables which is 
called the business ownership rate of a country. The data set is called COMPENDIA, 
which means COMParative ENtrepreneurship Data for International Analysis. It has 
been constructed by EIM Business and Policy Research, using OECD statistics (in 
particular OECD Labour Force Statistics) as well as other relevant sources. We make 
an attempt to make business ownership rates comparable across countries and over time. 
This is not straightforward as different countries measure business ownership or self-
employment in different ways. The definition used in COMPENDIA includes both the 
unincorporated and the incorporated self-employed. This chapter describes the 
methodology used for constructing the COMPENDIA data base. It also presents the 
business ownership rates for the 23 countries. Special attention is paid to the United 
States. This country alone accounts for about 30% of all self-employed reported in the 
COMPENDIA data set. 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Van Stel, A.J. (2003), COMPENDIA 2000.2: A Harmonized Data Set of Business 
Ownership Rates in 23 OECD Countries, EIM Research Report 200302, Zoetermeer: 
EIM. 
A revised version is to be published in the International Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal. 
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9.1 Introduction 
In present times there is renewed attention for the role of entrepreneurship in the 
economy. This is reflected by an increasing amount of research in the field of 
entrepreneurship. Much of this research is qualitative in nature. Far less 
entrepreneurship research is quantitative. In particular, there are relatively few studies 
which use data bases with internationally comparable figures on entrepreneurship.  
Operationalizing entrepreneurship for empirical measurement is difficult (Storey, 1991). 
The degree of difficulty involved increases exponentially when cross-country 
comparisons are made. Systematic measurement conducive to cross-country 
comparisons is limited (Audretsch, 2003). Nevertheless, cross-country data bases on 
entrepreneurship are important in understanding the role of entrepreneurship in 
economic processes. The measure most often used to operationalize the extent of 
entrepreneurship in a country is the number of self-employed individuals or business 
owners, largely because they are measured in most countries, and measured in 
comprehensive ways facilitating comparisons across countries and over time (Blau, 
1987). But even for this measure of entrepreneurship, cross-country comparability is a 
major problem. The numbers of self-employed reported in OECD Labour Force 
Statistics -one of the most important data sources on the subject- are not comparable 
across countries as each country supplies figures according to its own self-employment 
definition. In particular, the extent to which owner/managers of incorporated businesses 
(OMIBs) are included in the self-employment counts differs across countries. This 
problem is not very well-known.134 However, in chapter 5 of OECD Employment 
Outlook June 2000, attention is being paid to this particular subject, and an overview of 
self-employment definitions used in various (OECD) countries is provided. 
In recent years, EIM has made an attempt to construct an international data base with 
(macro) self-employment figures for 23 OECD countries that are comparable across 
countries. The 23 countries are the 15 countries of the (old) European Union plus 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. The data base is called COMPENDIA (COMParative ENtrepreneurship Data 
for International Analysis). The data base currently contains figures for the period 1972-
2002 (even years only), and is updated every two years.  
To arrive at such a uniform data base, we first established the exact definition per 
country used in OECD Labour Force Statistics. Next, we have chosen a self-
employment definition to be used in our uniform data base. In choosing a definition, we 
acknowledge that business ownership (self-employment) and entrepreneurship are 
related but not synonymous concepts. Entrepreneurship in a ‘Schumpeterian sense’ 
refers to the activity of introducing ‘new combinations’ of productive means in the 
market place. Entrepreneurship in a broad economic sense (business ownership or self-
employment) means owning and managing a business, or otherwise working on one’s 
own account. Thus, on the one hand Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are a small fraction of 
                                                          
134 For instance, during a panel discussion of policy makers at the “First GEM Research Conference” 
(Berlin, April 2004), participants expressed their surprise because –contrary to what is commonly 
believed– Germany had relatively more self-employed individuals than the United States, according to 
OECD statistics. However, this can be explained by the fact that for Germany, OMIBs are included in the 
OECD self-employment count, whereas for the US, they are excluded. Hence the data are not comparable 
between the two countries. 
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the business owners, while on the other hand some entrepreneurs (so-called 
intrapreneurs) do not work on their own account.135 
In COMPENDIA we have chosen a strict application of the broad entrepreneurship 
definition given above. This involves inclusion of owner/managers of both 
unincorporated and incorporated businesses but exclusion of unpaid family workers. 
Following statistical convention, our definition also excludes so-called ‘side-owners’ 
(self-employment as a secondary activity). Self-employed individuals in the sectors 
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing are also excluded. For countries not following 
the COMPENDIA definition in OECD Labour Force Statistics, we made a correction to 
arrive at an estimate for the number of self-employed persons according to the required 
definition. In the present chapter, we provide explanation on the COMPENDIA data 
base. We describe in detail what the self-employment figures represent, how the figures 
were obtained and what corrections were made to the raw data. We pay special attention 
to the United States, as this country alone accounts for about 30% of all self-employed 
reported in the COMPENDIA data base. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 9.2, we discuss the self-
employment (business ownership) definition used in COMPENDIA. Also, we discuss 
the data on self-employment published in OECD Labour Force Statistics, which form 
the main source for our data base. In Section 9.3 we discuss the general method that –in 
principle– is used for each country to correct the raw LFS data.136 As an illustration of 
the many data problems that may arise when constructing a times series on the number 
of business owners, Section 9.4 discusses in detail the construction of the 
COMPENDIA times series for the United States. Section 9.5 presents the business 
ownership rates for the 23 countries and provides some explanation on general trends in 
business ownership that can be observed across countries. The final section is used for 
discussion. 
9.2 Definitions and main data source 
In this section we describe the self-employment (business ownership) definition used in 
COMPENDIA, i.e. which groups of workers are included in the self-employment 
count? We also mention the industry groups covered in COMPENDIA and we give a 
short overview of harmonization problems that have to be solved. Finally, we describe 
how business ownership data are scaled in COMPENDIA, to arrive at comparable 
figures across countries. We start this section with a description of self-employment 
data in OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
Self-employment data in OECD Labour Force Statistics 
OECD Labour Force Statistics forms the basis for our data set on the number of self-
employed per country. In this annual publication, in the chapter Country Tables, for 
every country there is a table called ‘Professional status and breakdown by activities’. In 
                                                          
135 For a complete overview about the relation between the concepts entrepreneurship and self-
employment/business ownership, see Wennekers and Thurik (1999). 
136 In the remainder of this chapter the full name ‘OECD Labour Force Statistics’ and the abbreviation 
‘LFS’ will be used interchangeably. 
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this table, total employment is divided in three professional statuses: a) employees, b) 
employers and persons working on own account, and c) unpaid family workers. In 
principle, we use the category ‘employers and persons working on own account’. At all 
events, this category includes all unincorporated self-employed individuals (sole 
proprietors and partners). However, as far as incorporated self-employed are involved 
(owner/managers of incorporated businesses), there is a uniformity problem. In some 
countries they are counted as self-employed and in other countries they are counted as 
employee. The latter case may prevail because formally, owner/managers of 
incorporated businesses are employees of their own businesses. The different statistical 
treatment of incorporated self-employed in different countries forms the main 
harmonization problem to be dealt with in COMPENDIA, and we will discuss this 
problem in detail in Section 9.3. 
In LFS, professional status applies to the primary activity of a person. For example, a 
person who works as an employee in some business for four days a week, and runs his 
own business for one day a week (i.e. the person is self-employed as secondary activity) 
is counted in the a)-category rather than in the b)-category mentioned above.137 In other 
words, the data in the professional status classification in LFS relate to the main job. In 
COMPENDIA, we follow this practice and we exclude the so-called side owners 
(secondary activity) from our self-employment count. 
Which groups of workers are included in COMPENDIA? 
In constructing a data set on numbers of self-employed, we have to decide which groups 
of workers are included in the self-employment count, and which are not. In particular, 
we have to deal with the following two cases: unpaid family workers and 
owner/managers of incorporated businesses. In some studies, these groups of workers 
are counted as self-employed, and in other studies they are counted as employees. As 
regards unpaid family workers, we consider these workers not relevant for measuring 
the extent of ‘entrepreneurship’. These people do not own the business they work for, 
and thus do not bear responsibility and risk in the same way as ‘real’ self-employed 
individuals do. We exclude this group of workers from our self-employment count. As 
regards owner/managers of incorporated businesses, we do consider this group as highly 
relevant, because in an ‘entrepreneurial’ sense, this group is not essentially different 
from the unincorporated self-employed. We include the incorporated self-employed in 
our self-employment definition. 
Which industry groups are covered in COMPENDIA? 
In LFS, the employment status division is applied separately for the agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing industries on the one hand and the ‘non-agricultural 
activities’ on the other hand.138 The agricultural industries are structurally different from 
the rest of the economy, in that self-employment is the natural employment status in 
these industries. We exclude the agricultural industries from our self-employment count 
and concentrate on the numbers of self-employed in the non-agricultural industries.  
                                                          
137 The minimum weekly amount of time that a person has to work in order to be included in the (self-) 
employment count of LFS is one hour (OECD, 2002, pp. xi-xii). 
138 The ‘agricultural industries’ are thus defined to include agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. 
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Summarizing we use the following self-employment (business ownership) definition in 
COMPENDIA:  
the total number of unincorporated and incorporated self-employed outside 
the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing industries, who carry out self-
employment as their primary employment activity. 
We use the terms business owners and self-employed interchangeably, to indicate that 
we also include owner/managers of incorporated businesses in our self-employment 
notion. 
Harmonizing the OECD Labour Force Statistics data 
In constructing a harmonized data set for the number of business owners across 
countries and over time, two types of comparability problems can be identified. The 
first problem involves comparability across countries, i.e. different countries using 
different self-employment definitions. Having chosen a self-employment definition to 
be used in our data set COMPENDIA, we have to adjust the raw LFS data for those 
countries which use a different definition in LFS. The corrections that we apply mainly 
involve corrections for the numbers of incorporated self-employed in certain countries. 
We aim at applying the same method for each country to ensure comparability. This 
general method is described in Section 9.3. The second problem involves comparability 
over time, i.e. the occurrence of trend breaks in LFS. A trend break may occur if the set-
up of the labour force survey in a country changes from a certain year onwards. Also 
changes in self-employment definitions over time or changes in industrial classifications 
may introduce trend breaks. These trend breaks are corrected for in COMPENDIA and 
the corrections are described in Section 9.4 for the United States. For the corrections 
made for the remaining 22 countries we refer to Van Stel (2003).  
Scaling the business ownership data 
In order to compare self-employment figures across countries in a meaningful way, 
some form of scaling must be applied. A common scaling variable is the size of the 
labour force. In COMPENDIA, the number of self-employed (business owners) in a 
country as a fraction of total labour force is indicated as the country’s business 
ownership rate. Total labour force consists of employees, self-employed persons 
(including OMIBs), unpaid family workers, people employed by the Army and 
unemployed persons. Data on total labour force are also obtained from OECD Labour 
Force Statistics. For this variable, comparability problems of the raw LFS figures across 
countries and over time occur less often than for the variable self-employment. 
However, in some cases, corrections were still needed, and these are described in Van 
Stel (2003).  
9.3 Harmonizing self-employment data in COMPENDIA 
In this section we give a general description of the data collection and data construction 
of the number of business owners for the 23 countries in the data base, for the period 
1972-2002. As mentioned, our business ownership definition includes unincorporated 
self-employed as well as owner/managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs). We 
exclude the agricultural industries. In principle, we use the numbers reported in OECD 
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Labour Force Statistics. At all events, this item includes all unincorporated self-
employed. However, the extent of inclusion of OMIBs in the reported numbers varies 
per country, due to different set-up of labor force surveys in different countries. This 
involves issues as whether classification in employment status categories is done by the 
interviewer or by the respondent, the degree of guidance that is given by the interviewer 
on the term ‘self-employment’, the number of categories which respondents can choose 
from, etcetera. For details on these labour force surveys, see OECD (2000), Annex 5A.  
Estimating the 1994 level of the number of OMIBs 
The countries thus differ in the extent to which OMIBs are included in the official 
statistics. In OECD Employment Outlook June 2000, p. 158, countries are categorized in 
five types as regards the inclusion of OMIBs in OECD Labour Force Statistics:  
1) excluding (all) OMIBs, 
2) classification of OMIBs is unclear, 
3) including (all) OMIBs, 
4) including most OMIBs, 
5) excluding most OMIBs.  
Our desired definition is the third one: including (all) OMIBs. For countries not 
following this definition, i.e. those countries which are categorized as 1), 2), 4), or 5), 
we make an estimation of the number of OMIBs in 1994 using the following procedure.  
Estimation procedure for European countries in COMPENDIA 
We use as the total number of business owners (unincorporated as well as incorporated 
self-employed) the maximum of  
a) the reported number of self-employed in OECD Labour Force Statistics 1981-2001, 
and 
b) the number of ‘non-primary private enterprises’ with less than 50 employees, from 
the data base that is constructed in the framework of The European Observatory for 
SMEs: Sixth Report (KPMG/ENSR, 2000).139 This data base is largely based on the 
Eurostat publication Enterprises in Europe, which contains harmonized information for 
the 18 European countries in our COMPENDIA data set on (among other variables) the 
number of enterprises, by industry and size-class.  
We use the number of enterprises with less than 50 employees because in larger 
companies the manager often does not have the control. Formally, this control rests with 
the shareholders. A second reason for not including all firms in the estimated number of 
business owners is that not all firms are independent. Dependent firms (subsidiary 
companies) by definition are not linked to self-employed individuals. By using the 
number of enterprises smaller than 50 employees, we do not take account of the fact that 
partnerships have more than one self-employed individual, and on the other hand, that 
individuals can have more than one corporation or that individuals can run a business as 
a side activity. However, the number of enterprises smaller than 50 employees should 
approximately equal the number of business owners, by and large. 
                                                          
139 The term ‘non-primary’ is defined to exclude agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. 
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The comparison is made for the year 1994. In case the number of enterprises exceeds 
the reported number of ‘employers and persons working on own account’, as reported 
by OECD Labour Force Statistics, we can derive a raise-factor that corrects for the 
number of OMIBs. In principle, for such countries we apply this raise-factor constantly, 
for the whole period 1972-2002. For those 1)-, 2)-, 4)-, or 5)-categorized countries for 
which the reported number of business owners in LFS exceeds the number of 
enterprises, we choose the number of LFS-reported business owners. Because such a 
country does not belong to category 3), we know that such an estimate does not include 
all OMIBs. But we also know that the number of enterprises is lower, and therefore we 
argue that it is likely that the vast majority of the OMIBs is included in the reported LFS 
number. 
Estimation procedure for non-European countries in COMPENDIA 
For the five non-European countries in COMPENDIA, we look again at the 
categorization in OECD Employment Outlook June 2000. The above-mentioned 
European Observatory for SMEs does not contain data on non-European countries. 
Therefore in case the categorization is not ‘3) including (all) OMIBs’, we must estimate 
the number of OMIBs in another way. We use country-specific sources and we refer to 
Section 9.4 (United States) and Van Stel (2003) (other countries) for a description. In all 
cases we apply a procedure that resembles the procedure for the European countries as 
closely as possible. 
Expert knowledge 
For all countries in our data set it holds that we deviate from the above procedures in 
case we dispose of ‘expert knowledge’, i.e. additional information from other sources. 
This is the case for the Netherlands, Iceland, Switzerland, and New Zealand. For the 
estimation of the number of OMIBs of these countries we refer to Van Stel (2003). 
Is the development over time of numbers of OMIBs measured independently? 
In Table 9.1, the number of business owners including statistically non-identified 
OMIBs is estimated for 1994. For some countries this results in a raise-factor that 
corrects (for) the number of OMIBs. In principle, the raise-factor is applied constantly 
for the whole period 1972-2002. In a small number of countries, the implicit assumption 
is that the development over time of the number of incorporated self-employed (ISE; or 
OMIBs) equals that of the number of unincorporated self-employed (USE). This may be 
an implausible assumption as the development over time of the numbers of these two 
groups may be quite different over such a long period of time. This is not a desirable 
characteristic of using such a procedure.140 
However, for the majority of countries the actual assumption that lies behind our 
method of estimating the number of OMIBs, is not so strong. For example, when a 
country is categorized as ‘including most OMIBs’, the development over time of ‘most’ 
OMIBs is included in the published numbers of OECD Labour Force Statistics. The 
actual assumption that we make when applying a point estimate of the raise-factor 
                                                          
140 Note that for countries where the 1994 number of business owners in LFS exceeds the number of 
enterprises smaller than 50 employees, i.e. countries that use the reported LFS numbers, the development 
over time of the number of ISE is measured independently of the development of the number of USE. 
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constantly for the whole period, is that the proportion of non-identified OMIBs in the 
total number of business owners stays constant over time, and this is a less strong and 
hence more plausible assumption. Additionally, for the United States, we use 
independent information on the number of OMIBs for the whole period 1972-2002. The 
only assumption we make here is that the quotient (employer firms)/(self-reported 
incorporated self-employed according to Current Population Survey) stays constant over 
the period 1972-1986 (see Section 9.4). This is not such a strong assumption, and hence 
the development over time of the number of estimated OMIBs for the US may be 
considered reliable. 
In Table 9.1 we give an overview of the results of applying the (missing) OMIBs 
estimation procedure described in this section. The number of enterprises is reported 
only when it is needed in the OMIB estimation procedure of that country. Hence, the 
number is not reported for countries with categorization ‘including all OMIBs’, or for 
countries where ‘expert knowledge’ is used. The number of enterprises is also not 
reported for the non-European countries. In principle, the mentioning of a raise-factor 
for a country in the last column of Table 9.1 implies that the factor is applied constantly 
for the whole period 1972-2002. However, in three cases (The Netherlands, United 
States and Japan), the raise-factor is mentioned for illustrational purposes only. 
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Table 9.1 Estimating the number of business owners including all OMIBs in 1994 
for 23 OECD countries (all numbers expressed in thousands) 1 
Country 
 
OMIB-
categorization 
in OECD 
Employment 
Outlook  
June 2000 
 
1. Number 
of business 
owners in 
OECD LFS 
1981-2001 
 
2. Number of 
enterprises  
smaller than 
50 employees 
 
3. Number of 
business 
owners  
(1994) used in 
COMPENDIA 
2002.1 
 
Raise-factor 
OMIBs 
(=3./1.;  
only if 3.>1.) 
 
Austria unclear 230 281 281 1.22 
Belgium incl. all 498  498  
Denmark incl. most 161 164 164 1.02 
Finland incl. most 193 167 194  
France incl. most 1817 3 2293 2293 1.26 
Germany  incl. most 2938 3070 3070 1.04 
Greece incl. most 840 555 840  
Ireland incl. most 145 72 162  
Italy unclear 4117 3 3681 4117  
Luxembourg unclear 11.8 4 13 13 1.10 
Netherlands 2 incl. most 596  699 1.17 6 
Portugal unclear 736 600 736  
Spain incl. all 2052  2052  
Sweden incl. most 340 335 340  
United 
Kingdom incl. most 3002 3 3136 3170 1.04 
Iceland 2 unclear 18.1  18.1  
Norway excl. most 116 168 168 1.45 
Switzerland 2 N.A. N.A.  292  
United States excl. all 8955  13929 1.56 6 
Japan excl. all 6130  6950 1.13 6 
Canada incl. all 1804 5  1804  
Australia excl. all 984  1493 1.52 
New Zealand 2 unclear 226  226  
1 Data on number of enterprises taken from The European Observatory for SMEs: Sixth Report; 
estimation of OMIBs for non-European countries based on country-specific sources. Finland and 
Ireland: 1994 number of business owners in COMPENDIA 2002.1 adjusted for post-1994 trend breaks. 
2 Expert knowledge: estimation of number of OMIBs deviates from usual procedure. 
3 OECD Labour Force Statistics, version 1978-1998. UK: raise-factor for COMPENDIA 2000.1 (1.04) 
has been applied to revised 1994 figure (3035, from LFS 1981-2001). 
4 Including unpaid family workers. 
5 OECD Employment Outlook June 2000. 
6 Raise-factor not used to construct the data, and only mentioned for purpose of illustration. 
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9.4 Measuring business ownership in the United States 
As regards the number of self-employed individuals in the United States, many different 
sources report different figures. The official self-employment definition as practiced by 
the Bureau of the Census in its Current Population Survey (CPS) excludes the 
incorporated self-employed. The definition thus only includes the unincorporated self-
employed which consist of sole proprietors and partners, see SBA (1997), p. 87.141 As 
we also include the incorporated self-employed (ISE) in our COMPENDIA definition, 
we had to resort to other sources as regards the number of ISE. 
The organization of this section is as follows. First, we discuss reported figures on 
(unincorporated) self-employed in various sources. Our estimation of the number of 
incorporated self-employed is described in Section 9.4.2. This subsection also includes 
a discussion on some specific measurement problems concerning ISE. Third, we present 
our business ownership series for the US, and we provide some explanation for the 
different developments over time of numbers of unincorporated and incorporated self-
employed. Finally, we provide a discussion on the large differences between numbers of 
self-employed according to labour force surveys and numbers of businesses according 
to tax return data. 
9.4.1 Unincorporated self-employed 
To illustrate the variety of figures on the self-employed, we consider the number of self-
employed in 1994 (in thousands). According to OECD (2002) the number of non-
agricultural self-employed is 8955. According to SBA (1997), p. 88, Table 3.1, which is 
taken from the source Statistical Abstract of the United States and which corresponds to 
Bregger (1996), p. 4, Table 1, the number is 9003. Finally, according to SBA (1997), p. 
90, Table 3.3, which is a tabulation by Carolyn Looff and Associates based on 
unpublished CPS data, the number is 8856 (unincorporated self-employed). See Table 
9.2a. In this chapter, the sources Bregger (1996) and Carolyn Looff and Associates (as 
reported in SBA, 1997) will henceforth be abbreviated as Bregger and Carolyn Looff. 
 
Table 9.2a Number of non-agricultural self-employed in 1994, according to different 
sources 1 
Source Reported self-employed 1994 
(x 1000) 
OECD Labour Force Statistics 1981-2001 8955 
Carolyn Looff and Associates, as reported in SBA 
(1997) 
8856 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, as reported 
in SBA (1997) / Bregger (1996) 
9003 
1 Unincorporated self-employed, primary activity, excluding unpaid family workers. 
                                                          
141 People who are self-employed as a secondary activity (side owners) are also not included in the 
Census definition, see SBA (1997), p. 87. 
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At first sight, Table 9.2a is confusing. Three sources which claim to report the number 
of non-agricultural self-employed in 1994, all report (slightly) different figures. If we 
take a closer look the differences can be explained though. One problem is the industrial 
classification of the agricultural sector. All three sources claim to report the number of 
self-employed in the ‘non-agricultural’ industries. However, OECD Labour Force 
Statistics (LFS) and Carolyn Looff actually refer to ‘agriculture’ in broad sense. That is, 
they do not only exclude the agricultural sector, but also the hunting, forestry and 
fishing sectors.142 Bregger, on the other hand, excludes only the agricultural sector 
proper. Indeed, Bregger and LFS actually use the same source, the Current Population 
Survey. Both sources report the same number of self-employed (and also the same 
number of total employed) for all industries, namely. Only the division between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors differs. So, the difference between 9003 
(Bregger) and 8955 (LFS) actually represents the number of self-employed workers in 
the hunting, forestry and fishing sectors. Because we use the sector definition of LFS, 
the figure of Bregger is inappropriate for our purposes. In other words, we work with 
the broad definition of agriculture. 
We have now found the explanation for the difference between Bregger and LFS. But 
why does Carolyn Looff also deviate from LFS? Both work with the same agriculture 
definition and both work with CPS data. An explanation might be that Carolyn Looff 
reports data from the month March, while LFS reports year averages. In March, the 
demand for workers is on average lower than for instance in the holiday months July 
and August. This might be an explanation for the lower figures of Carolyn Looff (the 
total employment figure is also lower than that of the LFS). In Table 9.2b, the possible 
explanations for the different figures are summarized. 
 
Table 9.2b Explanations for different 1994 self-employment figures in different 
sources 
Source Non-agricultural self-
employed 1994 (x 1000) 
Definition 
‘Agriculture’ 
Time of survey 
OECD LFS 1981-
2001 
8955 broad (incl. hun, 
for, fish) 
year average 
Carolyn Looff 8856 broad March 
Bregger 9003 narrow year average 
9.4.2 Incorporated self-employed 
In the previous section we saw that there is some confusion about the numbers of 
unincorporated self-employed persons. The confusion gets even bigger if we want to 
measure the number of incorporated self-employed, i.e. the number of owner/managers 
of incorporated businesses. As mentioned earlier, this type of self-employment is 
excluded from the figures in official statistics. As a result, information on the numbers 
                                                          
142 For LFS, we can deduct that this is indeed the case from the observation that the totals for the whole 
economy are divided between agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing on the one hand and ‘non-
agricultural activities’ on the other hand. For Carolyn Looff we can deduct the same thing from a related 
Carolyn Looff-table with an industrial classification of the ‘non-agricultural’ sectors which does not 
include the hunting, forestry and fishing sectors, see SBA (1997), pp. 92-93, Table 3.4. 
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of owner/managers is hard to find. However, there are two sources which report more or 
less comparable figures on the subject. These are again Bregger (1996) and Carolyn 
Looff, as reported in SBA (1997), p. 90. In SBA (1997), p. 91, it is reported that the 
number of incorporated self-employed (the owner/managers) increased with 40% 
between 1976 and 1979 and with 33.3% between 1979 and 1983. Bregger, p. 8, reports 
that the number of self-employed owners of incorporated businesses rose from 1.5 mln 
in 1976 to 2.1 mln in 1979 and to 2.8 mln in 1982. Note that these figures correspond to 
the 40% and 33.3% increases as reported in SBA (1997). However, it is clear from the 
latter source that the 33.3% increase relates to a four-year period and not to a three-year 
period.143 So, we have a figure of 2.8 mln for all industries (including the agricultural 
sectors) in 1982 according to Bregger. In SBA (1987), p. 114, Table 4.3 -which is the 
same type of tabulation as the one of Carolyn Looff in SBA (1997), p. 90- a number of 
2.59 million of incorporated self-employed (ISE) in May 1983 is reported for all non-
agricultural industries. These figures seem to match quite well. Indeed the ratio 
2.59/2.8 (non-agricultural ISE/total ISE) closely resembles the corresponding ratio for 
1989 that can be derived from Bregger, p. 8, Table 5.144 Therefore, in order to construct 
a series of the number of incorporated self-employed between 1976 and 1994, we use 
the figures for 1983, 1988 and 1994 as provided by SBA (1987), p. 114, Table 4.3 and 
SBA (1997), p. 90, Table 3.3 (these two tabulations are consistent) and for 1976 and 
1979 we apply the 40% and 33.3% increase figures to the 1983 figure of 2.59 mln. We 
can even go back until 1967.145 For 1967, Fain (1980), p. 7, reports a number of 
850,000 incorporated self-employed. This figure is consistent with the figures for 1976 
and 1979 reported by Bregger (1996). In order to correct for the agricultural 
owner/managers we again apply the relative growth rate (1.5/0.85 between 1967 and 
1976, an increase of 76.4%) in order to arrive at an estimate of the number of non-
agricultural incorporated self-employed in 1967. See Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 Incorporated self-employed (non-agricultural), 1967-94, preliminary 
times series 
Year Number 
(x 1000) 
Source / method 
1967   786 increase 76.4% 1967-76, reported by Fain (1980) 
1976 1388 increase 40.0% 1976-79, reported by SBA (1987), p. 112 
1979 1943 increase 33.3% 1979-83, reported by SBA (1987), p. 112 
1983 2590 SBA (1987), p. 114 
1988 2984 SBA (1997), p. 90 
1994 3955 SBA (1997), p. 90 
Source: Own calculations, based on SBA. 
                                                          
143 The 33.3% increase actually relates to the period 1978-82 instead of 1979-83, and to all industries, see 
SBA (1987), p. 112, Table 4.2. Because the period analysed in that table is 1979-83, the relative changes 
were assumed equal for the two periods. 
144 Actually, the ratio in Bregger is somewhat higher. One possible explanation is that agriculture has 
become less important between 1982/83 and 1989. Another one is that the non-agricultural industries are 
more broadly defined in Bregger, as discussed earlier. 
145 From 1967 on, because of a change in the Current Population Survey in that year, it is possible to 
identify those workers who report themselves as self-employed but have incorporated their business. 
Before 1967, these workers could not be identified separately from other self-employed individuals. See 
Bregger (1996), p. 4, and Fain (1980), p. 7. 
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Underestimation of numbers of owner/managers 
Although with help of data reported in SBA (1987, 1997) we have been able to produce 
some preliminary figures for the number of owner/managers, it is important to note that 
these figures actually understate the real number of owner/managers. This is because 
legally, these workers are employees of their own businesses. Now, in the labour force 
survey people are asked whether they are employed by a government, a private 
company or a nonprofit organization (in which cases they are classified as wage and 
salary workers) or whether they are self-employed. In the latter case, the following 
question is asked: “Is this business incorporated”? The people who answer ‘yes’ are still 
classified as wage and salary workers in the official statistics. It is these figures (the 
numbers of people who answer ‘yes’ on the incorporated business question) that are 
tabulated in SBA (1987, 1997) and which figures we have taken over in Table 9.3. 
However, not all incorporated self-employed are detected by the extra question. 
Owner/managers who answer that they are wage and salary workers (because legally 
this is the case) are not identified as self-employed workers because no extra question is 
asked to people who respond that they are employed by a private company. So the 
reported numbers of incorporated self-employed only relate to people who responded 
(erroneously, for the purposes of the labour force survey) that they are self-employed. 
The figures do not include the owner/managers who (correctly, for those purposes) 
identify themselves as wage and salary workers. These owners cannot be identified. For 
more details about these questionnaires, see Bregger, p. 8, SBA (1997), p. 113, and 
OECD (2000), Annex 5A. 
So, the reported figures are actually an understatement of the real number of 
incorporated self-employed. However, the magnitude of the understatement is 
unknown, see Fain (1980), p. 7: “Another group which cannot be separated and studied 
are those incorporated self-employed who report themselves initially as wage and salary 
employees. There is no way to determine how large this group might be or to know 
whether it has grown larger or smaller over time”. The problem of the unidentified 
owner/managers who report themselves as wage and salary worker seems to prevail not 
only in the United States but also in other OECD countries. This is because in general, 
statistical definitions are based on legal employment statuses, see Hakim (1988), p. 422: 
“Working proprietors or managers of incorporated businesses are classified as 
employees in statistical surveys, because that is their status in law and for tax and social 
insurance purposes. However, these distinctions are not necessarily observed by 
respondents to the labour force surveys that provide the main source of data on self-
employment, and errors cannot always be detected and corrected by statistical offices.” 
So, because the official status of owner/managers is that of employee, labour force 
surveys do not bother to ask respondents who report themselves as employees whether 
or not they own an incorporated business. Therefore, their numbers are unknown, as 
Hakim (1988), p. 423, reports: “And we do not have any idea how many more working 
proprietors and managers of their own incorporated businesses are invisible in the 
statistics because they classified themselves –according to the rules– as employees of 
their own small firm”. 
While Fain (1980) and Hakim (1988) in principle report on the particular measurement 
problems in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, the problems 
prevail in many other (if not all) OECD countries as well. See for example OECD 
(1992), p. 185: “Data on the numbers of owner-managers of incorporated businesses are 
not widely available. In addition, their propensity to report themselves as self-employed 
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is unknown”. This implies that those owner/managers who report themselves as 
employee are not identified, consistent with Fain (1980) and Hakim (1988). See also 
OECD (2000), Annex 5A. 
Correction based on number of employer firms 
Because we want to obtain a plausible estimate of the number of incorporated self-
employed, and we know that the series from Table 9.3 is too low, we make a correction 
on these series. For this purpose we use the number of employer firms, as yearly 
published in the The State of Small Business, A Report of the President, see for example 
SBA (1998a), p. 118, Table A9, and SBA (1999), p. 205, Table A5. The number of 
employer firms is a conventional estimate for the number of OMIBs. See SBA (2000), 
p. 5: “Incorporated self-employment is generally defined as an employer firm […]”. In 
The State of Small Business, A Report of the President, the number of ‘nonfarm’ 
employer firms is published each year, both by size-class and by industry.146 Because 
we work with the broad definition of agriculture, we subtract the number of employer 
firms in the industry ‘Agricultural services, Forestry, and Fishing’ from the total 
number of ‘nonfarm’ employer firms. Next, because we try to use a method for the 
United States that is as uniform as possible with the method for the European countries, 
we take only the employer firms that are smaller than 50 employees.147 This leads to the 
series in Table 9.4 below. 
 
Table 9.4 Estimated number of incorporated self-employed (non-agricultural) in 
US, 1988-2000, based on number of employer firms (x 1000) 
 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Inc. SE 4690 4789 4808 4974 5157 5408 5528 
Source: Own calculations, based on SBA (1998a), p. 118, Table A9 (years 1988-94), SBA 
(2000), p. A-2, Table 1.2 (years 1996-98), and SBA (2001), p. A-3, Table 2 (year 2000). 
As we see from Table 9.4, the number of employer firms is measured from 1988 
onwards. We have no information on the number of employer firms before that year. 
Therefore, for the year 1988, we compute the ratio employer firms / incorporated self-
employed according to the labour force survey (see Table 9.3) and apply this factor to 
the series in Table 9.3 (for the years prior to 1988). The ratio equals 4690/2984 = 1.57. 
The implicit assumption is that about two third of the OMIB-respondents in the labour 
force survey classify themselves as self-employed while one third classify themselves as 
wage and salary employees. This may be plausible.148 
9.4.3 Total number of self-employed 
                                                          
146 The term ‘farm’ relates to agriculture in narrow sense here, compare Section 9.4.1. 
147 For this purpose the number of firms with employment size between 19 and 50 is approximated at 
75% of the firms with size between 19 and 100. 
148 In a description of labour force surveys in different countries, OECD (2000), p. 192, states that “It is 
assumed that when the procedure is self-assessment alone, OMIBs will mainly classify themselves as 
self-employed”. 
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Having constructed a series for the incorporated self-employed, we are now able to 
construct a series for the total self-employed, according to our definition (all 
incorporated and unincorporated self-employed but excluding the agricultural sectors, 
the secondary jobs and the unpaid family workers). For the unincorporated self-
employed (USE) we use OECD Labour Force Statistics.149 For the incorporated self-
employed (ISE) we use the series from Table 9.4 for 1988 and later years, and the series 
from Table 9.3, with the correction factor applied to it, for the years prior to 1988. For 
the years between 1972 and 1988 that are not reported in Table 9.3, we interpolate. This 
results in the series presented in Table 9.5. 
 
Table 9.5 Total number of US non-agricultural self-employed, 1972-2000 (x 1000) 
 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1994 2000 
USE (OECD LFS) 5342 5754 6956 7748 8474 8955 8630 
ISE, uncorrected 
(see Table 9.3) 
1120 1388 2104 2669    
ISE, corrected  
(see Table 9.4 for 1988-
2000, and apply factor 
1.57 for period 1972-86) 
1761 2181 3308 4195 4690 4974 5528 
Total self-employed   7103   7935  10264  11943  13164  13929  14158 
Labour force 
(OECD LFS) 
88847 97826 108544 115241 123378 132474 143774 
Business ownership 
rate 
0.080 0.081 0.095 0.104 0.107 0.105 0.098 
Source: Own calculations. 
Different trends for incorporated and unincorporated business owners 
From Table 9.5, we see that the number of incorporated self-employed (ISE) has 
increased faster than the number of unincorporated self-employed (USE). For example, 
in the period 1980-2000, the number of ISE increased with an average of 2.6% per year. 
In the same period the average annual growth of the number of USE was 1.1%. 
Apparently, more self-employed individuals choose for incorporation of their business. 
Why does this occur? There can be many reasons, as Fain (1980), p. 7, reports: “The 
move towards incorporation is a function of many complex factors. A worker will 
usually incorporate his business for traditional benefits of the corporate structure, 
including limited liability, tax considerations, and the increased opportunity to raise 
capital through the sale of stocks and bonds”. Simply put, when an unincorporated 
business expands, it becomes more attractive to incorporate the business. So, when 
small businesses perform well and expand, they will often choose for incorporation. In 
that case however, the status of the entrepreneur in the official statistics changes from 
self-employed to employee. See Bregger, p. 8: “What undoubtedly occurs is that, as the 
small businesses expand and bring on employees, the owners incorporate their 
businesses, thereby shifting the class-of-worker classification to wage and salary 
                                                          
149 We use LFS versions 1981-2001 and 1970-1990. For 1990 and 1992, we have used LFS 1974-1994, in 
order to take account of two (minor) trend breaks in 1990 and 1994 in LFS 1981-2001. 
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employment. This type of transitional shuffling, while not readily measurable, is very 
likely an ongoing event […]”.  
From the previous paragraph, it is clear that data on USE alone can be misleading. For 
example, if the number of USE stays constant or decreases, one cannot tell whether this 
is because business ownership really decreases, or whether many small businesses have 
incorporated their business and as a result are not considered self-employed any more in 
official statistics. Formulated otherwise, if the number of USE decreases one cannot tell 
whether the ‘real’ degree of business ownership is affected as well. The above example 
underlines the importance of including the owner/managers of incorporated businesses 
in the self-employment count. 
9.4.4 Inconsistency of self-employment data and business stock data 
As has become clear from the previous discussion, there are many difficulties in 
measuring the number of business owners. Another intriguing statistical problem is 
linking the number of business owners to the number of businesses. For the United 
States, striking differences exist between data on the number of self-employed and data 
on the number of businesses. Business data are collected by the Internal Revenue 
Service of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (IRS). In Table 9.6, we report for 1994 
the number of businesses per type of business from IRS (number of business tax 
returns), as reported by SBA (1997), p. 25, and the number of self-employed per type of 
self-employed from Carolyn Looff and Associates, as reported by SBA (1997), p. 90.  
 
Table 9.6 Comparison of business data (IRS) and self-employment data (Carolyn 
Looff), 1994 
Businesses (IRS) Number 
(x 1000) 
Self-employed (Carolyn 
Looff) 
Number 
(x 1000) 
Corporations   4667 Incorporated self-empl.   3955 
Partnerships   1558 Unincorporated self-empl.   8856 
Proprietorships 15831 Self-employed as second job 1   2539 
Total 22056 Total 15350 
1 In the tabulation of Carolyn Looff this group is called Wage-and-Salary Workers with Self-Employment 
(WSSE). 
In SBA (1987), p. 135, two explanations are put forward for the differences between 
IRS data on the number of businesses and the CPS data on the number of business 
owners: “First, self-employed persons with more than one business are counted only 
once in the CPS, but all reporting businesses are included in IRS counts. Second, all 
movement into self-employment during the year is counted in the IRS survey, while the 
CPS provides only a snapshot view-the month of May”. 
Difference Corporations / Incorporated Self-Employed 
Regarding the first row of Table 9.6 (corporations versus incorporated self-employed), 
the gap between the number of corporations and the number of incorporated self-
employed individuals might be explained more or less satisfactorily by the explanations 
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already mentioned and some other ones. First, people can indeed have more than one 
corporation. Second, there are corporations without (incorporated) self-employed 
individuals, like dependent corporations (subsidiary companies). There are also no self-
employed in a firm if the majority of the shares is not owned by one (or sometimes two 
or three) persons but if the shares are divided in a great number of smaller shares (for 
instance, companies with an exchange quotation). Note that, on the other hand, there 
may also be corporations with more than one incorporated self-employed individual. 
But in that case, businesses are counted more than once in the IRS survey. As is 
reported by SBA (1998b), p. 2, about the IRS data: “Tax return data include all 
businesses, but it will overstate the number of businesses when a business files more 
than one tax return”. So, firms having more than one self-employed individual is not a 
cause for the differences between the CPS and IRS data. A third explanation for the 
differences between CPS and IRS data is that there are also incorporated self-employed 
individuals who are not counted in the CPS as self-employed (because they report 
themselves as employee of their own business) but whose businesses are counted in the 
IRS. This is because every business has to pay taxes, so businesses are always counted. 
Fourth, there is the stock/flow difference as described in SBA (1987), p. 135. All four 
explanations point in the direction of more corporations in the IRS count than 
incorporated self-employed individuals in the CPS count. Given that the difference is 
not extremely large, the figures in the first row of Table 9.6 seem to be more or less 
plausible. 
Difference Proprietorships / Unincorporated Self-Employed 
Looking at the second and third row of Table 9.6, the differences between the business 
figures and the self-employment figures are much larger. If we assume that people who 
are self-employed as a second job (side owners) do not own incorporated businesses but 
instead own unincorporated businesses, we can compare the total number of 
unincorporated businesses (sole proprietorships and partnerships) according to IRS –
which is 17,391,000– with the total number of unincorporated self-employed (primary 
and secondary jobs) according to Carolyn Looff: 11,395,000. So, there is a huge gap of 
almost 6 million businesses that is unaccounted for. Looking at the four possible 
explanations that applied to the difference between the number of corporations and the 
number of incorporated self-employed individuals, we conclude that only the fourth one 
also applies to the difference for the unincorporated businesses and self-employed. The 
other three possible explanations do not apply here, as will now be explained. First, 
people cannot have more than one unincorporated business since one can bear full 
liability only once. Second, unincorporated businesses always have at least one self-
employed individual. Third, the specific problematic of the hidden incorporated self-
employed does not apply to the unincorporated self-employed. So, only the stock/flow 
argument remains to explain the difference between businesses and self-employment. 
However, the gap of 6 million is far too large to ascribe to this particular argument. 
Conclusion: differences cannot be explained  
We conclude that the differences between business statistics and (self-) employment 
statistics cannot be explained in a satisfactory way, particularly for the unincorporated 
businesses and self-employed. But what’s more, also publications that report on the 
number of businesses in the U.S. are not always consistent in themselves. For example, 
in SBA (1998b), p. 2, there are two tables on the number of U.S. businesses: one from 
the IRS which reports 23,155,000 nonfarm business tax returns in 1996 and one from 
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the Bureau of the Census which reports 17,253,000 businesses in 1992 (all industries). 
Leaving the reasons for the difference between these two figures out of consideration 
(two of which are the four year difference and the possibility of double tax returns in the 
IRS count), it is at least striking that in the text covering these tables (SBA, 1998b, p. 
1), we read: “The total number of businesses in the U.S. is not definitely known; 
however, the figure is believed to be between 13 and 16 million”. These last figures are 
thus not consistent with the figures in the tables themselves, which are higher. They are 
however in line with the self-employment figures from Carolyn Looff, see Table 9.6. 
Apparently, considering the quotation just mentioned, the status of the (high) figures 
from several business statistics is not clear. In COMPENDIA, however, we are 
interested in business owners and not in businesses. Despite all the problems and 
limitations that also exist for the statistics on the number of self-employed persons, the 
figures from this type of statistics seem to be more consistent than business statistics. 
We consider the series on the number of self-employed individuals (business owners) 
that we constructed in Table 9.5 a reasonably reliable estimate. 
9.5 Business ownership rates 1972-2002 
In this section we present some data on business ownership from the COMPENDIA 
data base. The complete data base can be found at www.eim.net. From Table 9.7 we see 
that in 2002 business ownership rates are high in Mediterranean countries, especially 
Greece and Italy, while they are relatively low in Scandinavian countries and 
Luxembourg. We also see that for the 23 OECD countries covered by the data set, there 
are over 44 million business owners, 46% of whom are in European countries, and 31% 
of whom are in the United States. 
Concerning developments over time, most countries display a U-shaped pattern of 
initial decline, followed by an increase of the business ownership rate. The decline is 
not always visible from Table 9.7 because the data start only in 1972. However, in the 
post World War II period business ownership rates have declined constantly in most 
Western economies. Large firms exploited economies of scale in the production of new 
economic and technological knowledge, leaving little room for entrepreneurship and 
small businesses (Schumpeter, 1950). But from the 1970s onwards times have changed 
and the trend towards less self-employment has reversed, starting in the United States. 
There are several reasons for the revival of small business and self-employment in 
Western economies. Notably, in many sectors, new technologies have reduced the 
necessity of scale economies to arrive at competitive advantages (Meijaard, 2001). 
Developments like globalization, the ICT-revolution and the increased role of 
knowledge in the production process have led to increased dynamics and uncertainty in 
the world economy from the 1970s onwards. In turn, these developments have created 
room for (groups of) small firms to act as agents of change (Audretsch and Thurik, 
2000). The bigger role in technological development for small and new firms is referred 
to by Audretsch and Thurik (2004) as a regime switch from the ‘managed’ to the 
‘entrepreneurial’ economy.150  
                                                          
150 There are also other reasons for the revival of entrepreneurship such as an increased consumer demand 
for variety and the increased employment share of services in modern economies. See Carree et al. (2002) 
for an overview. 
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Table 9.7 Business ownership rates in 23 OECD countries, 1972-2002 
 
1972 1980 1988 1996 2002 
Share 
2002 
Austria 0.093 0.073 0.069 0.074 0.083 0.007 
Belgium 0.105 0.098 0.109 0.119 0.113 0.011 
Denmark 0.082 0.074 0.056 0.064 0.067 0.004 
Finland 0.066 0.064 0.076 0.080 0.079 0.005 
France 0.113 0.101 0.099 0.088 0.081 0.049 
Germany (West) 0.076 0.066 0.070 0.082 0.086 0.078 
Greece 0.161 0.182 0.186 0.197 0.193 0.019 
Ireland 0.077 0.086 0.101 0.112 0.112 0.005 
Italy 0.143 0.148 0.169 0.183 0.183 0.100 
Luxembourg 0.107 0.087 0.075 0.067 0.054 0.000 
The Netherlands 0.100 0.085 0.082 0.102 0.108 0.020 
Portugal 0.113 0.119 0.116 0.156 0.137 0.016 
Spain 0.118 0.110 0.123 0.130 0.129 0.053 
Sweden 0.074 0.070 0.064 0.081 0.081 0.008 
United Kingdom 0.078 0.074 0.101 0.111 0.107 0.072 
Iceland 0.111 0.088 0.101 0.130 0.123 0.000 
Norway 0.097 0.084 0.084 0.071 0.065 0.003 
Switzerland 0.066 0.065 0.071 0.085 0.076 0.007 
Europe-18 0.100 0.095 0.105 0.112 0.110 0.460 
United States 0.080 0.095 0.107 0.104 0.095 0.312 
Japan 0.125 0.131 0.123 0.101 0.092 0.139 
Canada 0.079 0.087 0.106 0.128 0.122 0.047 
Australia 0.126 0.168 0.164 0.155 0.164 0.037 
New Zealand 0.106 0.090 0.114 0.139 0.135 0.006 
23 Countries 0.098 0.102 0.110 0.109 0.104 1.000 
       
Total number of 
business owners 
(x 1000) 
 
29401 34342 40666 44206 44342 
 
Source: COMPENDIA 2002.1. 
Business ownership rates refer to the number of non-agricultural self-employed (unincorporated as well 
as incorporated) as a fraction of the labour force. 
Germany refers to West-Germany until 1991. 
Many Western countries have experienced a shift from the ‘managed’ to the 
‘entrepreneurial’ economy. However, the extent and timing of this shift has not been 
identical across countries (Audretsch et al., 2002a). The first country to experience the 
transition from the ‘managed’ to the ‘entrepreneurial’ economy was the United States 
(Verheul et al., 2002). Indeed, from Table 9.7 it can be seen that the United States has 
the highest increase in business ownership rate between 1972 and 1980. The different 
extent and timing of the shift across countries is further illustrated by Figure 9.1, where 
the development of the business ownership rate is depicted for the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France and Germany. As mentioned, the upswing in business 
ownership was first experienced by the United States in the 1970s. The United 
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Kingdom followed in the 1980s. Still later, Germany follows (see also Audretsch, 
2000). France however, has had a constantly decreasing business ownership rate.  
Institutions and policies of countries play a role in the different extent and timing of the 
shift across countries. For instance, the steep increase in business ownership in the 
United Kingdom in the 1980s was stimulated by government policy aiming at 
maximising the number of new-firm startups in an attempt to fight unemployment (Van 
Stel and Storey, 2004). In the 1990s however, UK policy changed towards a focus on 
incumbent business with ‘growth potential’, which may explain the leveling off of the 
business ownership rate in the 1990s.151 The constant decrease in France may be due to 
French policy, which for a long time focussed on large businesses, for instance by 
giving the majority of their orders to large businesses. Also, high tax burdens on SMEs 
and a discrepancy in social security between wage- and self-employed people create few 
incentives for entrepreneurship. A negative cultural attitude towards entrepreneurship 
probably also plays a role (Henriquez et al., 2002).  
 
Figure 9.1 Development in business ownership in four OECD countries, 1972-2002 
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Source: COMPENDIA 2002.1. 
Germany refers to West-Germany until 1991. 
9.6 Discussion 
In this chapter we presented the data set COMPENDIA. The data set contains 
harmonized information on numbers of business owners and the size of the labour force, 
for 23 OECD countries over the period 1972-2002. The quotient of these two variables 
is called the business ownership rate. These harmonized data are helpful for conducting 
quantitative research on entrepreneurship at the macro level. Our primary data source is 
OECD Labour Force Statistics and in COMPENDIA we have made an attempt to make 
                                                          
151 In the United States the leveling off may be due to shake out of industries that are in a more advanced 
stage than elsewhere in modern OECD countries (Audretsch and Thurik, 2004). 
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business ownership rates comparable across countries and over time. The main problem 
in harmonizing business ownership data is the different statistical treatment of the 
incorporated self-employed, as this category of workers is classified as wage-and-salary 
workers in some countries, and as self-employed workers in other countries. We have 
chosen our business ownership definition to include the unincorporated and the 
incorporated self-employed, because both categories run their own businesses. 
Concerning self-employment definitions being in force in different countries, we based 
ourselves on the definitions reported in OECD Employment Outlook June 2000. Next, 
for countries not including all owner/managers of incorporated businesses in their self-
employment count, we made corrections based on numbers of enterprises from The 
European Observatory for SMEs: Sixth Report, or, for some countries, specific 
information from national sources. 
In making these corrections, we tried to approximate the (unknown) real numbers of 
business owners as closely as possible. Of course, the quality of the approximations 
depends on the plausibility of the corrections applied. In this respect, we should mention 
some limitations of our data set. First, for many countries, we apply a constant 
correction factor for OMIBs (computed in 1994) to the whole period 1972-2000. This is 
not ideal as, in reality, the number of OMIBs in proportion to the number of 
unincorporated self-employed may change over time. In many cases this drawback is 
however mitigated because our correction only relates to a smaller number of non-
identified OMIBs. Second, for many countries, our correction factor for numbers of 
OMIBs is based on enterprise data, not on employment (i.e. person-based) data. It is 
well-known that there are many difficulties in relating these two kinds of data sources. 
Third, for some countries little information on numbers of non-agricultural self-
employed was available in OECD Labour Force Statistics, forcing us to use rather crude 
approximation methods. This holds especially for Switzerland and, prior to 1986, for 
New Zealand (see Van Stel, 2003, for details). Despite these limitations we think that 
COMPENDIA provides the most reliable, comparative data set available today, 
regarding business ownership across industrialized countries and over time. 
For harmonizing business ownership data across countries and over time, the ideal 
situation would be to use actual data on numbers of incorporated self-employed (as for 
some countries is already done in COMPENDIA 2002.1), but for many countries these 
numbers cannot be identified from the domestic labour force surveys being in force. For 
these countries, corrections based on numbers of enterprises are the best approximation 
possible. Nevertheless, in order to improve cross-country comparability of business 
ownership data, future research should concentrate on collecting actual data on numbers 
of incorporated self-employed. If not available from labour force surveys, such data 
may be obtained from other national sources like tax return data. 
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Summary in Dutch 
Ondernemerschap en Economische Groei 
De opvatting dat ondernemerschap belangrijk is voor het behalen van economische 
groei in moderne economieën wordt breed gedragen. Zowel economen als 
beleidsmakers zijn ervan overtuigd dat ondernemers door hun creativiteit en autonomie 
een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan de economische groei. De relatie tussen 
ondernemerschap en economische groei wordt in de economische literatuur bestudeerd 
vanuit verschillende perspectieven. Voorbeelden zijn de theorievorming over de rol van 
ondernemerschap in de economie, het mathematisch modelleren van economische groei 
(bijvoorbeeld in endogene groeimodellen) en het empirisch modelleren en meten van de 
relatie. Dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan dit derde onderdeel van de literatuur. Het 
levert met name een bijdrage aan het meten van de relatie tussen ondernemerschap en 
economische groei op het niveau van landen en regio’s. 
Dit proefschrift is empirisch van aard. In zeven van de negen hoofdstukken worden 
economische modellen geïntroduceerd en getoetst aan empirische gegevens. Ieder 
hoofdstuk behandelt een verschillend aspect van de relatie tussen ondernemerschap en 
economische groei. Gemeenschappelijk in de hoofdstukken is echter dat de relatie 
steeds het land (Hoofdstuk 2, 3, 4, 7 en 8) of de regio (Hoofdstuk 5 en 6) als eenheid 
van analyse heeft. Het laatste hoofdstuk (9) van dit boek is gewijd aan de 
COMPENDIA dataset van EIM. In deze dataset is gepoogd om data over aantallen 
ondernemers te harmoniseren tussen landen (23 OESO landen) en over de tijd (1972-
heden). Het vergelijkbaar maken van aantallen ondernemers in verschillende landen is 
belangrijk. Het gebrek aan geharmoniseerde datasets is namelijk één van de redenen 
waarom empirische ondernemerschapsliteratuur op het niveau van landen niet goed van 
de grond komt. De COMPENDIA dataset wordt ook gebruikt voor de analyse in 
Hoofdstuk 2. 
Behalve door de nadruk te leggen op landen en regio’s, levert dit boek nog op vier 
andere manieren een bijdrage aan de literatuur. Ten eerste wordt het concept van een 
‘optimale’ economische structuur (in termen van het relatieve aantal ondernemers of het 
MKB-aandeel in de economie) geïntroduceerd en wordt het bestaan van een dergelijk 
optimum empirisch getoetst (zie Hoofdstuk 2, 3 en 4). Ten tweede wordt onderzocht in 
hoeverre de invloed van ondernemerschap op economische groei afhankelijk is van het 
ontwikkelingsniveau van een economie (zie Hoofdstuk 2 en 7), de sector van 
economische aktiviteit (zie Hoofdstuk 3, 5 en 8), en de verhouding tussen kwantiteit en 
kwaliteit van de ondernemers in een land of regio (zie Hoofdstuk 6). Ten derde wordt 
uitgebreid aandacht besteed aan statistische meetproblemen. Naast het samenstellen van 
de eerder genoemde COMPENDIA dataset (zie Hoofdstuk 9) zijn voor dit proefschrift 
serieuze inspanningen verricht om geharmoniseerde datasets te construeren op het 
gebied van aantallen ondernemers op land-sector niveau (zie Hoofdstuk 3), en op het 
gebied van aantallen startende bedrijven op regionaal niveau (zie Hoofdstuk 6). Ten 
vierde levert dit proefschrift één van de eerste pogingen om de belangrijkste maatstaf 
van ondernemerschap uit de Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, de ‘Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity’ ratio, empirisch te koppelen aan economische groei (zie 
Hoofdstuk 7).  
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De rol van ondernemerschap in de economie is de laatste 50 jaar sterk veranderd. In de 
periode na de Tweede Wereldoorlog leken ondernemerschap en kleine bedrijven van 
ondergeschikt belang. Grote bedrijven werden gezien als de motor van economische 
groei. Zij konden immers schaalvoordelen uitbuiten op het terrein van de produktie van 
nieuwe economische en technologische kennis. Vanaf de jaren ’70 is het belang van 
ondernemerschap en kleine bedrijven echter toegenomen. Dit blijkt onder meer uit 
stijgende aantallen zelfstandig ondernemers in diverse Westerse landen. Diverse 
ontwikkelingen hebben bijgedragen aan dit toegenomen belang van ondernemerschap. 
De ICT-revolutie en daaruit voortvloeiende nieuwe technologieën hebben de 
schaalvoordelen van de grote bedrijven aanzienlijk gereduceerd. Verder hebben de 
globalisering, de ICT-revolutie en het toegenomen belang van kennis in het 
produktieproces geleid tot een toenemende dynamiek en onzekerheid in de 
wereldeconomie sinds de jaren ‘70. Dit heeft ruimte gecrëeerd voor (groepen) kleine 
bedrijven om bij te dragen aan een voortdurende vernieuwing van de economie. Dit kan 
als volgt worden ingezien. Door de toegenomen onzekerheid in de wereldeconomie 
bestaan er in moderne economieën vaker verschillen van inzicht tussen bazen en 
ondergeschikten (principaal-agent problemen) wat betreft de waardering van nieuwe 
economische kennis. Wanneer de baas een idee voor een nieuw produkt van een 
medewerker niet wil uitvoeren (omdat hij er niets in ziet), kan de medewerker er voor 
kiezen om een eigen bedrijf op te richten en te proberen om zijn idee zelf uit te baten. 
Pas na het starten van het bedrijf blijkt of het idee inderdaad commercieel levensvatbaar 
is. Wanneer in een land of regio vele nieuwe bedrijven proberen om nieuwe ideeën uit 
te baten, zullen uiteindelijk de beste bedrijven (oftewel de beste ideeën) door de markt 
geselecteerd worden en de zwakste bedrijven uit de markt gedrukt worden. Op deze 
manier dragen, op geaggregeerd niveau, de nieuwe bedrijven bij aan een verbetering 
van de kwaliteit van het bedrijvenbestand, en daarmee uiteindelijk aan economische 
groei. 
Wanneer we praten over ondernemerschap is een belangrijke vraag wat hieronder 
verstaan wordt. Er bestaat in de literatuur geen overeenstemming over de definitie van 
ondernemerschap. Vaak wordt gesteld dat het in elk geval drie dimensies omvat: het 
omgaan met risico en onzekerheid, het waarnemen van winstmogelijkheden en het 
bijdragen aan vernieuwing. Voor empirische analyse moet het begrip ondernemerschap 
geoperationaliseerd worden. In dit proefschrift worden de volgende maatstaven voor de 
mate van ondernemerschap in een land of regio gebruikt: het aantal zelfstandig 
ondernemers (Hoofdstuk 2, 3 en 9), het aantal bestaande bedrijven (Hoofdstuk 5), het 
aantal nieuwe bedrijven (Hoofdstuk 6 en 8), het aantal mensen dat eigenaar is van een 
jong bedrijf danwel bezig is met het starten van een nieuw bedrijf (Hoofdstuk 7), en het 
MKB-aandeel in de totale omzet van een land (Hoofdstuk 4). Om in empirisch 
onderzoek ondernemerschap te kunnen koppelen aan economische prestaties, moet ook 
dit laatste begrip geoperationaliseerd worden. In dit proefschrift worden de volgende 
maatstaven voor economische prestaties van een land of regio gebruikt: groei van 
inkomen per hoofd (Hoofdstuk 2), groei van (sectoraal) bruto binnenlands produkt 
(Hoofdstuk 3, 4, 5 en 7) en werkgelegenheidsgroei (Hoofdstuk 6 en 8). 
De inhoud van de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken wordt hieronder beschreven. Het eerste 
hoofdstuk bevat een inleiding op het onderwerp alsmede een korte beschrijving van elk 
hoofdstuk en de conclusies van het proefschrift. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de (tweezijdige) 
relatie tussen zelfstandig ondernemerschap en economische ontwikkeling op macro 
niveau onderzocht. Met behulp van een econometrisch model en een dataset voor 23 
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OESO-landen (inclusief de Verenigde Staten en Japan) over de periode 1976-1996 
wordt onderzocht of en hoe het ‘evenwichtsniveau’ van zelfstandig ondernemerschap in 
een land samenhangt met het niveau van economische ontwikkeling (gemeten als 
inkomen per hoofd). Vervolgens wordt onderzocht of afwijkingen van dit 
evenwichtsniveau op een zeker moment gevolgen hebben voor de economische groei in 
de opvolgende periode. Oftewel, kan het evenwichtsniveau van zelfstandig 
ondernemerschap ook opgevat worden als een ‘optimaal’ niveau? We vinden 
empirische onderbouwing voor een U-vormige evenwichtsrelatie tussen economische 
ontwikkeling en zelfstandig ondernemerschap. Tevens vinden we dat verschillen tussen 
het werkelijke niveau en het evenwichtsniveau van zelfstandig ondernemerschap een 
negatieve invloed hebben op de economische groei. Dit impliceert dat economieën te 
weinig maar ook te veel ondernemers kunnen hebben. In het eerste geval is er 
waarschijnlijk sprake van te weinig concurrentie en te weinig prikkel tot innovatie, 
terwijl in het laatste geval te veel ‘marginale’ bedrijven de markt overspoelen.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt bovengenoemd model uitgewerkt met inachtneming van een 
sectorale component. We bestuderen in hoeverre de resultaten op macro niveau uit 
Hoofdstuk 2 het gevolg zijn van verschillen in sectorstructuur (in termen van de 
aandelen van de industriesector en de dienstensector in een economie) tussen landen. Zo 
is bijvoorbeeld bekend dat het aantal zelfstandig ondernemers in de industrie (relatief) 
lager is dan in de diensten. Een lagere groei op macro niveau veroorzaakt door een 
suboptimaal aantal ondernemers (de zogenaamde ‘groeistraf’) zou daarom in 
werkelijkheid te wijten kunnen zijn aan een suboptimale sectorstructuur, terwijl binnen 
de sectoren het aantal ondernemers wel ‘optimaal’ is. Met het model uit Hoofdstuk 2 
kan dit onderscheid niet worden gemaakt. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt het model geschat met 
sectorale data. De groeistraf van een afwijkend aantal ondernemers blijkt ook binnen 
sectoren geldig te zijn. Verder worden empirische aanwijzingen gevonden dat het 
merendeel van de (OESO) landen in de dataset te weinig zelfstandig ondernemers heeft 
in de industriesector en te veel in de dienstensector. 
Ook Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt of er een groeistraf is op het afwijken van een ‘optimale’ 
economische structuur. In dit hoofdstuk wordt economische structuur echter gemeten in 
termen van het aandeel van kleine en middelgrote bedrijven in de totale economie van 
een land. Gebruikmakend van data voor 17 Europese landen in het begin van de jaren 
’90 vinden we dat landen die hun economische structuur in een sneller tempo hebben 
aangepast in de richting van een hoger aandeel van MKB bedrijven, beloond zijn met 
hogere groeicijfers. Dit betekent dat voor de meeste economieën in de dataset, MKB 
bedrijven een te geringe rol speelden in het begin van de jaren ’90. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de invloed van kennis spillovers op regionaal-economische groei 
onderzocht. Daar waar veel mensen met elkaar in contact komen vinden spillovers 
plaats. Wanneer het gaat om informatie die niet zonder meer voor iedereen toegankelijk 
en begrijpelijk is, spreekt men wel van kennis spillovers. Deze verspreiding van kennis 
vormt een belangrijke bron van economische groei in moderne economieën. Met name 
kleine bedrijven zijn gebaat bij kennis spillovers omdat zij relatief minder eigen 
middelen ter beschikking hebben voor het produceren van nieuwe economische en 
technologische kennis (middels onderzoek en ontwikkeling), in vergelijking met grote 
bedrijven. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt welk type kennis spillovers meer bevorderlijk is 
voor regionaal-economische groei: spillovers binnen sectoren of spillovers tussen 
sectoren. Ook wordt het belang van lokale concurrentie voor regionaal-economische 
groei onderzocht. Op basis van een dataset van Nederlandse regio’s in de periode 1987-
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1995 wordt gevonden dat lokale concurrentie met name belangrijk is voor regionaal-
economische groei in de industrie terwijl spillovers tussen sectoren met name van 
belang zijn voor regionaal-economische groei in de dienstensector. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt de invloed van het aantal startende bedrijven in een regio op de 
werkgelegenheidsgroei in die regio onderzocht. In theorie kan een hoger aantal starters 
leiden tot meer groei (bijvoorbeeld door toegenomen concurrentie) maar ook tot minder 
groei (bijvoorbeeld als het starten van een bedrijf gesubsidieerd wordt en dit leidt tot te 
veel starters met relatief beperkte capaciteiten). In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt de invloed van het 
aantal starters op regionaal-economische groei onderzocht met behulp van een dataset 
voor Britse regio’s in de periode 1980-1998. De resultaten wijzen uit dat regio’s die 
beleid gevoerd hebben op het maximaliseren van het aantal starters -als middel voor het 
bestrijden van werkloosheid- een lagere groei hebben gekend in vergelijking met andere 
regio’s. Ook wordt gevonden dat het algemene effect van een hogere startersratio in de 
jaren ’80, toen het economisch beleid in Groot-Brittannië gericht was op het het 
maximaliseren van het aantal starters (middels het verstrekken van subsidies voor het 
starten van een bedrijf), lager was dan in de jaren ’90. Beide bevindingen trekken de 
doeltreffendheid van dergelijk subsidiebeleid in twijfel. 
In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt de invloed van de Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) ratio op 
economische groei onderzocht voor een steekproef van 36 landen. De TEA ratio is de 
ondernemerschapsmaatstaf van de Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. TEA wordt 
gemeten als het aantal mensen dat eigenaar is van een jong bedrijf danwel bezig is met 
het starten van een nieuw bedrijf, als percentage van de volwassen bevolking. Naast 
vele sterk ontwikkelde landen bevat de dataset van de Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
ook een aantal minder sterk ontwikkelde landen. Hierdoor is het mogelijk om te 
onderzoeken of ondernemerschap een andere rol speelt in meer en minder ontwikkelde 
economieën. Onze empirische exercities wijzen uit dat de TEA ratio invloed heeft op 
economische groei, maar dat deze invloed toeneemt met het ontwikkelingsniveau van 
een economie (gemeten als inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking). Het is denkbaar dat 
ondernemers in meer ontwikkelde landen meer capaciteiten hebben en dat een hoge 
TEA ratio in die landen daarom meer bijdraagt aan economische groei dan een hoge 
TEA ratio in minder ontwikkelde landen. 
Hoofdstuk 8 besteedt aandacht aan de relatie tussen bedrijvendynamiek (starters en 
opheffingen) en werkgelegenheidsgroei op land-bedrijfstak niveau. We gebruiken 
geharmoniseerde data over de aantallen starters en opheffingen voor een selectie van 
snelgroeiende en innovatieve bedrijfstakken in zes ontwikkelde economieën. In onze 
analyse maken we onderscheid tussen het volume van bedrijvendynamiek (volatiliteit) 
en de samenstelling van bedrijvendynamiek (netto-toetreding). Ook onderzoeken we of 
er empirische aanwijzingen zijn voor het bestaan van een ‘optimaal’ niveau van 
bedrijvendynamiek. We vinden positieve werkgelegenheidseffecten zowel voor netto-
toetreding als voor volatiliteit. Deze effecten zijn aanzienlijk sterker voor 
industriesectoren dan voor dienstensectoren. We vinden geen aanwijzing voor het 
bestaan van een ‘optimaal’ niveau van bedrijvendynamiek. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit boek is gewijd aan de COMPENDIA dataset. Deze door 
EIM geconstrueerde dataset bevat geharmoniseerde aantallen ondernemers voor 23 
OESO landen. De dataset bevat reeksen vanaf 1972 en wordt regelmatig geactualiseerd. 
Het gebruik van vergelijkbare aantallen ondernemers in verschillende landen is niet 
vanzelfsprekend omdat landen andere ondernemersdefinities hanteren. Met name de 
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groep directeur-grootaandeelhouders (dga’s) wordt per land verschillend verwerkt in 
werkgelegenheidsstatistieken (in termen van classificatie als werknemer of als 
zelfstandig ondernemer). Dit komt doordat dga’s formeel werknemer zijn van hun eigen 
bedrijf (meestal een besloten vennootschap) maar zich in hun dagelijks werk meer als 
ondernemer manifesteren. De ondernemersdefinitie in COMPENDIA omvat zowel 
directeur-eigenaren van bedrijven zonder rechtspersoonlijkheid (zoals eenmanszaken en 
vennootschappen onder firma) als directeur-eigenaren van bedrijven met 
rechtspersoonlijkheid (zoals besloten vennootschappen). Meewerkende gezinsleden zijn 
uitgesloten van de definitie. Hoofdstuk 9 beschrijft de manier waarop de data 
geharmoniseerd zijn voor de diverse landen.  
Wanneer de diverse hoofdstukken gecombineerd worden, kunnen verschillende 
conclusies worden getrokken. In de meeste studies wordt een positief effect van 
ondernemerschap op economische groei gevonden. Er zijn echter ook uitzonderingen. 
De richting en omvang van het effect hangt af van tenminste drie factoren:  
1) het ontwikkelingsniveau van een economie,  
2) de sector van economische aktiviteit, en  
3) de verhouding tussen kwantiteit en kwaliteit van de ondernemers in een land of regio. 
ad 1) Zowel in Hoofdstuk 2 als in Hoofdstuk 7 worden aanwijzingen gevonden dat de 
invloed van meer ondernemerschap in een land op economische groei afhankelijk is van 
het ontwikkelingsniveau van de economie. Ondernemerschap speelt een andere rol in 
landen in verschillende stadia van economische ontwikkeling. In sterk ontwikkelde 
landen dragen ondernemers en kleine bedrijven bij aan economische groei door hun 
innovatiekracht en hun rol in de vernieuwing van de economie. Zwakkere bedrijven 
worden uit de markt gedrukt door nieuwe bedrijven die innovatiever zijn. De beste 
bedrijven worden door de markt geselecteerd. Dit selectieproces leidt uiteindelijk tot 
economische groei. In minder ontwikkelde landen zijn het met name de grote bedrijven 
die de economie moeten trekken. Door exploitatie van schaalvoordelen en het snel 
absorberen van bestaande technologieën uit meer ontwikkelde landen zorgen de grote 
bedrijven voor groei in deze minder ontwikkelde economieën. De bijdrage aan 
economische groei van ondernemers en kleine bedrijven is in deze economieën kleiner. 
Wel kunnen ze zich in het kielzog van de grote bedrijven ontwikkelen door te leren van 
de grote bedrijven, bijvoorbeeld door als toeleverancier te fungeren. 
ad 2) De uitkomsten van Hoofdstuk 3, 5 en 8 wijzen in de richting van een sterker 
positief effect van ondernemerschap op economische groei in industriesectoren, 
vergeleken met dienstensectoren. Dit hangt vermoedelijk samen met het grotere belang 
van innovatie in de industrie, vergeleken met de diensten. Innovatie in dienstensectoren 
is vaker niet-technologisch en incrementeel van aard terwijl innovatie in 
industriesectoren vaker inspanningen op het gebied van onderzoek en ontwikkeling 
(O&O) vergt en radicaal van aard is. In moderne economieën is radicale innovatie 
belangrijker voor economische groei dan incrementele innovatie. Een gebrek aan 
ondernemerschap en een tekort aan kleine bedrijven is dan relatief schadelijker in 
industriesectoren omdat er te weinig prikkels zijn voor het creëren van radicale 
innovaties. 
ad 3) De conclusie dat het effect ook afhangt van de verhouding tussen kwantiteit en 
kwaliteit van de ondernemers in een land of regio is gebaseerd op Hoofdstuk 6 van dit 
boek. Dit hoofdstuk bevat empirische aanwijzingen dat het subsidiëren van het starten 
van een nieuw bedrijf niet leidt tot de beoogde werkgelegenheidsimpulsen. Wanneer 
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regionale overheden de werkgelegenheid willen stimuleren via subsidies op het starten 
van een bedrijf, dan kan dit individuen aantrekken die een bedrijf starten om de 
verkeerde redenen. Het gaat dan met name om individuen met beperkte capaciteiten die 
niet zozeer intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn om een eigen bedrijf te runnen, maar meer 
geïnteresseerd zijn in de daaraan verbonden subsidie. Zodra de subsidie stopgezet wordt 
gaat het bedrijf vaak alsnog failliet. Uiteindelijk wordt zowel het vertrouwen van de 
betrokken ondernemers als het vertrouwen van de consumenten aangetast, hetgeen leidt 
tot zwakkere economische prestaties van de regio. Economisch beleid dat eenzijdig 
gericht is op het maximaliseren van het aantal ondernemers, zonder oog te hebben voor 
de kwaliteit van de ondernemers, zal daarom waarschijnlijk niet erg succesvol zijn.  
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